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 1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Why study solidarity? 
Solidarity is simultaneously omnipresent and absent. It is omnipresent in research 
articles and public debates. Solidarity is a key concept in political and social theory as 
well as in contemporary politics and societies. One of the major debates concerns 
whether solidarity is needed or in danger, and we can trace the idea back to the 
transformation from feudal to modern societies. The French sociologist Émile 
Durkheim (2012) explored the transformation of social relations from mechanic to 
organic solidarity in modern societies. Solidarity was part of the slogan of the French 
Revolution – ‘Egalité, Liberté, Fraternité’ – to demand human and civil rights as well as 
the self-determination of the people. Solidarity proved to be a central term in the 
labour movement to ground the necessity of a social bond between workers to fight 
against capitalism. Calls to solidarity were also widespread in the 20th century in 
respect of anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as well as in the 
formation of (new) social movements regarding civil rights, women’s equality, and 
anti-nuclear and anti-war issues. A prominent example that even semantically 
subscribes to the concept of solidarity is the Polish trade union Solidarność. It 
challenged the Polish communist state at its foundations and through industrial actions 
and protest, Solidarność triggered major political and social transformations in the 
country in the 1980s. 
At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of 21st century, solidarity is 
often discussed in relation to the impact of globalisation on the solidary bond between 
citizens and on the transformation of the national welfare state. The European 
integration project has also focused on solidarity among nation-states and the potential 
for social cohesion at the international level. Claiming solidarity has a long historical 
tradition and legacy, but most often it refers to claims on transformations, moments of 
crises, and rapid changes or even threats to the current state of affairs. Consequently, it 
seems that solidarity is ubiquitous within the social and political spheres. 
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At the same time, however, one could say that solidarity is absent. There is 
hardly any in-depth discussion and close analysis of what solidarity means, what it 
encompasses, and what constitute its limits and opportunities. Nonetheless, solidarity 
remains a buzzword in public debates and research articles. In this way, the word 
solidarity often serves as a placeholder that stands for multiple different things in 
various disciplines, which produces a vast amount of research and findings that hardly 
take each other into account. The same is true of the public debate. Solidarity is hardly 
spelled out regarding what actors mean, demand, and claim in response to others, or in 
terms of what they demand from others.1 Hence my claim is that solidarity is both 
omnipresent and absent at the same time. 
The aim of the present thesis is to shed light on this phenomenon and further 
explore the idea of solidarity. What does it mean, what kind of solidarity is discussed in 
public debates? Can we identify a single understanding of solidarity that is 
predominant in the public sphere, or is there a plethora of meanings that confuses 
rather than differentiates the idea of solidarity? Or is the idea itself devoid of any 
concrete content, meaning that solidarity has no (more) actual meaning, serving more 
as a rhetorical phrase than a meaningful concept in public discussions? 
Furthermore, the thesis investigates the actor dimension in solidarity debates. 
Who is publicly claiming solidarity? Is it still a leftist concept that is used by social 
democratic, green, and socialist actors to fight capitalism while uniting the labour 
movement in their industrial actions and demonstration? Or do we identify not only a 
widening of the concept, but also an expansion of the constellation of actors to include 
religious groups, civil society groups, activists who call for solidarity and use solidarity 
as a central theme in their protests and (single-issue) mobilisations? What roles do 
national executives, government actors, and other formal institutional actors (in the 
nation-state and beyond) play in claiming solidarity? Are these actors absent from the 
debate? Does solidarity only feature in a certain political spectrum? And finally, how 
can we understand the observation that calls for solidarity and times of great 
transformation seem to intersect? Are times of crisis times of solidarity claims? Does it 
                                                     
1 For instance, in the latest coalition agreement between the CDU, the CSU and the SPD from 
March 2018, solidarity is mentioned 19 times in various policy areas (Bundesregierung 2018). 
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matter what crisis prompts the call for solidarity, or are only specific types of solidarity 
relevant in times of crisis? 
Without seeking to exhaustively answer such questions, this thesis aims to 
provide some responses to these and more general queries. The main objective is to 
illuminate aspects in the research on solidarity that have been largely neglected until 
now and to show what a close study of solidarity in public debates can contribute to 
the understanding of contemporary politics and society. My central argument is that 
solidarity has been hardly analysed in its discursive construction in the public sphere. 
Previous research has focused on macro-structural aspects or on micro-behavioural 
characteristics of solidarity. By focusing on the public claims on solidarity, I will dissect 
the various meanings of solidarity used in public debates in Europe during times of 
crisis. How solidarity is framed and justified by actors is a major building block of the 
thesis. The dissertation will also look at the actor constellation and thereby examine 
who is claiming solidarity with and for whom. Hence, I analyse the framing and actor 
visibility in public solidarity discourses in times of crisis. For this purpose, the study 
focuses on the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis discourse in the European 
Union (EU) member states Germany and Ireland. 
Solidarity is often investigated in (perceived) times of crisis. In general, times of 
crisis are understood as an ‘unstable situation of extreme danger or difficulty’ (Kahler 
and Lake 2013: 10). Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger (1992) state that if a danger lies 
ahead of us, we call for mutual support. We demand help and want to support others 
who are struggling. Solidary actions are often related to struggles, acts of resistance, 
and fights for a shared goal which create a shared value-horizon (Honneth 1992: 208). 
Furthermore, Bayertz (1998: 40–41) indicates that standing together to fight for shared 
interests creates solidarity. He calls such an understanding of solidarity a term of 
political struggle (Kampfbegriff) – people are united by fighting together. In this sense, 
solidarity is constantly rearticulated by its ‘users’ in hard times. In times of crisis, 
people are mobilised to act in solidarity among the members of a group. Consequently, 
if we want to study the concept of solidarity more closely, the focus should be on times 
of crisis. 
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With the Euro crisis and migration crisis, the EU faced two fundamental crises 
that were distinct in their political, social, and economic constellations. However, both 
crises share the public appeal to solidarity. Various actors invoked solidarity and 
demanded solidarity from others in order to deal with and solve the respective crisis. 
The two crisis trajectories also exhibit quite different challenges and different levels of 
country involvement and exposure. Previous research has shown that a lack of state 
power and an (un-)willingness to undertake substantial institutional reforms in the EU 
are both observable in the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis (Biermann et al. 
2019; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2018). Regarding solidarity, the debtor countries 
demanded solidarity from the creditor countries in the Euro crisis and solidarity was 
often depicted as an anti-austerity claim. In the migration crisis, solidarity was one of 
the buzzwords in the public debate. It featured very prominently and was taken up by 
NGOs, politicians and journalists. Nonetheless, the debate about solidarity in the EU 
migration and refugee policy started before the summer of 2015 and only reached its 
peak in the so-called ‘long summer of migration’ (Kasparek and Speer 2015). 
Hence, while a lack of solidarity is often noted by scholars, the call to solidarity 
still resonated in the public discourse in both crises. In this light, the dissertation will 
analyse the solidarity discourse in the German and Irish media in times of crisis. 
Concretely, the present thesis suggests a new conceptual perspective on solidarity by 
investigating the discursive construction of solidarity in the mass media in hard times. 
I argue in Chapter 2 that solidarity is discursively constructed in public claims. 
Solidarity consists of two dimensions – meaning and scale – and both dimensions 
constitute several concepts of solidarity. While solidarity is mostly researched in social 
policy studies or investigated in surveys, the two dimensions of meaning and scale, as 
well as the meaning-making process itself, are hardly considered in these studies. The 
newly suggested meso-discursive perspective affords us the opportunity to analyse 
solidarity claims, to differentiate between meanings and scopes of solidarity, and to 
empirically assess which meanings and scales of solidarity are used in Europe’s 
migration crisis and the Euro crisis. These empirical tasks are undertaken in chapters 3-
5 of the dissertation. 
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The introduction of the thesis is structured as follows. The next section (1.2) 
sheds light on the two crises – the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis – and 
briefly reconstructs the crises’ trajectories. This is crucial in order to highlight their 
differences and to draw out their shared public appeal to solidarity. It also explains the 
rationale for choosing Germany and Ireland as cases for the subsequent empirical 
analysis. The third section (1.3) focuses on the philosophical roots of solidarity and 
maps the research programme on solidarity. It is divided into three perspectives on 
solidarity with the third one being the above-mentioned new perspective on the 
discursive construction of solidarity (see also Chapter 2). The following section (1.4) 
lays out the institutional and ideational dimension of the thesis. It describes two 
approaches (discourse coalition approach and ideational leadership approach) to study 
actors in ideational politics and discusses an approach (coalition magnet approach) 
with which to study the influence of ideas in politics. Section 1.5 outlines the 
methodological pathway of the thesis and shows the advantage of using political 
claims analysis and discourse network analysis. The last section (1.6) offers an 
overview of the remaining chapters of the dissertation as a whole. 
1.2 The EU in times of crisis: The Euro crisis and Europe’s 
migration crisis 
1.2.1 From the global recession to the Euro crisis 
The origins of the Euro crisis can be traced back to the financial and housing crisis in 
the US. The near meltdown of the financial system in the US can be related to the 
collapse of the bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the severe financial 
problems of the investment bank Bear Stearns and the public mortgage service 
company Fannie Mae. These developments had a strong impact on the banking and 
financial sector in Europe, because European and US banks have been heavily 
entangled in their banking activities (Jones et al. 2016; Tooze 2018). Ireland especially 
suffered a severe banking crisis. The Irish government had to bailout the six biggest 
Irish banks in 2008. Otherwise, the Irish banking system would have collapsed which 
would have had profound consequences on the European banking sector. Jones et al. 
(2016: 1023) summarise the Irish situation as follows: ‘The Irish bank bailout eventually 
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shifted more than €62 billion bank liabilities onto the shoulders of Irish taxpayers, 
turning a state that had been a model of fiscal rectitude into a massive debtor that had 
to turn to the EU and IMF for a bailout’. Consequently, and as Figure 1 shows, the Irish 
debt level increased dramatically from a low level of 25 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 
around 130 per cent in 2012/13 (Hardiman and Regan 2013; Roche et al. 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2018a), own illustration (no data for Ireland in 2017). 
 
German, Dutch, French, and British banks also traded with the affected Irish banks. 
The political answer to the increasing level of national debt was a strict austerity 
programme in Ireland, introduced by the ruling government coalition of Fianna Fáil 
and the Irish Green Party (Roche et al. 2017). However, it did not insulate Ireland from 
a severe economic and social shock with rising levels of unemployment and cuts in the 
public sector and in social spending. While the level of national debts rose, the deficits 
in the crisis countries grew too. As we see in Figure 2, the government deficit especially 
Figure 1: General national level of debt in per cent of GDP (2007-17) 
 7 
increased in Greece, Portugal, and even more dramatically in Ireland between 2009 and 
2011. Germany and the Netherlands experienced very moderate deficit increases and 
made a surplus again from 2014 and 2015. Accordingly, while Ireland was hit hard, 
Germany hardly experienced a crisis and established itself as a (new) economic 
powerhouse in the EU. Moreover, it used its economic strength to increase its political 
influence in the EU on monetary and economic issues. 
 
Figure 2: General government deficit, per cent of GDP (2007-17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2018b), own illustration. 
 
While Jones et al. (2016) argue that the EU managed the Euro crisis in a series of ‘failing 
forward’ reforms – that is, incremental reforms that help to contain the crisis in the 
short term, but which create further obstacles that are again dealt with on a short-term 
basis, and so on – other scholars argue that these austerity reforms were implemented 
by the wrong means and had hardly a positive effect on the debtor countries (Blyth 
2015; Matthijs 2016). In particular, Ireland's recovery is rather initiated by FDI-led 
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growth than the adjustments programme by the Troika as studies demonstrate (Brazys 
and Regan 2017; Regan and Brazys 2018). 
Nonetheless, the EU established new institutional structures during the Euro 
crisis. In 2010, the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) were created to provide loans to 
the debtor states and finance the bailouts up to 500 billion Euros. The later European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) is an intergovernmental organisation, based on 
international public law and a treaty among the EU member states, that the Eurozone 
member states established in 2012 so as to create a lasting mechanism for dealing with 
the bailouts and financial assistance to the debtor states (Schelkle 2017). Moreover, the 
so-called Troika/Institutions (European Central Bank, European Commission, and 
International Monetary Fund) have far-reaching competencies in the debtor states with 
regard to budget surveillance and supervision of the bailout programmes in the 
respective countries. On the one hand, this has created a lot of criticism about the 
democratic deficit and weak legitimacy of the Troika, and on the other, it has 
highlighted the decreasing national sovereignty and limited budget autonomy of 
national parliaments (Crum 2013; Jones and Matthijs 2017). Besides the ESM, the 
member states agreed to establish a banking union and create supervisory rights for 
the ECB to avoid another banking collapse. However, this banking union is still 
unfinished; it also lacks transparency and a political instrument to prevent the ‘too big 
to fail’ logic recurring in the next crisis (Tesche 2017). To sum up, the Euro crisis has yet 
to be resolved, the future of the monetary union is still pending, and the crisis has 
deeply affected the domestic politics in the debtor and creditor states of the EU 
(Copelovitch et al. 2016) 
1.2.2 Contested migration and asylum policies in the EU 
The migration crisis in 2015 marked another significant crisis for the EU. The European 
border countries have had to deal with immigration for a long time and harmonising 
national migration policies across EU member states has been on the agenda of EU 
policymaking since the 1990s (Forschungsgruppe Staatsprojekt Europa 2014; Geddes 
2010). Since 2010, the number of incoming asylum seekers is reflected in the trend of 
increasing numbers of asylum applications for the EU in total and for Germany in 
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particular (Figure 3). The delayed peak of the numbers of asylum applications in 2016 
is due to the bureaucratic difficulties in the German and other national migration 
offices dealing with a high number of applications in a short period of time. Hence, 
many applications were dealt with in 2016. Ireland experienced a relative increase in 
asylum applications, but as Table 1 and Figure 3 show, it hardly had any substantial 
increase in absolute numbers in comparison to Germany, Italy, Greece or Hungary. 
 
Figure 3: Asylum applications of non-EU citizens in selected EU member states (2010-
17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018), own illustration. 
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Table 1: Asylum applications of non-EU citizens in selected EU member states (2010-
17) 
 
Germany Ireland Italy Greece Spain Hungary Total (EU-28) 
2010 48,475 1,935 10,000 10,275 2,740 2,095 259,400 
2011 53,235 1,290 40,315 9,310 3,420 1,690 309,000 
2012 77,485 955 17,335 9,575 2,565 2,155 335,400 
2013 126,705 945 26,620 8,225 4,485 18,895 431,100 
2014 202,645 1,450 64,625 9,430 5,615 42,775 627,000 
2015 476,510 3,275 83,540 13,205 14,780 177,135 1,322,800 
2016 745,155 2,245 122,960 51,110 15,755 29,430 1,260,900 
2017 222,560 2,930 128,850 58,650 36,605 3,390 704,600 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018). 
 
Claims on reforming the Dublin system were raised before the crisis in 2015, but 
instead of following the demands from the Southern European countries, Northern 
and Western European countries shaped the EU migration and asylum policies and 
applied their own regulation and norms to the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) (Zaun 2016). Additionally, with recent migration movements following the 
‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, North and Central 
Africa, the number of people trying to cross the Mediterranean has increased 
continuously. The situation in Syria, in particular, became more precarious: The Syrian 
civil war intensified from 2012 onward, the refugee camp capacities in the 
neighbouring countries Jordan and Lebanon were becoming overstretched and the 
UNHCR refugee camps in the region suffered from a financial shortage. This triggered 
a new immigration dynamic in this region and more and more people fled to other 
countries and to regions further away, namely the EU. 
The border countries, especially Greece and Italy, had been hit by the Euro crisis 
and faced comprehensive austerity programmes that had limited the already weak 
bureaucratic administration even further. Thus, the Euro crisis influenced the impact of 
the upcoming migration crisis to some extent and created the political-institutionalist 
context in which the incoming asylum seekers brought another challenge to the EU and 
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the incomplete EU Home and Justice Affairs. While police jurisdiction, law 
enforcement, and the Schengen agreement were continuously developed and 
improved over the years, the Dublin Regulations are still seen as incomplete and 
asymmetrically developed in comparison to the other policy areas (Monar 2014). 
The biggest obstacle is that the Dublin Regulations predominantly focus on 
harmonising asylum procedures throughout the EU and avoiding any type of 
individual abuse of claiming asylum in different countries (whether at the same time or 
consecutively after one procedure has failed). At the same time, the so-called Dublin III 
Regulations, introduced in 2013, state that the country in which an asylum seeker first 
enters EU territory must deal with the asylum application. Moreover, the establishment 
of Frontex as the European border and coast guard police puts a strong emphasis on 
border patrol and border surveillance. These developments have meant that it is almost 
impossible to claim asylum in countries that do not have an external EU border (e. g. 
Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden). The migration movements in the summer 
of 2015 have shown this imbalance and asymmetric responsibility mechanism, and this 
vividly demonstrated the weaknesses of the current CEAS. The movements through 
Southeast European countries ended in Hungary, but then went further to Austria, 
Germany, Sweden, and other countries. This shows that a solidarity mechanism and a 
change of the Dublin regulations are needed that shifts the burden from the border 
countries to all EU member states and creates a fair relocation of refugees across the 
EU. 
In reaction to increasing numbers of sea and/or land arrivals in the EU (Figure 
4), the European Commission introduced a mandatory solidarity mechanism to 
relocate refugees among the EU member states to share responsibility and disburden 
Italy and Greece in September 2015 (European Commission 2015). These are the two 
states that have been affected the most by the high influx of refugees in 2015. 
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Figure 4: Refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe (2014-18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNHCR (2019), own illustration. It shows the number of sea and/or land arrivals in the 
three countries and is not identical to the number of asylum applications in these countries. 
 
Accordingly, suggesting an EU-wide solidarity mechanism to relocate refugees among 
the member states seemed like a good idea, because not only was it publicly embraced 
by various key actors (Chapter 2 and Chapter 5), but it was also established on the 
supranational level of the EU. Still, the national implementation and compliance of this 
EU-wide mechanism was unsuccessful, and it is far from any transition period to reach 
the necessary relocation of 160,000 refugees in total. Hungary and Slovakia even went 
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to sue the EU for introducing the mechanism, 
because they were outvoted by a qualified majority voting procedure in the European 
Council (European Council 2015). The ECJ rejected their complaint and forced them to 
accept the decision (Byrne 2017). Despite this legal conflict, almost every EU member 
state is far from fulfilling their agreed quota (European Commission 2017b). Moreover, 
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a blame game has started between the receiver states and the affected states Italy and 
Greece over whether the receiving states are not willing to take in refugees or Italy and 
Greece have severe bureaucratic and administrative problems dealing with the 
relocation requests from other member states. 
Hence, studying solidarity in Europe’s migration crisis gives us the opportunity 
to analyse an idea that has been quite dominant, put on the institutional-policy agenda 
of the EU, and even voted for by the majority in the European Council but then failed 
in the concrete institutionalisation and implementation in the EU member states in the 
aftermath of the long summer of migration in 2015 (Chapter 5). 
1.2.3 How to study solidarity in times of crisis 
In order to study solidarity as an idea in the two crises, I build upon research that has 
examined successfully implemented ideas such as austerity in the Euro crisis (Blyth 
2015). Looking at solidarity does not mean that I will examine either the winning side 
of the ideational battle or the losing side. Nonetheless, both crises manifest some sort of 
Pyrrhic victory of solidarity. Regarding the Euro crisis, the transfer union was not 
established, the banking union remains incomplete, an EU Marshall Plan as a public 
investment programme has not been realised, and substantial and sustainable debt cuts 
for Greece or Ireland were not accomplished (Jones et al. 2016). Otherwise, scholars 
have argued that solidarity was institutionalised as a by-product of the general Euro 
crisis management (Schelkle 2017), and that the crisis showed the resilience of inner-
European solidarity. In this regard, Schelkle argues that the institutionalisation of the 
ESM led to a solidarity mechanism between the EU member states. 
The same holds true for the migration crisis. Many reform ideas have been 
publicly discussed and the member states are aware of the limitations of the Dublin 
Regulations. A voluntary relocation plan as a European solidarity mechanism was 
established in the migration crisis. Still, any kind of obligatory relocation scheme and 
sharing of responsibility ultimately failed due to resistance from EU member states and 
partisan conflicts within the member states (Zaun 2018). All actions, in one way or 
another, were presented as solidary actions, but they were often linked to other 
concepts that are less solidarity-oriented. 
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In Chapter 5, I will demonstrate that the Euro crisis discourse on solidarity in 
Germany shows a strong entanglement of solidarity and austerity claims, while the 
migration crisis shows the weakening of the pro-solidarity discourse by an increasing 
presence of security and demarcation claims in the wake of the crisis. In this regard, 
solidarity is analysed in its ideational context to show that solidarity is closely linked to 
other concepts. 
Accordingly, solidarity is studied in the two specific cases of Germany and 
Ireland. I have selected these two countries for two reasons: their involvement in the 
crises, and the relational aspect of solidarity. Ireland was strongly impacted by the Euro 
crisis and had to agree to the bailout programme and austerity measures of the Troika. 
As such, Ireland is understood as a debtor state in the Euro crisis. Germany, on the 
other hand, is perceived as the political and economic winner of the Euro crisis, 
because it gained influence in the European Council by its strict political agenda and 
highest amount of credit-giving to the ESM. Germany also did well economically, 
because of its strong export-driven growth and comparatively low wages. So, Germany 
is understood as a creditor state in the Euro crisis. Therefore, Ireland and Germany 
stand for the two main country types in the Euro crisis (Frieden and Walter 2017). With 
regard to solidarity, I conceptualise this relation as receiver and giver of solidarity. In 
times of crisis, actors call for solidarity and need support to deal with the crisis. Ireland 
is understood as a receiver of solidarity from other countries, the EU and international 
organisations. Consequently, calls for solidarity might feature more prominently in the 
Irish case than in German case. Germany, on the other side, is conceptualised as a giver 
of solidarity, because, due to it being less affected by the Euro crisis, Germany is 
expected to support crisis countries and prevent the collapse of the Eurozone. 
The migration crisis shows a different constellation. Ireland was hardly affected 
by any migration movement in Europe in recent years due to its geographical location 
and its opt-out of the Schengen agreement. Asylum seekers have little chance of 
claiming asylum at an Irish border. By contrast, Ireland was one of the main 
destinations for EU citizens during the ‘Celtic Tiger era’ (2000-07), especially in terms 
of the construction industry and for high-skilled tech workers from within the EU. 
During the crisis, the immigration numbers decreased strongly while the emigration 
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numbers rose to a new high (Glynn and O’Connell 2017). Additionally, Ireland defines 
itself as a migration country in which phases of emigration as well as immigration are 
rather normal (Gilmartin 2015), while Germany still struggles to recognise its migration 
past and present. However, Germany has been more strongly affected by migration 
dynamics in recent years, reaching a peak in 2015. Therefore, migration and integration 
policies are strongly contested in the German public (Green 2004). With respect to 
solidarity, Germany is conceptualised as a receiver of solidarity, because it is strongly 
affected by Europe’s migration crisis and demands support and help from others. 
Ireland, on the other side, is understood as a giver of solidarity, because it does not 
have to deal with a high number of refugees, but is expected to help and act in 
solidarity with others. Thus, we find altered case constellations in Europe’s migration 
crisis and the Euro crisis, respectively. 
The present study considers these different constellations for the 
conceptualisation and analysis of the cases and empirical material by taking into 
account the affectedness of the country and the specific position they occupy in the 
solidary relation between Ireland and Germany, and whether these aspects make a 
difference for the discursive construction of solidarity and its related framing 
strategies. These starting descriptions and claims require further clarification and in-
depth discussion with regard to two main aspects: first, I elaborate on the 
understandings of solidarity, and second, I highlight the role of agency and ideas in 
political processes. These two aspects guide the dissertation project as a whole and are 
discussed in the following two sections of the introduction. 
1.3 Mapping solidarity 
1.3.1 The philosophical roots of solidarity 
The term ‘solidarity’ is widely used in everyday language, policy papers, as well as in 
academic texts. It is a broadly shared concept in European societies and languages 
(Schmale 2017). The origins of the word can be traced back to the Roman legal phrase 
‘obligatio in solidum’ in Ancient times, which is a liability statement: a member of a 
group is responsible for its debts, and the group is responsible for the single member 
(Bayertz 1998). In this regard, solidarity has its semantic roots in the law (Brunkhorst 
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2002). However, solidarity could have had another Latin origin, namely ‘solidus’, 
which means dense or firm (Brunkhorst 2002: 10–12; Wildt 1998: 210). This might 
explain why solidarity often stands for the social cohesion of a group or a society in 
modern times (Section 1.3.3). Only if the social bond between the members of the 
group is solid can they support and help each other.2 
Despite these semantic origins, the meaning of solidarity has gradually mutated 
and evolved as a result of historical, social, and political circumstances (Bayertz 1998; 
Brunkhorst 2002; Münkler 2004; Schieder 1972). For this study, the different historical 
pathways and changes in the meaning of solidarity are less important than the fact that 
solidarity has no universal and uncontested meaning. Rather, the contestation of 
solidarity is taken into account, highlighting that actors make sense of concepts and 
ideas in their own way and can disagree with one another. Considering concepts as 
contested (Gallie 1956) underlines the fact that actors argue about the proper use and 
criticise and defend their understanding. Or, as Gallie (1956: 172) points out: ‘More 
simply, to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to 
recognise that one’s own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses’. 
Consequently, what solidarity means is deeply contested and a matter of discursive 
struggles, specific actor constellations, and historical and social circumstances. 
While solidarity has recently become a commonly used term in empirical 
research, it is philosophically not as relevant and well theorised as justice or freedom. 
As Frankfurt (1987: 24) claims in an early observation: 
In the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University (which houses 8.5 million volumes), 
there are 1,159 entries in the card catalog under the subject heading ‘liberty’ and 326 
under ‘equality.’ Under ‘fraternity,’ there are none. This is because the catalog refers to the 
social ideal in question as ‘brotherliness.’ Under that heading there are four entries! Why 
does fraternity (or brotherliness) have so much less salience than liberty and equality? 
Perhaps the explanation is that, in virtue of our fundamental commitment to 
individualism, the political ideals to which we are most deeply and actively attracted 
have to do with what we supposed to be the rights of individuals, and no one claims a 
right to fraternity. It is also possible that liberty and equality get more attention in certain 
quarters because, unlike fraternity, they are considered to be susceptible to more or less 
formal treatment. In any event, the fact is that there has been very little serious 
                                                     
2 Brunkhorst (2002: 30–33) claims that the idea of solidarity can even be traced back to the Greek 
term friendship – a personal bond in the Greek polis and a relation to support each other on an 
equal level. 
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investigation into just what fraternity is, what it entails, or why it should be regarded as 
especially desirable. 
Frankfurt’s claim remains valid to some extent, even today. In contrast to the 
aforementioned terms, solidarity is not part of the canonical readings in political theory 
and philosophy. In recent handbooks on the subject, entries on solidarity (or close 
synonyms such as ‘fraternity’ or ‘brotherhood’) are missing (Dryzek et al. 2006; Estlund 
2012; Göhler et al. 2011), which gives support to my opening argument that solidarity is 
rather absent in the scholarly debate. Nevertheless, this research gap has been filled in 
recent years in the sense that solidarity is mentioned more often in research articles. 
Figure 5 provides an overview of the recent trend on solidarity research. In this regard, 
Frankfurt’s claim on the almost complete absence of solidarity research is corroborated 
until the 1990s. Afterwards, there has been a growing interest in the concept and 
related political and social phenomena. 
 
Figure 5: Number of texts on solidarity (1928-2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: It shows the number of texts (n=3626) in the Scopus database that entail ‘solidarity’ in the 
title. Research article, book chapters and books are included in Scopus. 
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With regard to the more recent conceptual development of solidarity, Schieder (1972: 
563) argues that solidarity is a rather modern term, which was invented after the 
French Revolution3 and the European Enlightenment. It refers to the first tendencies of 
secularisation, (liberal) humanism, and the differentiation of modern societies. 
Solidarity became a common societal term in the middle of the 19th century (Schieder 
1972). For instance, in the French case, the solidarism approach was relatively 
prominent in the 19th century, which sought to reconcile socialist and liberal ideas 
(Béland 2009; Große Kracht 2015; Hayward 1959). While some authors argue that 
solidarity contains a universal tendency based on the aforementioned developments 
(Brunkhorst 2002; Habermas 1990; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992), others have 
questioned this by emphasising the particularism of solidarity. 
The latter argue that it refers to a limited group, because of its relational and 
reciprocal nature. To act in solidarity, so the critics claim, means to establish a concrete 
relationship between the giver and receiver of solidarity wherein an interaction takes 
place that cannot be universalised. Showing solidarity requires a concrete other and 
this is necessarily a limited group. As Richard Rorty notes, ‘feelings of solidarity are 
necessarily a matter of which similarities and dissimilarities strike us as salient, and 
that such salience is a function of a historically contingent final vocabulary’ (2007: 192). 
In this respect, the critics claim that the universal solidarity theorists set solidarity on a 
par with justice, which is a universal and moral principle (Beckert et al. 2004; Kersting 
1998: 413–415).4 If we follow the conceptual path that solidarity is a particularistic 
concept, then the different semantics and varying scopes of solidarity have to be 
                                                     
3 There is an argument about the appearance of fraternity in the declaration of the French 
Revolution in 1789 (besides liberty and equality). Schieder (1972: 565–566) and Brunkhorst 
(2002) refer to that date as important for the fraternity term, while Munoz-Dardé (1998: 148) 
claims that fraternity was missing in the original text of the French Declaration of 1789. She 
claims that its first mention was not until the constitution of 1848. In the original text of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, approved by the National Assembly of France on 26th August 
1789, solidarity is in fact not mentioned (National Assembly of France 1789). Still, the phrase 
‘egalité, liberté, fraternité’ was one of the main slogans amid the tumultuous days of the French 
Revolution. 
4 Contrary to his former claims on the equivalence and morality of solidarity and justice 
(Habermas 1990), Habermas indicates in a recent text that justice and solidarity are not the 
same, but they can refer to each other. He recognises that his first statement on the matter 
focuses too strongly on moral (universal) standards and bears the tendency to depoliticise 
solidarity. Accordingly, Habermas (2013) conceptualises solidarity as supererogatory right. 
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empirically investigated more carefully. Moreover, solidarity should then be 
empirically examined in different contexts in order to scrutinise the former claim and 
assess the variance and boundedness of solidarity. 
I show that there are two main paradigms in solidarity research. I call them the 
macro-structural and the micro-behavioural perspective on solidarity. While the first 
looks at welfare state institutions and social policies as a form of institutionalised 
solidarity, the latter is concerned with individual agents and collective actors who have 
specific attitudes and behaviour. Both research perspectives yield valuable insights into 
solidarity and are not criticised per se for their particular viewpoint on solidarity. The 
contribution of this dissertation is to complement these two paradigms with a third 
approach that looks at the meso-discursive side of solidarity. More concretely, the 
discursive construction of solidarity should be considered as a third perspective on 
solidarity. It offers a unique way of studying the construction of solidarity via 
communication and, as such, it is able to capture debates about the institutionalisation 
of solidarity in the nation-state or regional integration projects as well as discussions 
about a weakening or strengthening of (solidary) attitudes and the social bond among 
citizens. Before we examine this new perspective in greater detail (see also Chapter 2), 
let us focus on the macro-structural and micro-behavioural perspectives in the 
following. In doing so, we can clarify the main aspects of both research streams, 
identify what is missing in both approaches, and set out why it is necessary to develop 
the meso-discursive approach. 
1.3.2 The macro-structural perspective on solidarity 
The research on solidarity of the first perspective deals with welfare state institutions 
and social policies in OECD countries. The welfare state is understood as 
‘institutionalised solidarity’ (Gelissen 2000). The focus, then, is on how structural 
solidarity decreases or increases due to changes in the environment, whether a 
transformation of the welfare state is observable and what effects this has for the 
solidarity project of the welfare state (Béland 2009; Berger 2005; Boräng 2015).5 As Arts 
                                                     
5 A similar approach is taken by Brunkhorst (2002) and recently by Jones and Matthijs (2017) by 
linking solidarity with democracy and democratic legitimacy. As Jones and Matthijs (2017: 185) 
put it: ‘Why do democratic institutions struggle to maintain their vitality and legitimacy in hard 
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and Gelissen (2001: 283) reframe a central claim by Esping-Anderson, the ‘welfare 
states […] have always promised social “solidarity of the people”’. Understanding the 
welfare state as a solidarity mechanism shows the social integration function of this 
institution. It is ‘a matter of altruistic, one-sided transactions, of helping those 
incapable of helping themselves’ (Leitner and Lessenich 2003: 329). 
It underlines the structural aspect of solidarity that creates relations between 
actors and the welfare state. The social insurance scheme is just such an institutional 
arrangement, which provides an exchange and can be seen as a cornerstone of welfare 
state politics. It is depersonalised, because the exchange mechanism works for every 
contributor and recipient of the insurance scheme. As long as an individual is a 
member of the social insurance programme, they benefit from it (and pay for it too). 
Nevertheless, the solidarity welfare mechanism also covers the costs for specific groups 
that have hardly contributed to some insurance schemes such as unemployment 
payment for people who have not had a job. Here the idea of reciprocity comes in and 
there is an expectation that these people will contribute to the welfare state later when 
they do have a job.6 
Although solidarity has often been invoked in previous studies, scholars have 
seldom engaged in a discussion of the meaning of solidarity. If solidarity is specified, 
its attribute is often ‘social’. In this regard, social solidarity has a double or mixed 
meaning. On the one hand, it stands for the welfare state and that the welfare state 
provides social solidarity (Baldwin 1990). On the other, social solidarity is a substitute 
for terms like ‘social bond’ or ‘social glue’ between the members of a society (section 
1.3.3). 
The research on welfare solidarity was challenged in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, because the national boundedness of social solidarity was reconsidered (Börner 
                                                                                                                                                           
times? […] [W]e identify a loss of solidarity as the root cause of Western political dysfunction 
over the past decade’. This perspective shares the macro-structural approach and the emphasis 
on the strength or weakness of a (national) social bond for societies (and democracy). 
6 This reciprocity is challenged in the European Union, because recent legal decisions establish 
new restriction for the access to welfare benefits to EU citizens in EU member states (Farahat 
2015). Certain rules of exclusion also apply in the national welfare state in which refugees or 
disabled persons are partially seen as ‘undeserving’ of social benefits (Sales 2002; Trenz and 
Grasso 2018). 
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2013; Ferrera 2006; Mau 2005b). Social solidarity was investigated in the context of the 
nation-state and this was often the limit of the investigation. One reason for this is that 
social policies are predominantly shaped in the national territory, while no EU social 
policy has existed to date (Martinsen and Vollaard 2014). Accordingly, there was said to 
be an absence of solidarity in the European Union. This was challenged by several 
academics who claimed that scholars have to take off their national solidarity glasses 
and consider the European context if they want to examine European solidarity 
(Börner 2013; Mau 2005b). Mau explicitly refers to other institutional arrangements that 
can be understood as solidarity mechanisms. For instance, the union citizenship can be 
conceptualised as a social bond among European citizens. Being a European citizen 
gives duties and rights and thus a certain belonging that can create a kind of 
transnational European solidarity. Moreover, the cohesion, investment, and structural 
funds of the EU are understood as solidary mechanisms redistributing money and 
resources among the European member states and decreasing the inequality among the 
countries and within the regions of a country (Copsey 2015). 
To sum up, the macro-structural perspective on solidarity is chiefly concerned 
with social solidarity in the national welfare state. Sometimes the scope of this 
perspective is extended to include European solidarity. However, this 
conceptualisation of national or European social solidarity is too vague. Therefore, I 
suggest further broadening the scope and considering various scales of (social) 
solidarity. If solidarity is analysed in its structural and institutional manifestations, 
then, first, it is worth distinguishing between local, national, supranational, and 
intergovernmental scales of solidarity. Second, the macro-structural perspective on 
solidarity is still focused on institutions and structural arrangements. The interplay of 
institutions and procedures is investigated in terms of whether they provide the 
ground for solidarity or are the result of social solidarity acts. Hence, the public appeal 
to solidarity, the claim to act in solidarity hardly enters into the macro-structural 
perspective. It is rather assumed that certain social policy instruments create solidarity 
and that the European treaties are calls for the same European solidarity. This implicit 
focus on the output legitimation of solidarity could be complemented by also looking 
at the input legitimation strategies by actors. It is worth exploring how actors promote 
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and justify their understanding of solidarity in the public sphere in order to show how 
actors make sense of the call to solidarity. We will come back to this in section 1.3.4 of 
the introduction. 
1.3.3 The micro-behavioural perspective on solidarity 
Solidarity from the second perspective is primarily an attitude or a behaviour that 
actors express (Berger 2005: 14–15; Kaufmann 2005). Specific interests and preferences, 
as well as norms and values, are taken into account to explain the (non-)solidary 
actions of individuals and groups. The focus is on the active engagement of the people 
in the welfare state that produces solidarity. This national identification is then 
understood as a social bond, that is, solidarity among the people (Mau 2005b; Offe 
1998). 
Attitudes towards the welfare state or immigration are considered to measure 
solidarity in the national population. Are social benefits for all social groups more 
accepted in homogenous or heterogeneous populations, and do we find stronger in-
group solidarity than solidarity with strangers in the welfare state? Van Oorschot 
(2000) demonstrates that, in the Dutch case, the deservingness of financial support 
depends largely on one’s status and belonging to a social group. Elder people or people 
who are not able to work (physically and/or psychically) are more openly granted 
social benefits than people who are not willing to work. On the ‘giver side’, higher 
educated people with a higher socio-economic status are more willing to give benefits 
to this group than less educated people with a lower socio-economic status. The results 
underline that people do not give solidarity in a universal manner, but rather 
selectively and conditionally. In a similar way, Scheepers and Grotenhuis (2005) argue 
about donating money to the poor. They argue that this is understood as a solidary 
action and that people who have a higher income, a higher educational level, and are 
politically left-leaning are more likely to donate than others. In this regard, solidarity 
stands for social cohesion and the thickness of the social bond among the people, but as 
demonstrated, the strength of the social bond depends on the concrete relation between 
social groups. 
While some scholars have argued that national and European identity are 
exclusive, other studies have demonstrated that they form multiple layers in a complex 
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identification process (Jones 2014; Liebert 2016; Risse 2010). In fact, the stronger 
identification with the EU increases the likelihood of supporting EU social policy 
competencies. Furthermore, cultural openness, appreciating diversity and cultural 
tolerance increases the support of European transnational redistribution among EU 
citizens (Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Gerhards et al. 2018; Kuhn et al. 2018; Mau 2005a). 
This supports the previous claim that solidarity is socially bounded. People are asked 
to act in solidarity with humans in need or should go on strike to support the other 
workers and labour negotiations (Manatschal and Freitag 2014; Pernicka and Hofmann 
2015). It is a context in which people are mobilised to act in solidarity or are requested 
to think about their solidarity attitudes. 
Here again, we find a Europeanisation of this perspective by focusing not only 
on types of national welfare states, but also on the European level and attitudes 
towards a European welfare state (Gerhards et al. 2016; Mau 2005a). These attitudes 
are, nonetheless, dependent on the national welfare state and how much national 
solidarity people know from their familiar social policies. As Mau argues, there is 
either the hope of an upgrade towards more social benefits and a better safety net, or 
the fear of a downgrade because the current national institutions already provide all 
the important solidary mechanisms. Still, the nation-state is very important as the 
context for belonging to the in-group. This then feeds back into the sharing or 
redistribution of resources among the in-group, or indeed the refusal to share and 
redistribute resources with the out-group (Mau 2005a; Mewes and Mau 2013; Thomann 
and Rapp 2018). Moreover, researchers have also found that (German) citizens were 
critical of the bailout programme during the Euro crisis and would have preferred to 
give less money to the crisis countries due to their fear that the economic and financial 
burden for Germany might become too high. Besides having a left-leaning political 
orientation, having altruistic (and cosmopolitan) attitudes does, in fact, increase the 
individual support for the bailout programme and the redistribution of resources 
among EU citizens (Bechtel et al. 2014; Kuhn et al. 2018). This goes hand in hand with 
the above-mentioned idea that solidarity is bound and conditionally given to others.  
Besides the type of welfare states, Ciornei and Recchi (2017) have demonstrated 
that cross-border interactions of Europeans foster European solidarity in times of crisis. 
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By dividing solidarity into its international (among member states) and transnational 
(among individuals) forms, they show that supporting equality principles and having a 
cosmopolitan attitude increases one’s support for transnational and international 
solidarity. As they state: ‘political beliefs in equality and cultural openness are the 
pillars of transnational solidarity’ (Ciornei and Recchi 2017: 15). Nevertheless, having 
transnational experiences and interactions does not automatically lead to European 
solidarity, as their results indicate (see also Calhoun 2002; Deutschmann et al. 2018). 
The micro-behavioural approach considers solidarity on the individual level. It 
investigates the beliefs, attitudes, and actions of people and collective actors. It mainly 
focuses on social solidarity as a proxy for (expected) redistributive behaviour, as well 
as on cultural solidarity as favouring certain norms and sets of beliefs. Hence, it 
investigates two meanings of solidarity with the predominant scale being the national 
scale, even though the European scale has been taken into account in more recent 
studies. Conceptually, meaning and scale are often conflated in these studies with less 
attention given to how meaning and scale overlap, differentiate or conflate.   
1.3.4 A new avenue: The meso-discursive perspective on solidarity 
After discussing the macro and micro approach to solidarity and showing their 
limitations with regard to the dimensions of meaning and scale, I sketch out the meso-
discursive approach to solidarity. This approach conceptualises solidarity as a 
contested concept (Gallie 1956). Actors interpret and frame the concept and disagree 
about its understanding. These framing processes and discursive constructions of 
solidarity are the conceptual building blocks of the meso approach. Framing theory 
informs the meso approach by highlighting the selection and salience processes that 
underpin framing (Entman 1993). While some frames appear more often in the debate, 
others are left out entirely. Actors select frames in their public claims in order to 
legitimise their actions and mobilise the public. By doing so, the public debate is 
structured through the selection of frames, making them more salient than other 
frames in public debates. With regard to the meso-discursive approach, this entails that 
meanings and scales of solidarity might be more or less visible in public discourses and 
actors might more frequently evoke a certain meaning or refrain from using a certain 
understanding of solidarity. 
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In order to discern the discursive construction process of solidarity, I suggest 
examining the dimensions of meaning and scale. These two dimensions constitute the 
concepts of solidarity. While the meaning of solidarity focuses on the content of a 
solidarity claim, the scale of solidarity refers to the social boundedness of the claim 
(whether it is linked to local, national or global groups/contexts). 
The aim of the meso approach is thereby to delineate the numerous concepts of 
solidarity used in pubic and academic debates, and to offer a new perspective on what 
solidarity means. Solidarity is differentiated into six meanings, with a seventh meaning 
that refers to solidarity in an ex negativo manner. The seventh meaning is named misuse 
of solidarity and refers to claims that directly contest the call to solidarity in the first 
place. The solidarity action is rejected and delegitimised by arguing that it is not a valid 
reference point. The seven meanings of solidarity are listed below in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Seven meanings of Solidarity 
Meanings Description 
Political solidarity Setting up new political mechanisms and instruments in a cooperative 
way 
Social solidarity Redistributing resources and people and groups volunteering 
Cultural solidarity Arguing for a shared identity and norms  
Legal solidarity Liability of members based on the signing of treaties and agreements 
Economic solidarity Support in the form of public investments and growth of the economy 
Monetary solidarity Risk-sharing and the reduction or share of sovereign debts to help 
others 
Misuse of solidarity Questioning the legitimacy of the call to solidarity 
Note: The same table is included in Chapter 2.2.5. 
 
Besides the meaning dimension of solidarity, the second dimension of the meso-
discursive approach to solidarity is that of scale. The scale is hardly considered as a 
unique dimension in the research on solidarity. It is either not mentioned in the 
solidarity research on welfare states and social policies, indirectly presupposing that 
solidarity can only be investigated on the national scale; or the scale becomes the only 
attribute of solidarity which in turn blurs the meaning dimension. Then, the debate 
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shifts to whether or not European solidarity is achievable and under what conditions. 
However, calling every solidarity beyond the nation-state (in the EU) European hardly 
helps to locate post-national solidarity claims and it is then less clear in terms of which 
meaning of solidarity is deployed. Since the research is then still concerned with kinds 
of social solidarity, the potential conceptual opening of solidarity does not hold true. 
Consequently, I suggest to take into account various scales of solidarity and then 
openly investigate on which scale solidarity is claimed. The following bullet points 
give an overview about the scales of solidarity: 
 local 
 national 
 international 
 transnational 
 global 
This gives a first insight into what kind of scales are suggested for the meso-discursive 
approach. A more detailed overview of scales and sub-scales of solidarity, which is also 
linked to the empirical basis of the thesis, is presented in Chapter 2. As I demonstrate, 
there are previous accounts on the framing of solidarity. Most often, solidarity is one 
frame among others in studies on the content and structure of parliamentary debates 
and media debates. Especially with regard to the recent Euro crisis, solidarity featured 
prominently in framing studies (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Galpin 2017; Wonka 2016). 
However, the conceptualisation of solidarity is rather generic in these studies. It mixes 
cultural and social meanings of solidarity and hardly discusses the different scales that 
solidarity can encompass. For example, Wonka operationalises solidarity on the 
transnational scale among citizens in different EU member states, while Closa and 
Maatsch understand solidarity as a means to redistributive justice among EU member 
states. Either reducing solidarity to one of the meanings, or subsuming solidarity 
claims under one of the concepts, fails to consider the various meanings and scales of 
solidarity. It also does not reflect the different implications of such a narrow 
understanding. 
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If only the redistribution of resources is considered as solidarity, then struggles 
of recognition, rights, and identity are failed to be acknowledged as solidarity 
struggles. Access to resources might be related to having certain rights or belonging to 
a certain social group and this in turn will affect who can claim or demand solidarity 
from others. Moreover, solely focusing on cultural aspects of solidarity struggles does 
not reflect the concrete material gains and losses in solidarity conflicts. Acting in 
solidarity can mean that distributional conflicts around the outcome of certain political 
processes arise. Whether insurance or welfare programmes work and support people 
in need does not just rely on certain rights or identities; it also relies on the resources, 
goods, and money that is distributed/allocated in order to compensate and equalise 
negative effects (e. g. unemployment). 
The meso-discursive approach to solidarity is applied in Chapters 3–5 with 
varying points of focus. The strongest emphasis is on the meaning dimension, 
demonstrating that actors use different understandings of solidarity in the respective 
discourses on the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis. To a lesser degree, the scale 
dimension is also taken into account. For instance, Chapters 4 and 5 note that not only 
members of government are strongly present in both crises discourses, but that they 
also refer most to the intergovernmental scale of political solidarity. Consequently, 
other accounts of solidarity – such as a transnational cultural solidarity – become less 
visible in the discourse on Europe’s migration crisis (Chapter 2). 
1.4 Studying ideas in institutionalist settings 
1.4.1 The role of ideas in institutionalism 
Politics works within institutional settings. Institutionalist approaches focus on the role 
of institutions – especially intermediate/intermediary institutions such as trade unions, 
parties or interest groups – in politics and their influence on the political decision-
making process. The three main institutionalist approaches are rational choice, 
historical, and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Since the beginning 
of the 21st century, discursive institutionalism (DI) has been developed as a fourth 
institutionalist approach by scholars in the field of comparative political economy. 
Mostly, the historical institutionalism (HI) approach was taken as the starting point and 
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main reference point for criticism in order to develop an ideational research 
programme (Blyth 2002; Hay 2006; Schmidt 2008).  
Two main aspects regarding historical institutionalism are often criticised (Blyth 
2002; Blyth 2003; Hay 2011; Schmidt 2008; Schmidt 2011; Schmidt 2012). First, HI is 
criticised for being too static. It focuses on continuity rather than change, and contains 
a bias towards a status of institutional equilibrium. HI mainly emphasises institutional 
constraints that determine what is (im-)possible. This results in a ‘rule-following logic’ 
(Schmidt 2008: 314) and a strong focus on path dependency. Institutions are most often 
seen as thresholds and obstacles demonstrating why agents could not change the 
historically evolved institutions and why new ideas could not be successful in 
institutional settings. Second, ideas are not seen to be relevant; rather, the institutional 
rules and conventions are prioritised. The HI approach considers ideas as powerful if 
key actors and major gatekeepers push for new ideas. As a result, HI studies mainly 
follow an interest-based and actor-centred approach and give less room to ideational 
explanations.7 
That said, HI scholars already argued in the 1990s that ideas – besides interests 
and institutions – should play a bigger role in the analysis of the political process (Hall 
1997; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). For instance, specific economic ideas might influence 
the bargaining process of the employer’s associations with trade unions, while new 
scientific findings might prompt a re-assessment of policy recommendations. One 
might also think of national cultures and historical heritage, which influence the 
actions and knowledge of actors. Historical institutionalists have focused on the 
interaction of ideas and material interests in institutional settings and how institutions 
are shaped by ideas since the mid-1980s (Checkel et al. 2016: 6–8; Thelen and Steinmo 
1992: 22–25; Weir 1992). 
In a seminal case study, Hall demonstrates that policymakers use certain ideas 
to promote their policies. Hall calls this ideational framework a policy paradigm (Hall 
1993; Schellinger 2016). Policy change occurs with respect to the political constellation 
of the involved policymakers, their concrete positional influence in the process, and 
                                                     
7 HI scholars are well aware of these limitations and have reflected on the prospects of historical 
institutionalism (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 13–15).  
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levels of uncertainty due to external factors. These three conditions influence the 
establishment, stability, and change of policy paradigms. Hall shows how 
Keynesianism, monetarism, and the related ideas behind these macroeconomic 
paradigms change in the economic policymaking process in the UK. Another important 
study of ideas in the historical institutionalism framework is provided by Sheri Berman 
(1998). She looks at the German social democratic party (SPD) and the Swedish social 
democratic party (SAP) in the interwar period of the 20th century and explains the 
different paths that both parties have taken: the SAP as the most dominant social 
democratic party after the Second World War in Europe, while the SPD struggled to 
find its political agenda until the 1960s. Berman takes an ideational approach to 
demonstrate that different perceptions, belief systems, and key ideas have shaped the 
parties’ preferences and have set the agenda to be either more (SAP) or less (SPD) 
successful in their development and electoral turnout.  
Accordingly, Hall (1997) claims that the combination of an institutional-based 
and ideas-oriented approach is one of the future paths to be taken (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992: 27–28). In particular, the question of representation has been neglected so far 
(Hall 1997: 193–196). Who is represented in the decision-making process, and how? 
And what does it tell us about the economic preferences and policy output? How are 
political decisions interpreted differently and what does it tell us about the dynamics 
of politics? The discursive institutionalism seems to be a response to Hall’s claim on the 
future of institutionalist analyses.8  
1.4.2 Discursive institutionalism 
The basic premise of discursive institutionalism (Hay 2006; Schmidt 2008) is that the 
distinct role of ideas in political processes should be investigated more carefully. 
Hence, what Vivien Schmidt calls discursive institutionalism can be understood as ‘an 
umbrella concept for the vast range of methodological approaches that take ideas and 
discourse seriously’ (Schmidt 2009: 404). Ideas help us to understand our environment, 
                                                     
8 In a recent study, Blyth et al. (2016) demonstrate that ideational researchers strongly engage 
with historical institutionalist accounts (by citing them), while historical institutionalist scholars 
mainly focus on HI itself or towards rational choice institutionalism (by citing them). This 
means that the exchange, combination, and learning process between ideational and historical 
institutionalist research is rather one-sided. 
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guide our actions, and ‘help us to think about ways to address problems and 
challenges that we face and therefore are the cause of our actions’ (Béland and Cox 
2011b: 4; Blyth 2003). Recent ideational research goes beyond the initial claim that 
‘ideas matter’ and investigates how ideas matter so as to understand and explain 
policy decisions and power structures in discourses (Béland et al. 2016; Mehta 2011). 
Thus, discursive institutionalism is rather ‘concerned with the substantive content of 
ideas and the interactive processes of discourse and policy argumentation in 
institutional context’ (Schmidt 2012: 85). Institutions are seen as spaces for (contingent) 
political struggle about ideas that are not static ‘but constantly re-presented by 
proponents and opponents of change’ (Boswell and Hampshire 2017: 147). 
If we understand politics as a (non-violent) struggle between (collective) actors 
about various interpretations of political problems and their solution, the 
(re)construction of meaning is crucial. The discursive interactions between actors and 
ideas have to be considered for understanding and explaining political practices in 
institutional settings (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 32; Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Hay 
2011). Actors construct their own rationale by dealing with problems, which cannot 
just be deduced from material factors or self-interest. As Maarten Hajer (1995: 43) 
points out: 
The political conflict is hidden in the question of what definition is given to the problem, 
which aspects of social reality are included and which are left undiscussed. In this respect 
social constructivists have shown that various actors are likely to hold different 
perceptions of what the problem ‘really’ is. 
The discursive institutionalist approach does not assume that there are pre-defined 
interests that are fixed and can only be reversed through ‘external shocks’. Instead, 
communicative exchange in institutional settings enables and constrains actors’ 
interests and might stand in contradiction to previous claims. The process of 
deliberation and using various justifications can be understood and explained by 
looking at different interpretations by political actors. Such change in ideas and public 
discourses can be an indicator of incremental change in institutions, as well as changes 
in the background philosophy of actors (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Schmidt 2008; 
Schmidt 2012). 
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To sum up, discursive institutionalism provides a framework to analyse ideas in 
political processes. Even though Schmidt claims that including a discourse perspective 
in discursive institutionalism brings agency in to the picture (Schmidt 2008: 309) – 
defined as the communicative actions of agents – others have criticised the conceptual 
lack of actors and the minor relevance of agency within discursive institutionalist 
settings (Boswell and Hampshire 2017). To this end, further conceptual clarification is 
provided by extending the discursive institutionalism approach. Regarding the 
relevance of actors, Maarten Hajer’s (1995) discourse coalition approach and Stiller’s 
(2010) ideational leadership concept are applied to the ideational research framework 
in this dissertation. With regard to ideas, the coalition magnet concept by Béland and 
Cox (2016) is integrated into and partially extended for the dissertation. This recent 
contribution not only helps to theorise the role of ideas in discursive politics, but also 
provides conceptual leverage to translate the theoretical approaches into measurable 
concepts for the empirical analysis.  
1.4.3 Discourse coalitions, ideational leaders and coalition magnets 
Recent studies have called for greater recognition of the relevance of agency and how 
actors shape and reformulate ideas in discursive institutionalist approaches 
(Carstensen 2011; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Stiller 2010). Actors have a relative 
autonomy to articulate ideas that might even conflict with their basic political ideology 
for a certain time period (with the goal of accomplishing a certain policy outcome). 
Such ideational autonomy could lead to a new combination of ideas that are selected 
and formulated by actors in order to convince other actors. Boswell and Hampshire 
(2017) demonstrate how German and British politicians used their ideational autonomy 
to change the national immigration policy at the beginning of the 2000s. Thus, 
ideational research is not only about the relevance of ideas; it is also about actors, their 
conflicts and cooperative behaviour in discursive processes. Patterns of conflict and 
cooperation in politics emphasise the role of actors and the relations of actors to each 
other. In the following, two complementary approaches are presented and discussed 
with respect to the relevance of actors in discursive institutionalism. The discourse 
coalition approach  (Hajer 1995) and the ideational leadership concept (Stiller 2010) 
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stress the agency dimension in discursive structures and provide lenses that are later 
applied to the empirical material (Chapters 4 and 5). 
Maarten Hajer (1995) points out that actors’ interests are not given per se, but 
are constituted, transformed, and adjusted in relation to those of other actors. 
Moreover, actors’ preferences are constrained and enabled by institutional settings. In 
this discursive web, actors use ideas and concepts, position themselves with or against 
others and thus establish their preferences in a constant flux of re-production and 
adjustment. Within such meaning-making processes actors can form (discourse) 
coalitions to push for their shared interests or preferred options through (strategic) 
interactions in discourses. A discourse coalition is ‘a group of actors who share a social 
construct’ (Hajer 1993: 45). Social constructs are embedded in historical, social, and 
political processes and rely on prior knowledge about the issue being debated (e. g. 
meanings of solidarity in times of crisis). Communicative actions relate to each other if 
actors refer to the same concept and create a discursive bond upon which a discourse 
coalition is established. This means that it is not shared interests that form the 
fundament of the coalition, but rather the shared use of concepts. The processes and 
prior knowledge differ among actors and result in different perceptions of existing 
problems (e. g. whether it a banking crisis or a sovereign debt crisis in the EU) and how 
they should be handled. Public discourses are characterised by the polysemic structure 
of concepts that give actors the opportunity to use and interpret concepts in their own 
way. This assumes a rather dynamic formation of ideas and interests in political 
processes in which potentially ‘new discursive relationships and positionings are 
created’ (Hajer 1995: 60). Such discursive elements connect actors and provide an 
ideational ground on which to deliberate. Hajer (1995: 67) refers to the various 
concepts’ in discourses as ‘discursive affinity’. These structure the discourse and give 
rise to new problem perceptions and create the discursive paths through which actors 
come to understand the problem and present their solution. 
In her book on institutional change in the German welfare state, Stiller argues 
that recent social policy reforms (the Riester pension reform and the Hartz 
unemployment reform) were possible, because key policymakers pushed for it and 
influenced the policy agenda. She demonstrates that in addition to discourse coalitions 
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gaining traction, single actors can also substantially change the public discourse. Stiller 
argues that national executives have the capacity to work with ideas. Ideas are seen as 
resources that give actors a chance to overcome resistance by adversaries, propose 
alternative policy ideas or mobilise their peers for matters of consensus (Stiller 2010: 
26). 
Stiller (2010: 33) defines ideational leaders as ‘key policy-makers who use 
strategies that are idea-based (“ideational”), and purposively aim for the achievement 
of change, even in view of reform resistance (“leadership”)’. Her definition is extended 
for my dissertation, because her understanding of who can be an ideational leader is 
too narrow. Giving only national executives the capacity for ideational leadership 
might be reasonable in Stiller’s empirical study, but the public discourse can be 
influenced by a broad range of actors, as Kingdon (1995) has pointed out. Policy 
entrepreneurs fulfil a vital function in policy processes, because their main actions are 
to identify problems and provide solutions. The motives behind such entrepreneurship 
might be personal interests, future career prospects or a high degree of public 
recognition in this area and promoting this publicly (Kingdon 1995). Accordingly, 
being a public entrepreneur for a certain concept might increase your reputation for 
future debates, legitimise your work as an interest group or academic scholar. This can 
also be an opportunity for the parliamentary opposition to set an alternative agenda to 
that of the government, or for a single politician to associate his or her name with a 
specific issue and gain public attention. Government ministers can act as public 
entrepreneurs to support their staff and ministries in turf battles against other 
ministries or to create a sharp profile as a smaller partner in a coalition government. In 
general, various actors might legitimise their new policy proposals and utilise the 
media arena to promote these. 
The media arena is the main sphere in which a variety of actors come together 
and articulate their position and their ideas. As Ferree et al. (2002) convincingly argue, 
there are many sub-arenas, specialised forums and limited public spheres, but the mass 
media arena remains the centre of public attention and every group tries to be as 
visible as possible. Politicians seek out the public to present their ideas and plans and 
justify their actions (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Wessler et al. 2008). Especially in 
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relation to such a contested concept as solidarity, actors have to argue why they are for 
or against solidarity and provide reasons to the audience. Political rivals might 
challenge the articulated ideas and propose their own version of the necessary actions 
that have to be undertaken. This constant discursive struggle about the most dominant 
idea has to be closely studied to identify ideational leadership with respect to public 
legitimation strategies. Reframing the ideational leadership approach beyond the focus 
on government actors helps to assess which actor has the capacity for ideational 
leadership, how it is exercised, and whether a competing ideational leadership during 
the analysed time can be observed. 
After focusing on the actor side of discursive institutionalist research, I turn to 
the ideational part. Over the past two decades, the scholarly perspective has changed 
from whether ideas matter to how ideas matter (Mehta 2011). Although this is a 
concrete step forward, it is still relatively unknown how idea X and not idea Y has 
gained attraction. Ideas do not simply gain traction through their use by actors; as 
discourse studies show, ideas are anchored in various ways in discourse structures and 
they unfold effects on discourses (Foucault 2012; Laclau/Mouffe 2014/1985). Or as Hajer 
argues in respect of the duality of structure and agency: ‘[S]ocial action originates in 
human agency of clever, creative human beings but in a context of social structures of 
various sorts that both enable and constrain their agency’ (Hajer 1995: 58). Thus, I 
investigate the ideational side of discursive politics in order to scrutinise the attention 
that some ideas receive and to explore why and how some ideas are linked while 
others remain neglected and isolated in the discourse. The following subsection sheds 
some light on this by using the recently suggested ‘coalition magnet’ approach (Béland 
and Cox 2016). 
Béland and Cox (2016) suggest to examine influential ideas as ‘coalition 
magnets’. Such an understanding is close to Hajer’s (1995: 67) ‘discursive affinity’, but 
has two distinct advantages: on the one hand, their term is more specific in terms of 
how ideas become relevant. On the other, it leaves room for the strategic use of ideas 
by actors. The magnet metaphor indicates that an idea attracts actors and binds them 
together. The authors name three criteria for an idea to become a coalition magnet. 
First, they can be broadly interpreted and ‘effectively manipulated’ (Béland and Cox 
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2016: 429). This assumes that they are ‘ambiguous or polysemic’ ideas (Béland and Cox 
2016: 431; Jenson 2010). Such polysemic ideas are predestined to act as coalition 
magnets, because they combine varying ideas (Chapter 5). Second, key actors pick up 
such an idea and promote it. These actors can be in the formal decision-making process 
or veto players or perceived as central actors due to their policy-specific position (e. g. 
trade unions or employers’ association). Lastly, ideas have to bring together a variety of 
actors in order to promote such an idea.9 The coalition magnet concept can be 
extended. Instead of understanding one particular idea as a coalition magnet, in 
Chapter 4, I conceptualise the linking of ideas in the discourse as an act of creating 
coalition magnet patterns. Thus, coalition magnets respectively coalition magnet 
patterns are the structural results of actions of ideational bricolage, linking together 
different concepts within the discourse (Chapter 5). 
Summing up, the discourse coalition approach underlines the cooperative 
aspect of communication, highlighting that several actors argue for similar concepts 
and try to create the most convincing narrative. Stiller’s ideational leadership approach 
has focused on the capacity of single actors to push for change. Thus, the actor 
constellation in both crises can be studied with regard to the formation of discourse 
coalitions as well as single leaders who have the ability to influence the discourse. The 
coalition magnet approach highlights how ideas become influential in discursive 
struggles 
1.5 Political claims and discourse networks 
So far, I have argued in favour of studying solidarity in public debates and how actors 
make sense of calls to solidarity in times of crisis. Hence, solidarity is investigated in 
texts. In light of this, we need a methodology for textual analysis that takes both the 
agency and the ideational dimension into account. The political claims analysis (PCA) 
and the discourse network analysis (DNA) are selected for this purpose. The political 
claims analysis focuses on specific statements – claims – in public documents such as 
                                                     
9 The coalition magnet approach is similar to the master frame approach (Benford 2013). 
However, the main difference is that in a master frame, a core meaning connects the different 
interpretations. Thus, actors are linked to a single master frame such as a coalition magnet, but 
the latter does not assume that there is an original and stable meaning of the master frame itself. 
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parliamentary debates, newspaper articles or online media, and has been developed 
from protest event analysis and social movement studies (de Wilde 2013; de Wilde et al. 
2014; Koopmans and Statham 1999). Each claim is articulated by a specific actor and 
the link between speaker and statement is analysed. Thus, the PCA bridges the gap 
between content-oriented approaches and actor-centred approaches to analyse public 
debates. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. A claim is defined as: 
a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public 
articulation of political demands, calls of action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, 
which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other 
collective actors (Statham et al. 2005: 436). 
A claim represents the plurality of actions and demands made by actors in the public. 
The components of a claim are differentiated by following a logic of questions 
regarding each claim as Pieter de Wilde (2014: 52) exemplifies: ‘WHERE and WHEN, 
WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE 
interests and WHY’. These questions are the grammar of claims and help to identify 
the claim and make the coding process both transparent and comprehensible. 
Accordingly, the newspaper articles selected for the dissertation have been coded with 
the PCA. I use different categories of the coded claims in order to analyse the public 
debates on solidarity in both crises. Chapters 2 and 3 mainly focus on the justification 
in claims (the Why question) and shed light on how solidarity is justified or challenged 
in the migration crisis discourse. Additionally, Chapter 2 also investigates a part of the 
claim that has not been considered in previous studies. It is the justification scope that 
contains who is included by the justification. Based on this code category, the scale of 
solidarity is analysed. Chapters 4 and 5 not only use the justification category, but also 
focus on ‘who makes the claim’. While Chapter 4 illuminates the presence of 
individuals in public discourse, e. g. claims by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, 
Pope Francis or SZ-journalist Heribert Prantl, Chapter 5 looks at the partisan conflicts 
in the German media. Hence, only claims by political parties and politicians are taken 
into account for the analysis. 
The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the DNA 
(Leifeld 2016b: 54–56). Since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme and methodology, 
the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into relational network data. The 
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DNA brings together discourse analysis and social network analysis by focusing on the 
interconnectedness of concepts and actor appearances in discourses (Janning et al. 2009; 
Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). In general, discourse networks are two-mode 
or affiliation networks, because actors and concepts are the two types of nodes in the 
network. These networks have two types of nodes and links exist only between 
different types of nodes – for instance, actors are linked to concepts. Affiliation 
networks can be transformed into one-mode networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011). 
Actors use particular concepts and this communicative action can be 
understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. Other actors might use the 
same concept in the debate and build up a relation to the concept too (see, for instance, 
in Figure 6, actors a1 and a2). Since different actors have different mindsets, we assume 
that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors (again, 
see the different relations from actors a1, a2 and a3 to concepts f1, f2 and f3 in Figure 
6). Based on shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network 
analysis can detect specific actor networks or concept networks to examine which 
actors are relatively close to or distant from each other (Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). 
 
Source: Rennkamp et al. (2017: 216) 
 
The discourse network methodology is deployed in three out of four articles. While the 
article on the Euro crisis in the German and Irish discourse (Chapter 4) as well as the 
comparison of the Euro crisis and migration crisis in the German discourse (Chapter 5) 
analyse the affiliation networks of actors and concepts, the more theoretical article on 
the migration crisis in Germany (Chapter 2) uses the affiliation network of meanings 
Figure 6: Models of discourse networks 
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and scales of solidarity (and leaves out the actor dimension). Moreover, different 
network techniques are used in order to shed light on the actor visibility and the 
dominant concepts that have been used in the crisis debates. Specifically, centrality 
measures, community detection algorithms have been deployed and the discourse 
networks have been visualised to graphically underline the relation between actors and 
concepts in public debates. 
On the micro level of network analyses, the centrality of nodes is examined. 
Centrality indicates how important or influential a node is in a network, depending on 
how centrality is defined (Hanneman and Riddle 2011). In Chapters 2, 4 and 5, 
eigenvector centrality is calculated. Eigenvector centrality is defined as the number of 
edges a node has as well as how strongly linked the node is to other central nodes in 
the network. Hence, eigenvector centrality not only considers the specific network 
position of the node, but also considers the close network environment of the node in 
order to measure the centrality. The scale of centrality is from 0 to 1. The higher the 
score, the more central the node is in the network (Bonacich 1987). 
On the meso level of network analyses, subgroups within the network are 
identified by deploying community detection algorithms. Based on various 
specifications, these algorithms try to detect groups of nodes that are closely connected 
and thereby form subgroups within the large network. With regard to discourse 
networks, such subgroups could contain actors and concepts that are closely linked 
and often used in order to influence the public discourse. I used the Fast Greedy 
community detection algorithm in Chapter 2 and the walktrap community detection 
algorithm in Chapter 4. The former algorithm tries to optimise the modularity score of 
the network by removing edges to detect closely linked nodes.10 This shall reveal 
subgroups within the network (Clauset et al. 2004; Newman 2004). The latter algorithm 
is based on the assumption that random walks on the edges in a network will stay 
within a certain subgroup of nodes. Based on a certain length of steps, the detection 
algorithm moves along the edges and identifies nodes that are reached. The more often 
                                                     
10 The modularity score of a network indicates how weakly or strongly clustered a network is. It 
ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value, the clearer the network is clustered into separate 
subgroups (Newman 2006). 
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the same nodes are randomly reached, the higher the chance that the algorithm clusters 
these nodes within a subgroup (Pons and Latapy 2005). 
1.6 Outline of the dissertation 
The dissertation is structured into a prelude and four main chapters that are based on 
research articles with a final conclusion that summarises the findings and reflects on 
the limitations and future paths of the thesis. Table 3 offers an overview of the structure 
of the thesis and the central aspects that are focused on and investigated in the thesis. 
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Table 3: The structure of the dissertation 
 Prelude Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Main title Solidarity in Europe 
in times of crisis 
The discursive construction 
of solidarity 
The politics of solidarity in 
Europe's migration crisis 
Framing solidarity in the 
Euro crisis 
Contested solidarity in 
the Euro crisis and 
Europeʼs migration 
crisis 
Goal Reviewing recent 
studies on solidarity 
Theorising solidarity from a 
discourse perspective (meso 
level) 
Mapping public debate in 
Germany and Ireland 
during the migration crisis 
in 2015 
Identifying central actors and 
ideas in Germany & Ireland 
in the Euro crisis from 2010-
2015 
Analysing framing of 
solidarity by party 
actors in both crises 
Analytical 
framework 
- - macro and micro 
approaches to solidarity 
- Introducing the new meso 
approach with the 
dimensions meanings and 
scales of solidarity 
- discursive institutionalism - ideational leadership 
approach 
- coalition magnet (patterns) 
approach 
- discourse coalitions 
approach 
- coalition magnet 
approach 
Which crisis? - Migration crisis Migration crisis Euro crisis Euro crisis and 
Migration Crisis 
Which 
countries? 
- Germany Germany and  Ireland Germany and Ireland Germany 
Publication 
status 
Published online 
December 20th 2018 
Published online 
March 22nd 2019 
Forthcoming as chapter in 
an edited volume 
Published online 
March 5th 2019 
R&R (2. Round) 
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Before we begin with the theoretical and empirical exploration of solidarity, we make a 
small detour and look briefly at the current state of solidarity in Europe in times of crisis 
in the following Prelude. It reviews four recent contributions to the research on solidarity 
in Europe in times of crisis. While one book looks at Europe’s migration crisis and how 
solidarity is organised by pro-refugee activists across Europe (Della Porta 2018), another 
focuses on the Euro crisis and how institutional mechanisms have been established to act 
as safeguards and create solidarity as a by-product of a broader, more encompassing crisis 
management (Schelkle 2017). The third contribution examines citizens’ attitudes and 
motives in reaction to the multiple crises that the EU faces and thus illuminates the state 
of social solidarity in the EU (Lahusen and Grasso 2018a). Lastly, the legitimacy of the EU 
is deeply contested and the question then turns to how the EU has developed and 
sustained its legitimacy. By looking at the cultural transformation of Europe and the 
justifications of legitimation, the fourth book highlights symbols, norms, and practices of 
the EU’s authority (McNamara 2017). This review essay will help us to make the study of 
solidarity more concrete and shall give an initial impression of how solidarity is studied 
in the two crises and what constitute the advantages and potential challenges. The 
Prelude also provides a conceptual bridge to my own research and prepares the 
subsequent empirical studies. 
In the second chapter, solidarity is theorised from a discursive perspective. The 
research programme on solidarity is differentiated in three strands: Macro-structural, 
micro-behavioural, meso-discursive. By focusing on the last strand, I argue that the 
discursive construction of solidarity should be studied. Therein, solidarity is composed of 
the two dimensions of meaning and scale and I point out why it makes sense to consider 
both dimensions in future studies on solidarity. I illustrate the applicability of the new 
approach by examining a small subset of solidarity claims in German newspapers during 
Europe’s migration crisis. While many studies subsume claims on solidarity under the 
term European solidarity, I demonstrate that the meaning of political solidarity is strongly 
linked to the intergovernmental scale, while cultural solidarity refers to the transnational 
scale. This differentiation helps to understand what kind of solidarity actors claim and 
that a shift from transnational cultural solidarity to intergovernmental political solidarity 
shaped the recent migration crisis discourse. It highlights the political nature of the 
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migration crisis and the institutional asymmetries and reform potential in the Common 
European Asylum System that make the call to solidarity crucial. 
The third chapter provides an in-depth look into the debate on solidarity in 
Europe’s migration crisis in 2015 in the German and Irish quality newspapers. Focusing 
on the climax of the migration crisis in 2015, I investigate the framing of pro- and contra-
solidarity meanings. While the meanings of political, cultural, and social solidarity prevail 
on the pro-side of solidarity, security and demarcation claims are also featured in the 
public debate. It demonstrates that calling for solidarity is not an uncontested claim, but is 
challenged by demands to increase border surveillance in the Mediterranean or even by 
xenophobic agitation and racist attacks on refugees and volunteers. 
The fourth chapter turns to the Euro crisis and analyses the framing of solidarity in 
the German and Irish media debate. Based on the discursive institutionalism framework, I 
look at ideational leadership and coalition magnet patterns to investigate who is claiming 
solidarity, how it is framed, and whether there are differences between Germany as an 
expected giver of solidarity and Ireland as an expected receiver of solidarity in the Euro 
crisis (2010–15). Covering the whole crisis period and examining the public debate with 
the discourse network analysis yields novel insights. While the German discourse is 
strongly influenced by a ‘solidarity-austerity’ pattern, the Irish discourse focuses on the 
links between responsibility, conditionality, and solidarity. Despite these framing 
differences, I show that German (conservative) politicians and members of government 
dominate the public debate in both national discourses. This underlines the strong 
influence and agenda-setting capacity of Germany in the Euro crisis. 
The last chapter brings both crisis discourses together by comparing the German 
solidarity debate on the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis. Given the different 
expected positions on solidarity – Germany expected to receive solidarity in the migration 
crisis and was expected to give solidarity in the Euro crisis – I demonstrate that the crisis 
involvement/affectedness plays a role in how the public debate frames solidarity. By 
applying a discursive institutionalist framework that highlights the role of discourse 
coalitions, as well as specific coalition magnets in public debates, I show that austerity 
claims prevail in the Euro crisis and fundamentally challenge calls to solidarity. The 
migration crisis debate is influenced by political solidarity claims which are challenged by 
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security frames. The common factor in both discourses is the strong presence of 
government actors who establish discourse coalitions to push for their preferred 
understanding of ‘austerity-as-solidarity’ and ‘political solidarity versus security’. These 
findings underpin the ‘structural bias’ of media outlets towards the visibility of 
government actors in public debates, as well as the contested nature of solidarity claims in 
public discourses. 
I conclude the thesis in chapter 6 by summarising the main findings of the prelude 
and the four chapters, discussing the limitations of particular areas of the thesis, and 
signalling new paths for future studies on solidarity. 
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Prelude: Solidarity in Europe in times of crisis
11
 
 
'But where danger threatens, that which saves from it also grows.' 
('Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch.') 
Friedrich Hölderlin 
 
The Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis have deeply shaken the European project in 
its institutional design as well as its normative grounds. Established as an economic 
cooperation among Western European countries, the European integration process has 
always inhibited normative principles and values. French Foreign Minister Robert 
Schuman declared that Europe “will be built through concrete achievements which first 
create a de facto solidarity” (Schuman 1950). Proposing the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1957 as one of the key steps towards the current European Union, 
Schuman emphasised that by cooperating for the mutual benefit, the European countries 
will create a European social bond (and prevent another horrifying world war on the 
European continent). Almost 40 years later, Jacques Delors (1989) famously stated that 
“you cannot fall in love with the single market”, and pointed out that the European 
Community has to create a shared identity in order to sustain its legitimacy. Both claims 
highlight two things: On the one hand, if the EU wants to survive, it needs legitimacy 
beyond the establishment of a single market and should create institutions for the mutual 
benefit of the people. On the other hand, Europe is not only an institutional structure, but 
it also needs the support of the European citizens in order to mean something and 
provide levels of identification and trust. 
                                                     
11 The prelude is a revised version of the review essay “Solidarity in Europe in Times of Crisis”, 
published online in the Journal of European Integration, December 20th 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1546980. The following books are reviewed: Lahusen, C. and 
Grasso, M. (eds) (2018a) Solidarity in Europe: citizens’ responses in times of crisis, Cham: Palgrave  
Macmillan; Della Porta, D. (ed.) (2018) Solidarity mobilizations in the ‘refugee crisis’: contentious 
moves, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan; Schelkle, W. (2017) The political economy of monetary 
solidarity: Understanding the euro experiment, Oxford: Oxford University Press; McNamara, K. R. 
(2017) The politics of everyday Europe: constructing authority in the European Union, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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When we look at the Euro crisis, the dominant austerity paradigm combined with 
an increase of technocratic power on the supranational level as well as moral attacks on 
both sides of the debtor-creditor constellations (e. g. lazy Greeks versus Nazi-Germany) 
have fundamentally questioned the cooperative mode of the EU as well as the equal status 
of the member states (Matthijs and McNamara 2015; Sánchez-Cuenca 2017). The EU 
established new institutional structures such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
and the Fiscal Compact with far-reaching supervision rights for the European 
Commission. Europe’s migration crisis has questioned the values and principles of the 
European project even more. Even though incoming migration dynamics are not new to 
the Southern European countries and the Dublin regulations were installed before 2015, 
the large influx of asylum seekers from the Middle East and Northern Africa in a short 
time period have further pressured the Euro crisis countries Greece and Italy. Any attempt 
to establish a voluntary mechanism to share responsibility and coordinate relocations of 
migrants and refugees across the EU failed (Zaun 2018). 
Hence, European affairs do not seem to be in good shape when it comes to the 
question of solidarity. The current political crises of the EU can be understood as conflicts 
about solidarity – who is cooperating with whom for mutual benefits (Hutter et al. 2016). 
The four reviewed studies address the crises as well as related questions on the politics of 
solidarity in different ways. All four books illuminate types of solidarity in times of crisis 
and stress the multifaceted characteristics of the concept of solidarity. However, the 
contributions miss a clear understanding of the relation of solidarity and crisis as well as 
pay little attention to the meaning making process that is underpinning the attitudes 
(Lahusen/Grasso), practices and motifs (della Porta) and institutions (Schelkle) of 
solidarity. In this regard, the study by McNamara is crucial, because she focuses more on 
the meaning making process and the construction of ‘everyday Europe’. The disadvantage 
of her book is, however, a rather vague understanding of solidarity as a shared identity 
that the EU is lacking. 
Conditional solidarity in Europe 
The edited volume by Christian Lahusen and Maria Grasso is based on the EU 
Horizon2020 project TransSOL ‘Transnational Solidarity in Times of Crisis’ and is about 
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the state of European/transnational solidarity in times of crisis. Using an original survey 
that was conducted in the winter 2016/17 in eight European countries (Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland), the authors of the edited 
volume present findings for each country and bring the different crises (Euro crisis, 
migration crisis, Brexit) into the interpretation of the results. The researchers focus on 
different solidarity activities (e. g. donating money, demonstrating) and on six target 
groups (e. g. disabled persons, refugees) within and outside Europe. They consider 
behavioural, motivational and resource aspects in order to explain solidarity attitudes and 
behaviour in recent hard times. 
Three findings emerge in almost every country study: Firstly, they demonstrate a 
hierarchy of solidarity actions and underline that solidarity is rather a particular than a 
universal concept. People are willing to take actions for disabled persons and to a lesser 
extent also for refugees. Unemployed persons, however, are less likely to get solidarity 
support from their fellow citizens. This corroborates previous findings that unemployed 
persons or refugees are often seen as less deserving (Sales 2002; van Oorschot 2006). 
Secondly, although they show that every second respondent has acted in solidarity, the 
rather passive solidarity actions such as donating money are more likely than active 
solidarity actions such as demonstrating or being a member in a solidarity organization. 
Thus, acting in solidarity depends on resources, but also demonstrates different levels of 
activism. Thirdly, European solidarity is relatively modest when it comes to burden-
sharing issues and redistribution. With regard to financial risk sharing and incoming 
asylum seekers, solidarity is supported but mostly under strict conditionality and the 
expectation of reciprocal behaviour. If respondents have a positive attachment to the EU 
and feel that they benefit from the EU membership of their country, then they are also 
more likely to support EU-wide redistributive matters. 
Transnational solidarity in practice 
The second edited volume is based on a conference in 2017 which highlighted the 
intersection of social movement, citizenship and migration studies in order to investigate 
the solidarity practices in Europe’s refugee crisis. The concise introduction by Donatella 
della Porta sketches out the migration crisis in Europe, relates it to other protest situations 
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of precarious workers and migrants in the 1990s as well as social movement mobilisations 
against neoliberalism and global capitalism. Four interrelated topics are presented that 
guide the empirical chapters: political opportunity structures, movements as networks of 
individuals and organisations, repertoires and acts of citizenships and framing processes. 
Ten chapters investigate activities and mobilisation actions in cities (Calais, 
Istanbul, Barcelona), border areas (Lesbos, Lampedusa, Spain’s enclaves Ceuta and 
Melilla) and the Western Balkan route. They deploy mostly qualitative methods such as 
semi-structured interviews and (participatory) observations. Apart from the study on 
anti-refugee protests in France and Italy by Pietro Castelli Gattinara, the contributions 
focus on pro-refugee mobilisation and protest actions in Europe in order to understand 
the motivations and related emotions of the activists as well as the structural 
opportunities and constraints in these cases. 
Three important findings can be highlighted. Firstly, authors show that most of the 
activists were not involved in any previous actions for refugees. The sheer presence and 
urgency of doing something in these moments of turmoil triggered their motivation to 
help. While some of them were politicised by their actions supporting refugees and their 
contact with state authorities, most of them felt a rather moral duty and humanitarian 
obligation to show solidarity with people in need in their local or national context. 
Secondly, the more established political groups such as the ‘no border network’ 
experienced the institutionalisation and professionalisation of the crisis management by 
NGOs that have more resources, personal and close contact with state authorities in order 
to get access to camps and shelter areas. This led to conflicts about the supposedly 
depoliticising work of larger NGOs and the longer impact of the volunteering actions in 
Greece or Italy. Thirdly, most of the chapters demonstrate that the political opportunity 
structures strongly shape pro-refugee solidarity actions. Various spatial contexts – from 
’the jungle’ in Calais, the Western Balkan route, the Greek island Lesbos to Spanish 
regions – are interrelated in the formation and mobilisation of protest. While pro-refugee 
protests in the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla are difficult to organise, a more 
refugee-friendly executive in Barcelona enables actions and cooperation between the 
different actors and levels. When activists try to bridge the transnational spatial gap – as 
one study demonstrate by looking at solidarity mobilisations in Calais and Brussels – 
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different structures and organisational experiences show the opportunities and limitations 
of transnational protest actions. 
The implicit institutionalisation of monetary solidarity  
Waltraud Schelkle addresses the Euro crisis. Following a rationalist-institutionalist 
approach, she emphasises the cooperative aspect of monetary solidarity actions during 
the crisis. Monetary solidarity, understood as “deliberate or at least consciously tolerated 
risk sharing between members of a currency union”(Schelkle 2017: 1), is most often the 
outcome of an institutional evolution and thus a ‘by-product of collective actions’. In her 
book, Schelkle argues against three strands of literature: Firstly, ideational approaches that 
highlight austerity as a dominant paradigm across Europe (Blyth 2015; Matthijs 2016).12 
Secondly, economists trying to explain the Euro crisis with the ‘optimal currency area’-
theory. Thirdly, comparative political economists who make the economic and political 
diversity among the EU member states responsible for the tractions and non-solvable 
crisis of the EU (Hall 2012; Johnston and Regan 2016). In contrast to these approaches, 
Schelkle argues that collective action problems are at the core of the crisis. Having diverse 
members in the EU can constrain the European decision making process, but it can also be 
an opportunity to share risks respectively diversify risks in order to deal with 
uncertainties a single country cannot deal with. Schelkle understands the bailouts and the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism as “monetary solidarity, in the sense of 
creating for the first time a permanent capacity for fiscal risk sharing if a member state 
government is in distress” (Schelkle 2017: 18). By comparing the EU with the political 
development of the US, she demonstrates in chapter 4 the long process of creating a single 
currency for such a heterogeneous political formation. It took the US 150 years to install a 
stable monetary system from the first plan by Hamilton in the 1780s until the instalment 
of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913 and new banking supervision and insurance 
regulation after the Great Depression of 1929. 
                                                     
12 Schelkle also sees McNamara work on the evolution of the European monetary union as mainly 
driven by German ordoliberalism (1999) rather critical and emphasizes instead the diverse interests 
of EU member states favoring the single currency (Schelkle 2017: 131–135). 
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Schelkle also looks at economic EU migrants and whether their migration 
movements are a form of individual risk sharing because they move to other regions and 
countries in order to avoid unemployment and deprivation. The free movement of EU 
citizens and labour mobility within the EU is a social right that should not be restricted, 
but the risk sharing mechanism creates a dual labour market structure of domestic and 
foreign workers. Moreover, the regions and countries of origin which are already hit by 
the crisis, such as Greece, also lose workers who pay into the social system and cannot 
compensate the brain drain. While this insurance approach works well individually, it is 
less suited for states or regions. Schelkle also analyses the unified payment system in the 
EU (TARGET) and demonstrates how this has stabilised the Euro. By sticking together in 
one currency, pooling and spreading the risk across diverse members, uncertainty could 
be dealt with and the potential threat of an interbank lending collapse was prevented. 
Thus, monetary solidarity was created as a by-product of the TARGET system. At the end 
of the monography, Schelkle raises concerns about an ‘even closer union’ and sees ideas 
such as a European social security scheme rather sceptical (Schelkle 2017: 311–324). 
Interestingly, exactly this policy idea is put forward by Lahusen and Grasso who perceive 
it as a strong instrument of redistributing resources on the EU level to create a positive 
integration instrument and to foster solidarity among EU citizens (Lahusen and Grasso 
2018b: 276–277). 
Social solidarity in everyday Europe 
In contrast to the three books reviewed before, the latest book by Kathleen McNamara is 
interested in the daily, even banal, cultural symbols and practices of the European 
integration project and hence, she deals with solidarity more indirectly. She claims that 
‘Europeanness’ is not a substitute for the national, but is 'nesting' in national and local 
norms and traditions (McNamara 2017: 77–78). Since every political formation needs 
legitimation in order to survive and to provide identification for its subjects, the question 
of becoming accepted as 'taken for granted' is even more crucial in hard times.  Similar to 
earlier accounts stressing symbols like the Euro as an object of identification for a 'marble 
cake' type of European identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010), McNamara  
gives a broad account of the cultural transformation in the EU. She tries to show what a 
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cultural analysis of political processes can highlight and how ‘everyday Europe’ is 
(re)constructed and shaped by ‘labelling, mapping and narrating’ (chap. 3) the EU as 
legitimate political order. 
Using the literature on state formation and comparative political development, she 
shows that the legitimation and development of the EU is most often studied from the 
perspective of material interests (security and economic interests), but hardly from the 
cultural and social logic of shared cultural codes and symbols. The author focuses on 
different areas in which EU symbols, narratives and practices take place (e. g. EU 
institutions and architecture, EU citizenship and mobility, monetary and foreign policy). 
For instance, instead of building one central EU capital with all institutions in one place, 
the EU spreads across Europe with the main institutions in the founding West European 
member states (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg), but also with its various EU 
agencies, resembling a rather federalist understanding. McNamara demonstrates the 
‘localising Europe’ technique that situates the EU in different communities as well as tries 
to integrate the EU in the local and national communities in Warsaw/Poland (Frontex), 
Copenhagen/Denmark (European Environmental Agency) or in Parma/Italy (European 
Food Safety Authority Agency). Another example of this ‘banal authority’ is the Euro as a 
single currency. The fact that people can travel across the European Union and can pay 
with the same coins in 19 countries materialises the EU for every citizen and for tourists. 
Moreover, these coins still show national images on one side and an abstract map of 
Europe without national borders on the other side. This highlights how Europe 'localises' 
and 'deracinates' at the same time. Furthermore, the Euro is an important currency for the 
foreign exchange market, it presents the EU on financial markets and is relevant for 
foreign trade affairs.13 
Relevant for this review essay is that underlying McNamara’s reconstruction of 
‘everyday Europe’ is a notion of social solidarity. She points to the lack of it in the EU 
which threatens the EU's future. As McNamara states: “While the culture generated by 
                                                     
13 Another anecdotal evidence of how influential the cultural perception and symbolic power of the 
Euro as strong currency before the Euro crisis was, is the video ‘Blue Magic’ by the US-rapper Jay-
Z. Released in 2007 and inspired by the movie ‘American Gangster’, several short scenes show 
bundles of banknotes that seem to be counted or stored in suitcases. While most often in the US 
context, US dollar banknotes are shown, in this case, bundles of 500 Euro banknotes are seen (Jay-Z 
2007). 
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everyday life under EU governance has made the shift in political authority to the EU 
level palatable over the past five decades, and underpinned an astonishing degree of 
governance building in the EU, it has for the most part not resulted in a strong sense of 
solidarity or an impassioned, single European identity, but rather, by design, a much less 
contested, banal ‘imagined community’ of Europe” (McNamara 2017: ix). Thus, creating 
common symbols and an image to identify oneself and legitimise authority is at the 
bottom of any solidarity project. McNamara highlights that solidarity is not only created 
by institutional mechanisms, redistributing resources or collective practices, but also by 
more banal symbols underpinning social relations and political structures. However, 
McNamara still calls it social solidarity instead of cultural solidarity in order to stress the 
symbolic and social construction of a shared identity. 
Constructing solidarity in times of crisis 
All four works illuminate the state of solidarity in Europe in times of crisis and point to 
the contestation around the politics of solidarity on different levels (citizen's perceptions, 
activism, institutions, and symbols). Moreover, the two edited volumes demonstrate the 
value of a comparative perspective on solidarity in different countries which was mostly 
missing in previous research (Wallaschek 2016a). I want to stress two aspects that are less 
discussed in the four books. Firstly, the works do not theorise the conceptual relation of 
solidarity and crisis. The implicit understanding of all four books is that a crisis is a 
critical juncture that provides a threat to societies and political institutions, endangers 
solidarity and to this end, solidarity should be studied in order to scrutinise the effect of 
the crisis on (existing) solidarities. Thus, it seems that studying solidarity requires a crisis 
situation, because a perceived threat or danger might influence claims and attitudes 
towards solidarity. However, it is less clear whether this is a necessary or sufficient 
condition for analysing solidarity. What is the state of solidarity in non-crisis periods and 
how do solidary practices, attitudes and claims change before, in and after such a crisis? 
Moreover, when is crisis considered as a crisis that also affects the solidarity of political 
institutions and societies? These questions are not addressed in the four contributions. For 
instance, in the edited volume by Lahusen and Grasso, the authors expect that due to the 
crisis, solidarity is under pressure. However, the disadvantage of a cross-country survey 
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at only one point of time is that it is less clear what effect the multiple crises had, whether 
they increase the solidarity bond and how they intersect. Hence, how can we assume that 
solidarity is under pressure in times of crisis if there is no direct ex ante and ex post 
comparison possible? The relation of solidarity and moments of crisis should be 
considered in further research in order to shed light on the mechanisms behind calls to 
solidarity and crisis perceptions.  
Secondly, the construction process how actors attribute meaning to solidarity is 
hardly reflected in the contributions. Since solidarity can be understood as contested 
concept (Gallie 1956), actors have different understandings of the concept which might 
create conflicts about the proper meaning of solidarity. The TransSOL project adheres to 
the idea of social solidarity and differentiates between redistributive acts of solidarity, 
issues of belonging and identity as solidarity as well as investigates various contexts of 
solidarity. The authors in the edited volume on ‘Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee 
Crisis’’ most often see solidarity as support and concrete practice. In her contributions, 
della Porta stresses the difference of solidarity and resistance without justifying this, 
although other scholars have conceptualised solidarity as acts of emancipatory resistance 
(Bayertz 1999; Scholz 2008). Schelkle has the most minimalist understanding of solidarity 
which in turn leaves the question to what extent, conceptually, monetary solidarity differs 
from cooperation, reciprocity or enlightened self-interest? If solidarity is most often the 
'by-product' of solving collective action problems, then what about the intentionality and 
‘solidarity as joint action’ (Sangiovanni 2015) with others and sharing their perspective 
and engaging in solidarity actions to reduce injustices and inequalities? 
The discussed studies provide excellent insights into the multifaceted concept of 
solidarity and also demonstrate that the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis have 
sparked debates about the state of solidarity in Europe. Since there seems to be no 
sustainable and profound solution to one of the crises, the discussion on solidarity in 
Europe is likely to continue.  
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2 The Discursive construction of solidarity. Analysing 
public claims in Europe’s migration crisis14 
 
The article proposes a new approach to solidarity. Previous research has 
focused on macro-structural and micro-behavioural aspects of solidarity, 
overlooking that solidarity is discursively constructed by actors on the meso-
level. The meso approach to solidarity consists of two key dimensions: 
meaning and scale. The meaning of solidarity characterises its content. The 
scale of solidarity indicates who is encompassed by solidarity. This approach 
is applied by analysing meanings and scales of solidarity in the German 
media discourse on Europe’s migration crisis from 2010 to 2015. The 
discourse network analysis is deployed to study the co-occurrence of 
meanings and scales of solidarity. The results indicate that political and 
cultural solidarity are the most dominant meanings and they are mostly 
linked to the intergovernmental and transnational scale of solidarity. The 
number of claims to political solidarity on the intergovernmental level of the 
EU increases in 2015, signalling the greater relevance of creating a solidary 
institutional mechanism in the migration crisis. The article contributes to 
recent discussions on solidarity as well as the public framing of Europe’s 
migration crisis.  
Keywords: discursive construction of solidarity; discourse network analysis; 
Europe’s migration crisis; Germany; Solidarity  
 
  
                                                     
14 Chapter 2 has been published online in Political Studies on March 22nd 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719831585. I would like to thank Sebastian Haunss, Michelle 
Hollman, Ulrike Liebert, Sandra Reinecke as well as the anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the article. Moreover, I received very helpful 
feedback from the participants of the BIGSSS working group ‘migration and refugee studies’ as 
well as from the panel audiences at the 2018 ECPR General Conference at the University of 
Hamburg and the Refugees, Borders and Membership Conference at Malmö University. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Solidarity is a central concept in political and social theory. It has also featured 
prominently in recent discussions on the multiple crises of the European Union (EU) as 
well as in debates about the social cohesion of contemporary societies. It is a crucial idea 
in social-democratic and conservative party manifestos (Stjernø 2009), and in trade union 
activities (Gajewska 2009), while social movements engage in solidarity actions as part of 
their protest mobilisations (Della Porta 2018). Research on welfare states examines the 
institutional and behavioural aspects of (social) solidarity (Arts and Gelissen 2001; 
Baldwin 1990). In times of crises, the question of the weakness or strength of solidarity 
among individuals and groups gains increased scholarly attention (Ciornei and Recchi 
2017; Lahusen and Grasso 2018b). 
However, previous research on solidarity has two conceptual shortcomings. First, 
it does not consider the various meanings of solidarity. In this regard, existing studies 
mainly investigate solidarity with respect to redistributive politics and, thus, refer to the 
meaning of social solidarity. Yet, if we understand solidarity as a contested concept (Gallie 
1956), meaning that its proper understanding is debated by actors without arriving at a 
shared understanding of the term, then the discursive, meaning-making process of 
solidarity in itself should be a key focal point. Second, the scale of solidarity – that is, 
defining who is included in the claims for solidarity – plays an ambiguous role in the 
literature. The issue of scale is either not reflected by research on welfare states, which 
largely pursue a methodological nationalism, or it is semantically invoked by 
investigating European or transnational solidarity without indicating the underlying 
meaning of solidarity actions and attitudes.  
Accordingly, the present study will suggest a new research approach to solidarity 
that is situated on the meso-level and based on the two dimensions of meaning and scale. 
Taken together, the dimensions of meaning and scale underpin various concepts of 
solidarity. I conceptualise the meaning of solidarity as its content. Meanwhile, the scale of 
solidarity is understood to be the extent of its reach, and emphasises the boundedness of 
solidarity as it is expressed in specific social contexts. Hence, both dimensions form the 
new meso-discursive approach to solidarity, which I call the discursive construction of 
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solidarity. With the latter phrase, I refer to the framing of the concept of solidarity in 
public debates15. Solidarity has to be constructed and appealed to in order to legitimise 
political actions and mobilise public opinion. 
The approach is engaged empirically by analysing the meanings and scales of 
solidarity in the public discourse on Europe’s migration crisis in an explorative manner. 
To this end, I examine the meanings of solidarity that are deployed and the scales to 
which solidarity claims are linked, before identifying which of the meanings and scales of 
solidarity are most prominent in the discourse. In particular, I analyse German daily 
newspapers from 2010 to 2015. Germany was at the centre of the European migration 
crisis in 2015, creating a high degree of public awareness of the issue. Furthermore, 
Germany strongly shapes the European migration and refugee policies with its national 
norms and regulations (Zaun 2016). The migration crisis has challenged the political-
institutional order, normative guidelines, and the social integration of the EU (Geddes 
2018; Wallaschek 2018b). Previous research on the crisis has demonstrated how member 
states disagree about how best to resolve the migration crisis, how the EU lacks 
supranational authority to establish a mandatory relocation mechanism, and how security 
frames prevailed during the crisis in 2015 (Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017; Zaun 2018). 
Although previous studies have acknowledged the lack of solidarity, they have yet to 
consider how this corresponds to the claiming of solidarity within public discourse. 
Moreover, by looking at the state of public debate both before and during the crisis, we 
can trace the trajectory and changes in the crisis discourse with a view to explaining why 
the EU solidarity mechanism to relocate refugees among EU member states was so 
strongly contested at the end. 
The study utilises the discourse network methodology which has demonstrated 
the co-constitutive construction process of actor appearances and meaning formation in 
public discourses (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). Analysing the relation 
between the meaning and scale of solidarity helps to identify which meanings and scales 
are more or less linked to each other. Hence, I examine the meanings and scales of 
solidarity as two different and distinct nodes within the discourse network. 
                                                     
15 In the following, ‘discourse’ and ‘debate’ are used synonymously. 
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The two main contributions of the present article are as follows: Conceptually, this 
study introduces the new meso approach to solidarity and outlines its two major 
dimensions – namely, meaning and scale. Empirically, the article demonstrates the 
relevance of political solidarity during the crisis. While the pre-crisis discourse is divided 
by intergovernmental and transnational claims on political solidarity, the crisis discourse 
focuses predominantly on intergovernmental political solidarity. 
The article proceeds as follows: First, I review the literature on solidarity by 
dividing the field into macro-structural and micro-behavioural approaches, before 
proposing the new meso-level perspective on solidarity, and what I call the discursive 
construction of solidarity. After describing the data and the discourse network 
methodology used, I present and discuss the main findings. 
2.2 Solidarity research: Adding the meso approach to macro and 
micro approaches 
There has been a recent upsurge in research on the topic of solidarity, provoking debates 
about the state of solidarity within European politics (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; 
Habermas 2013; Sangiovanni 2013; Wallaschek 2018a). The semantic origins of the term 
“solidarity” can be traced back to Roman law and to the phrase “obligatio in solidum” 
which is a liability statement among members of a community, while the contemporary 
usage of the term has its origins in the 19th century (Bayertz 1998; Brunkhorst 2002). In 
broad terms, solidarity can be defined in one of two ways: either as “the preparedness to 
share resources with others by personal contribution to those in struggle or need and 
through taxation and redistribution organised by the state” (Stjernø 2009: 2), or as “a type 
of action: working with others for common political aims, paradigmatically in a context of 
incompletely shared interest” (Kolers 2012: 367). 
The empirical research on solidarity can be divided into three approaches. The first 
approach considers solidarity from a structural perspective, conceptualising mechanisms 
and institutions as providers of solidarity for its members. The second approach attributes 
certain attitudes and perceptions of individuals as solidary behaviour. Accordingly, as 
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Stjernø and Kolers theorise, the focus on redistribution, shared resources, and individual 
actions towards solidarity is reflected in macro and micro approaches. 
The third approach, however, conceptualises solidarity on the meso-level by 
looking at its discursive construction. Solidarity is framed differently by (collective) actors 
and it refers to various scales. Thus, solidarity contains two distinct yet crucial 
dimensions: meaning and scale. In what follows, I utilise both dimensions in order to 
discuss the three approaches. I argue that meaning(s) and scale(s) of solidarity are only 
partially reflected in the macro and micro approaches, which constitutes their conceptual 
shortcomings. I then present the meso-discursive approach to solidarity, before 
introducing the dimensions of meaning and scale, and applying these in the empirical 
part of the paper. 
2.2.1 Macro-structural approach: Institutional solidarity 
The macro approach focuses on the meaning of social solidarity at the national scale of the 
welfare state. Solidarity is understood as redistributive politics (Baldwin 1990). These 
solidarity policies can be inclusionary or exclusionary (Ferrera 2006). Institutional 
provisions – such as social security or unemployment insurance – are available to all 
members of the (national) community, and are, thus, inclusionary. This “institutionalised 
solidarity” (Gelissen 2000) is based on a reciprocal understanding whereby individuals 
pay for a common institutional scheme and in the case of negative experiences or 
consequences (e. g. unemployment), support is provided. The collective solidarity of the 
welfare state tends more towards a universal solidarity mechanism, since it is based on an 
impersonal and often mandatory redistributive process (Baldwin 1990; Boräng 2015). 
Solidarity policies are exclusionary when resources are not provided for “perceived 
outsiders” – such as the unemployed, the disabled or migrants. Such policies treat social 
groups differently, establish forms of conditional solidarity, and have exclusionary effects. 
This influences access to social benefits or questions the deservingness of particular social 
groups (Thomann and Rapp 2018; Trenz and Grasso 2018). 
With regard to scale, recent studies have “uploaded” the meaning of social 
solidarity to the European level by investigating the Europeanisation of national social 
policies and debating the idea and establishment of a Social Europe (Börner 2013; 
Martinsen and Vollaard 2014). Scholars have considered the union citizenship as a 
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solidary institutional arrangement. Having the same duties and rights across the EU – 
such as free movement within the Schengen area or voting for members of the European 
Parliament – creates a social bond among European citizens. This macro structure 
establishes a certain sense of belonging, which can be interpreted as a weak form of 
transnational European solidarity (Mau 2005b). 
To sum up the macro approach, it chiefly focuses on the meaning of (social) 
solidarity as a redistributive mechanism within institutional structures. In turn, 
motivational or ideological aspects, as well as agent-oriented factors, are seldom taken 
into account. Although the notion of scale has recently been explored in some studies on 
social solidarity, framing social solidarity as European solidarity blurs the conceptual 
difference between an international social solidarity among nation states and a 
transnational social solidarity among individuals and groups. 
2.2.2 Micro-behavioural approach: Solidarity as attitude 
The second approach deals with individual behaviour and attitudes towards foreigners or 
other vulnerable social groups as a type of social solidarity (van Oorschot 2006). Solidarity 
is seen as a shared value with regard to identification, trust or social cohesion among or 
within social groups (Breidahl et al. 2018). As in the macro approach, micro studies also 
examine national welfare states in order to identify increases or decreases in the degree of 
social bonds (Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005; van Oorschot 2000). In this regard, the issue 
of deservingness is most central, because studies have shown that solidarity actions 
largely depend on one’s status within, and belonging to, a social group. For instance, the 
elderly, those unable to work (physically and/or psychically), the disabled and refugees 
are more openly granted social benefits than people who are not willing to work (Lahusen 
and Grasso 2018b; van Oorschot 2000; van Oorschot 2006). Accordingly, the micro 
approach primarily considers the meaning of social solidarity for specific target groups 
within national welfare states. 
However, this focus has undergone something of a change in recent times, which 
has opened up the research so as to incorporate various scales of (social) solidarity. 
Solidary attitudes are also examined on the European scale, in an attempt to assess the 
preferences for a Social Europe (Mau 2005a). Scholars engage in the “no demos thesis” in 
the EU by investigating different types of belonging and levels of commitment (Liebert 
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2016; Risse 2010) and, as Erik Jones (2014: 691) emphatically states: “Issues of identity and 
solidarity lie at the heart of our understanding of European integration as a process, they 
hold the key to its legitimation, and they undergird its stability”. 
Based on survey and experimental data, scholars demonstrate levels of European 
or cosmopolitan solidarity based on transnational activities, international experiences of 
young people, cultural openness, and a high level of education (Bechtel et al. 2014; Ciornei 
and Recchi 2017; Kuhn et al. 2018; Lahusen and Grasso 2018b). Ciornei and Recchi 
distinguish between solidarity among nation states (international solidarity) and 
solidarity among EU citizens (transnational solidarity). However, the terminological focus 
on the scale of solidarity in recent studies results in a rather vague understanding of what 
solidarity means. Hence, while these studies offer more detail in terms of the dimension of 
scale, they have less to offer with regard to the dimension of meaning. 
In sum, the micro approach considers multiple scales of solidarity, but mainly 
operationalises solidarity in respect of social solidarity as an attitude towards the 
redistribution of goods. This understanding of solidarity is then subsumed under the 
different scales of European or cosmopolitan solidarity.16 
2.2.3 Meso-discursive approach: The discursive construction of solidarity 
The meso-discursive approach to solidarity proposed here considers the communicative 
practices, meaning-making processes, and the interactions of actors in the public sphere as 
situated at the meso-level – that is, between individual attitudes and state structures. The 
meso-discursive approach to solidarity builds on framing approaches. Frames draw out 
certain aspects while omitting others; as such, they exercise communicative power and 
serve to construct a certain public discourse. Scholars have demonstrated how frames 
influence not only actors’ behaviour, but also how actors understand issues and try to 
solve problems (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2007). As Entman (1993: 52) puts it: 
“framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
                                                     
16 In contrast, Teney and Helbling (2017) differentiate solidarity via two dimensions. While civic 
solidarity stands for openness towards foreigners and cultural diversity, redistributive solidarity 
refers to the redistribution of goods for poor and other vulnerable groups. For the present study, 
civic solidarity is integrated in cultural solidarity and redistributive solidarity is considered to be 
covered by social solidarity as Table 2 shows. 
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to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described”. Previous studies have shown that the 
construction of political issues and policy reforms heavily relies on the framing of an 
issue, as well as which frames are selected by the actors and are deemed most salient 
within public discourse (Leifeld and Haunss 2012; Steensland 2008). These sense-making 
processes are rarely considered in the previous macro- and micro-approaches to 
solidarity. The meaning of social solidarity is mostly presupposed, while the scale of 
solidarity is often neglected. Distinguishing the meaning and scale of solidarity and 
thereby focusing on both aspects more coherently via the meso-discursive approach will 
help to explicate the concept of solidarity and show how it is framed in public discourses. 
Accordingly, the discursive construction of solidarity points to the framing and 
interpretation of solidarity by actors. Actors deliberately use the term solidarity to argue 
for a certain policy position or to demand an opposing proposal. By using the term in a 
specific context (e. g. nation state or EU solidarity) and justifying its use in public 
statements, actors (re-)construct the meaning of solidarity and refer to it in relation to a 
certain scale. Accordingly, the approach differentiates between the meaning of solidarity 
and the scale of solidarity. Both dimensions, taken together, create concepts of solidarity. 
Previous research has investigated the framing of solidarity in policymaking 
processes and public debates (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Galpin 2017; Wonka 2016). 
However, most empirical studies in this area do not focus exclusively on solidarity, and 
instead adopt a more generic perspective. For instance, in his analysis of parliamentary 
debates in the German Bundestag, Wonka (2016) conceptualises solidarity as support for 
people in other countries. Thus, as in the micro approach, Wonka (2016) frames solidarity 
as social solidarity and refers to its transnational scale. Closa and Maatsch (2014), by 
contrast, in their analysis of parliamentary debates about the Euro crisis, understand 
solidarity as an argumentative reference point for justice and human rights among EU 
member states. They refer to social and cultural meanings of solidarity and connect the 
meaning of solidarity to the international scale. These two contributions reveal the 
polysemy of the concept of solidarity and indicate the need to differentiate the concept of 
solidarity into dimensions of meaning and scale. 
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The meso approach does not presuppose a substantial definition of the concept of 
solidarity, but rather understands it as a contested concept with various meanings and 
scales (Gallie 1956). Actors argue about the proper meaning of solidarity, but do not 
(necessarily) come to a shared understanding. Therefore, differentiating solidarity into the 
spheres of meaning and scale helps to illuminate the various understandings and 
demonstrate the possible conceptual combinations entailed by its meaning(s) and scale(s). 
Based on the existing literature, seven meanings of solidarity have been proposed. 
 
Table 4: Meanings of solidarity 
Meanings Description 
Political solidarity Setting up new political mechanisms and instruments in a 
cooperative way 
Social solidarity Redistributing resources and people and groups volunteering 
Cultural solidarity Arguing for a shared identity and norms  
Legal solidarity Liability of members based on the signing of treaties and agreements 
Economic solidarity Support in the form of public investments and growth of the 
economy 
Monetary solidarity Risk-sharing and the reduction or share of sovereign debts to help 
others 
Misuse of solidarity Questioning the legitimacy of the call to solidarity 
 
Political solidarity is based on the idea that a certain group (“we”) should cooperate in a 
political context in order to create solidary political institutions and policies (Kneuer and 
Masala 2015).17 Cultural solidarity emphasises shared norms or values to which actors 
refer in order to justify solidarity actions (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; Jones 2014). Social 
solidarity refers to welfare and social policy institutions as a form of redistributive 
politics, in addition to helping in the neighbourhood, with volunteers, local communities 
or organisations supporting the homeless or unemployed (Baldwin 1990; Manatschal and 
Freitag 2014). Legal solidarity is based on any legal agreement signed by actors and from 
which obligations and rights arise. The legal phrase “pacta sunt servanda” (agreements 
                                                     
17 This understanding of political solidarity differs from that of Sally Scholz (2008) who argues for a 
more normative and critical-emancipatory definition of political solidarity. 
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must be kept) can be interpreted as a solidary procedure in which one has to act 
accordingly or risk breaking the agreement. Economic solidarity refers to supportive 
actions in economic terms – for instance, public investments and expansive growth 
strategies (Sommer 2013). Monetary solidarity is understood as risk-sharing and lending 
creditability and liability to other member states within a regional integration project. By 
acting together beyond the limitations of self-interest, monetary solidarity is expressed 
(Schelkle 2017). Lastly, misuse of solidarity bears solidarity, but in contrast to the other 
meanings, the (legitimate) call for solidarity is questioned fundamentally. Thus, actors 
claim that the appeal to solidarity is misused by others. 
The second dimension of the approach is scale, which refers to the spatial range of 
any call to solidarity. Solidarity encompasses various groups, from social groups in a local 
context right up to the entirety of humankind across the globe. For instance, social 
solidarity might largely refer to a national population (Baldwin 1990), whilst recent 
studies attribute the European, cosmopolitan or transnational scale to social solidarity 
(Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Kuhn et al. 2018). The “European” scale is rather general and 
does not differentiate between solidarity among nation states and solidarity among 
individuals or groups, as advocated by Ciornei and Recchi (2017). The meaning of 
cosmopolitan solidarity is not applied here, because the term entails various substantial 
(universalist) claims on cultural diversity, multi-level governance, and free border 
crossing (of goods, capital, services, and people) (Teney et al. 2014). Thus, cosmopolitan 
solidarity conflates scale and meaning. Consequently, a more fine-grained typology of 
different scales is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Scales of solidarity 
Scales Sub-scales 
Local / 
National - national (exclusionary) 
- diverse population (inclusionary) 
International - intergovernmental EU-related 
- countries of origin 
- conflict zone countries 
- North Africa 
Transnational - EU citizens 
- specific group (non-EU citizens), e. g. Christians in the Middle East 
- migrants/refugees 
Global / 
 
The strengths of the newly introduced meso-discursive approach are as follows. First, it 
combines various scales and meanings of solidarity, and as such reflects the contested 
nature of solidarity. Secondly, it attributes agency to the actors in the framing of solidarity 
in public discourse. Even though political actors’ mindsets are shaped by institutional 
contexts and public philosophies (Boswell and Hampshire 2017), actors can reinterpret 
existing concepts or use “windows of opportunities” throughout the policy process in 
order to introduce new concepts or bring different ideas together. Thirdly, in opting to not 
postulate a fixed relation of a certain meaning with a specific scale, the meso-discursive 
approach has the advantage that every discursive combination of scale and meaning can 
be considered in respect of the empirical analysis of the discursive construction of 
solidarity. These varied combinations of both dimensions give rise to a diverse set of 
concepts of solidarity. As Entman (1993) has noted, framing processes are based on 
selection and salience. Hence, the meso approach enables us to study which meanings 
and scales of solidarity are selected, and how they become salient in the discourse. For 
instance, an actor could argue for a transnational social solidarity for all EU citizens, while 
another might claim a nationally oriented social solidarity that prefers a welfare 
chauvinist understanding of social benefits for the host population (against incoming 
foreigners). Investigating such discursive processes can reveal which of the meanings and 
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scales of solidarity are dominant, and whether and how they are connected. In the end, it 
will be possible to investigate the presence or absence of concepts of solidarity. 
2.3 Research design and methods 
The study analyses newspaper articles from two leading German daily quality 
newspapers from the period of 2010 to 2015. The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Die Welt 
have been selected on account of their broad readership and large circulation. Choosing a 
centre-left (SZ) and a centre-right (Welt) newspaper controls for different political 
ideologies and ensures that different positions and actors in the media arena are 
represented. Previous studies have shown that quality newspapers still serve as major 
gatekeepers in Western European countries and report more on political events than 
tabloids (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Nossek et al. 2015; Reinemann et al. 2012). 
Moreover, printed newspapers are crucial, because “thresholds for audience members are 
particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large” (Wessler et al. 2008: 5). 
Based on a keyword search in the database Factiva, 1,155 articles on solidarity in 
the migration crisis have been selected. Afterwards, the political claims analysis (PCA) 
was deployed (Koopmans and Statham 1999), which examined the different claims made 
by actors in the selected newspaper articles. The main idea of the PCA is that newspaper 
articles contain various statements by different actors that can be analysed separately 
from the whole newspaper text. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Koopmans 
and Statham (2010: 55) define claims as “public speech acts (including protest events) that 
articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or 
potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors”. In 
total, 344 solidarity claims were coded in the R package RQDA (Huang 2016). 176 claims 
in the SZ and 168 claims in Die Welt have been identified (more information on the 
selection of articles and the coding process are presented in the appendix of Chapter 2). 
Figure 7 provides an overview of the annual media coverage in relation to 
solidarity. Until 2012, and in comparison to the crisis in 2015, the discourse on migration 
and solidarity was relatively minor in both periodicals. From 2013 onwards, coverage 
increases, culminating in 2015 with the climax of the migration crisis. It marks Germany’s 
direct involvement whereby it gave access to thousands of asylum seekers coming via 
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Hungary and Southeast Europe in the summer of 2015. These total numbers indicate the 
importance of the topic and signal that the idea of solidarity became more relevant from 
2013 on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The dotted black graph shows the number of claims in the centre-right newspaper Die Welt, 
the solid black graph displays the number of claims in the centre-left newspaper SZ. 
 
The discourse network methodology is deployed to the claims analysis. It is a novel 
approach to study the co-evolution of actors and ideas in public discourses from a 
relational perspective (Leifeld 2016b). An actor using a concept is understood as a relation 
between this actor and the concept. Instead of examining the co-occurrence of actors and 
concepts in affiliation networks (Leifeld and Haunss 2012), the affiliation networks of 
meanings of solidarity and scales of solidarity are investigated in an explorative way so as 
to scrutinise the suggested meso approach to solidarity. The meaning-scale networks are 
undirected. The node size of the meaning-scale network is based on eigenvector centrality, 
which is based on the number of ties a node has, in addition to whether it is tied to other 
Figure 7: Number of claims in German newspapers on solidarity in Europe's migration 
crisis (2010-15) 
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central nodes in the network. The scale of the eigenvector centrality is from 0 to 1. The 
closer the value of a node is to 1, the more central it is in the network (Bonacich 1987). The 
thickness of an edge shows the number of times a concept is linked to a specific scale. 
Salient meanings and scales of solidarity can be identified, as well as how certain 
meanings and scales are closely linked to each other within the migration crisis discourse. 
The links of scales and meanings are studied by deploying the Fast Greedy community 
detection algorithm, which identifies subgroups within the network. The algorithm tries 
to optimise the modularity score of the network by removing edges in order to detect 
closely linked nodes. By doing so, subgroups within the network are discovered (Clauset 
et al. 2004; Newman 2004).18 The aim is to detect meanings and scales of solidarity that are 
so closely tied that they can be understood to constitute the conceptual glue that 
establishes (dominant) concepts of solidarity in the public discourse. 
2.4 Discourse networks in Europe's migration crisis 
The EU’s migration and refugee policy has received more public attention since the launch 
of the Stockholm programme in 2009, which seeks to harmonise national migration 
policies and create a common European asylum system (CEAS). The Lisbon Treaty also 
focused more strongly on a common EU migration policy, but national regulators are still 
the principal actors in the EU migration policy and decision-making process (Zaun 2016). 
One of the first public debates on solidarity related to migration movements in the 
selected time period followed the so-called “Arab Spring” in 2011. A minor debate started 
on increasing numbers of migrants coming to Italy. Representatives of the Italian 
government demanded a European solidarity plan in order to deal with the situation, 
while other EU member states declined such actions and evaluated the situation as not 
severe enough to share responsibilities. Further migration movements to Europe were 
covered in the media, as the shipwreck incidents in the Mediterranean increased in 2013 
and 2014. The media discourse in 2015 was highly dominated by the “summer of 
migration” narrative in which hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers passed Southeast 
                                                     
18 The Fast Greedy algorithm was compared to other community detection algorithms that are 
implemented in the igraph package and it performed best. This is documented in table 8 of the 
appendix of chapter 2. 
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Europe and the Mediterranean in an attempt to reach Western and Northern Europe 
(Vollmer and Karakayali 2018). The German discourse in 2015 was centred around three 
events: The death of several dozen migrants locked in a lorry on a highway in Austria at 
the end of August; German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement that “we can do it”, 
which became a key slogan at that time; and the photograph of three-year-old Alan Kurdi, 
lying dead on a Turkish beach at the beginning of September 2015. 
To account for discursive changes, the period of 2010 to 2015 is split into two 
phases: The pre-crisis phase from 2010 to 2014, and the climax of the migration crisis in 
2015. In doing so, the differences in the framing of solidarity are assessed with regard to 
the meanings and scales both before and during times of crisis. 
2.4.1 Intergovernmental political solidarity and transnational cultural 
solidarity (2010–14) 
In the pre-crisis phase, political solidarity is the most prominent meaning of solidarity in 
the discourse. Cultural and social solidarity are also quite visible in the discourse (Table 9 
in the appendix of chapter 2). Political, cultural, and social solidarity are strongly linked to 
the transnational scale. However, political solidarity is also strongly attached to the 
intergovernmental scale of the EU (as shown in Figure 8). 
After the “Arab Spring” in 2011, Italy experienced an increasing migration 
movement, and Italian politicians such as Roberto Maroni (Lega Nord, Minister of the 
Interior) urged the EU (member states) to act in solidarity. He argued for a fair relocation 
of newly arrived asylum seekers across the European Union. Moreover, other 
international actors – such as Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs – 
argued for more solidarity-oriented European policies. The following statements by a 
CSU-MEP and the European Commissioner Malmström underline the demand to 
establish an intergovernmental solidarity scheme in the EU, whilst non-affected member 
states hardly show any solidarity with the South European border countries. Hence, 
political actors criticise these countries and demand that the member states cooperate to 
resolve the issue: 
“‘Border controls are no solution’, criticised the CSU-MEP Bernd Posselt. Germany and Italy 
have to jointly deal with the influx of immigrants. Posselt demanded an ‘improved European 
solidarity and burden-sharing among the EU member states of short-term influxes of 
immigrants’.” (Welt, April 2011) 
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“Malmstöm affirmed her claim about a ‘common European asylum system until 2013’. […] 
Furthermore, Malmström demanded more solidarity from the EU member states with those 
countries in the EU that are particularly affected by illegal immigration.” (Welt, May 2011) 
 
Note: The bipartite network consists of meanings represented as circles and scales displayed as 
squares. The network has 15 nodes (7 meanings of solidarity and 8 scales) and 207 edges, 3 
subgroups are identified and the network modularity is 0.32. The size of the nodes is based on 
eigenvector centrality. The bigger the size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. 
The edge thickness and the edge labels indicate how often a meaning and a scale are linked. The 
subgroups are identified by the Fast Greedy community detection algorithm. 
 
The debate about a political solidarity mechanism to deal with the high number of 
incoming asylum seekers to the EU was reiterated over the pre-crisis period in various 
Figure 8: Meaning-scale network in Germany (2010-14) 
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contexts. For instance, the Minister-President of Baden-Württemberg (Winfried 
Kretschmann, Green party) engaged in the public discourse. In 2014, he stressed that the 
local capacities to host a large number of new asylum seekers are very limited. 
Kretschmann demanded a fair distribution of asylum seekers among the German states 
(Länder), as well as a solidary political solution at the EU level.  Thus, linking political 
solidarity to the intergovernmental scale resonated quite strongly in the public debate. 
However, the public discourse on a new European solidarity scheme has not led to any 
substantial reform or new European decision-making process in the pre-crisis period.  
The relevance of norms and values as underlying principles of a refugee and 
asylum policy is expressed by the network centrality of cultural solidarity. The 
transnational scope of this meaning of solidarity is particularly highlighted (Figure 8). 
Acting on a shared understanding of norms – such as Human Rights for refugees – is 
demanded in the public discourse. Moreover, the values of the European enlightenment 
are stressed, arguing for a moral imperative to act on behalf of refugees. For instance, the 
President of Germany, Joachim Gauck, emphasised the importance of a shared identity 
and the values of the Enlightenment, while Pope Francis highlighted the Christian 
tradition of charity to show solidarity with foreigners. 
Three subgroups have been discovered by the community detection algorithm in 
the discourse network. The smallest but most visible subgroup is centred on the 
intergovernmental scale. This underlines the intergovernmentalist approach and the 
central role of the EU member states in the policymaking process around migration and 
asylum issues. The coastguard mission “Mare Nostrum” of the Italian Navy in 2013–14 
and the following Frontex-led EU mission “Triton” exhibited some efforts to deal with 
migration movements in a cooperative manner, but as the upcoming migration crisis in 
2015 revealed, these actions were neither sustainable nor sufficient. The second subgroup 
has the transnational scale at its core. It includes the rather central meanings of cultural 
solidarity and social solidarity. These meanings of solidarity refer to Human Rights and 
global norms that should guide solidarity actions, as well as the voluntary actions of 
NGOs and activists who support refugees and asylum seekers. 
The third subgroup is rather marginal and less coherent in its network structure. It 
contains claims on financial help (monetary solidarity) for countries in conflict zones and 
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economic development programmes (economic solidarity) for countries of origin of 
asylum seekers with demands to stop any solidarity actions in the EU, because these 
solidarity claims are perceived as false (misuse of solidarity). 
2.4.2 The salience of intergovernmental political solidarity (2015) 
The meaning-scale network in 2015 (Figure 9) shows the peak of the discussion in the 
German media. Political solidarity remains the most salient meaning of solidarity. The 
most prevalent scale is, again, the intergovernmental scale of the EU. Cultural solidarity 
and the transnational scale have a lower centrality value, but are still visible. These two 
closely linked meanings and scales of solidarity are also at the centre of their respective 
subgroups. 
The debate about reform to EU migration policies continued and intensified 
during the “summer of migration” in 2015. This is underlined by the thick edge between 
political solidarity and the intergovernmental scale as one subgroup in the network. EU 
Commissioners and German domestic party actors claimed that the EU migration crisis 
should be solved in a solidary way by developing a political mechanism by which to fairly 
share the responsibility for the incoming asylum seekers. Claims on political solidarity 
noted the pressures experienced first by Greece, as a European border country, and then 
by other Southeast European countries in dealing with hundreds of thousands of refugees 
seeking shelter or passing through to reach destination countries in Western and Northern 
Europe (Sweden, Germany, Netherlands). 
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Note: The bipartite network consists of meanings represented as circles and scales displayed as 
squares. The network has 10 nodes (4 meanings of solidarity and 6 scales) and 114 edges, 3 
subgroups are identified and the network modularity is 0.33. The size of the nodes is based on 
eigenvector centrality. The bigger the size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. 
The edge thickness and the edge labels indicate how often a meaning and a scale are linked. The 
subgroups are identified by the Fast Greedy community detection algorithm. 
 
Political solidarity is also emphasised as a way of criticising other actors who want to 
build up national border control and pause the EU’s internal open border policy (the 
Schengen agreement). As German Chancellor Angela Merkel highlights in her statement, 
the existence of Schengen and solidary relocations are two sides of the same coin: 
“So far, the EU has not agreed on ‘how solidarity is shown in times in which the Schengen 
area is tested’. Thus, the question on the solidary relocation of refugees and the ‘willingness 
Figure 9: Meaning-scale network in Germany (2015) 
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to a permanent relocation mechanism is not a minor detail, but crucial to whether Schengen 
can be maintained sustainably’, claimed Merkel.” (SZ, November 2015) 
A second subgroup is formed around cultural and social solidarity with the transnational 
scale. These claims refer to a just treatment of asylum seekers and welcome the voluntary 
efforts of citizens and NGOs toward assisting incoming refugees. Dimitris Avramopoulos, 
the EU Commissioner for Migration since 2015, states that the EU is based on values that 
shall guide its actions: 
“‘We are a family in Europe. We have values that connect all of us.’ This might sound 
pathetic, but this is exactly the issue at stake in Brussels this Wednesday: whether the EU 
member states act in solidarity with those who had to leave their home and are seeking 
refuge in Europe. Avramopoulos, the Commissioner for Migration, claims the following: ‘We 
have to face the responsibility. Solidarity has to be translated into actual politics.’” (SZ, May 
2015) 
The third subgroup is rather marginal and hardly influences the public solidarity 
discourse. More financial assistance (monetary solidarity) is claimed, either from other 
member states (intergovernmental scale) or within the nation state (national scale) in 
federal countries such as Germany in order to help and integrate the incoming refugees. 
The findings of the discourse in 2015 demonstrate that the meanings and scales of 
solidarity are quite stable over time. Claims on political and cultural solidarity were 
already made before the crisis and were primarily linked to the intergovernmental and 
transnational scale, respectively. The intergovernmental scale of potential solidarity 
actions in the EU has been addressed in the pre-crisis discourse. On the one hand, this 
underscores the fact that claiming solidarity in Europe’s migration crisis became more 
salient in 2015 and drew out certain political conflicts in the reforming of the EU Justice 
and Home Affairs. The focus on the intergovernmental scale still underlines the fact that 
claims on solidarity are linked to political reforms such as new institutional settings. Calls 
to solidarity were not just rhetorical, but rather formed part of the political struggle over 
how to solve the migration crisis and reform the Justice and Home Affairs in the EU. On 
the other hand, these issues were previously discussed in the pre-crisis period, which 
demonstrates that the call for solidarity in times of crisis rests upon extant ideas and 
policy proposals. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this article, I have proposed a new meso-discursive approach to solidarity. I have 
argued that the discursive construction of solidarity is overlooked by macro-institutional 
and micro-behavioural approaches to solidarity. I have suggested two dimensions for the 
analysis of solidarity: the first concerns how solidarity is framed and thus how actors 
attribute meaning to solidarity, while the second relates to the scale to which claims on 
solidarity refer. Both dimensions create concepts of solidarity. In order to scrutinise the 
new meso approach, I studied the discourse on solidarity amid Europe’s migration crisis. 
Solidarity was one of the crucial ideas in the crisis in 2015, but as the study has 
demonstrated, calls for solidarity extend back to before the solidarity-crisis nexus and 
indeed were already debated in previous years. The discourse network methodology was 
deployed so as to examine the meaning(s) and scale(s) of solidarity, and to show how 
these are linked to one another in the German media discourse. The new meso approach 
to solidarity demonstrated that differentiating between the meaning and the scale of 
solidarity can help us to better understand how actors make sense of a contested concept 
such as solidarity. It also shows that solidarity is not only inscribed in institutional settings 
or individual attitude, but emphasises the meaning making process underlying solidarity 
actions and beliefs. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the meaning of solidarity is 
malleable and not restricted to any particular scale, even if one can identify some closer 
connections between specific scales and meanings. Considering the scale dimension for 
the analysis of solidarity in particular provides a new perspective on how solidarity is 
bounded, and that it is a rather particularistic concept that refers to specific social contexts 
and social groups. 
The results provide novel insights into the research on solidarity and Europe’s 
migration crisis. First, a broad range of solidarity understandings are used in public 
discourse. Nonetheless, the meaning of political solidarity was shown to be highly salient 
in both time periods of the migration crisis discourse. This also holds true, to some extent, 
for the meaning of cultural solidarity. The discursive relevance of cultural solidarity 
corroborates earlier accounts, which suggest that solidarity refers to shared values and 
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norms. These create a sense of belonging and identification in the public, which is crucial 
in establishing political legitimacy in times of crisis (Jones 2014). 
The salience of political solidarity demonstrates the political nature of Europe’s 
migration crisis. Due to a lack of cooperation and shared responsibility in the EU 
migration and asylum policy based on one-sided obligations of border countries like Italy 
and Greece (and, to a lesser extent, Spain) in the Dublin Regulations, the political 
solidarity gap was debated by many actors in the German discourse. The establishment of 
the EU solidarity mechanism in September 2015 – which relocated 160,000 refugees from 
Greece and Italy to other EU member states through a certain quota (European 
Commission 2015) – was a consequence of increased pressure at the EU level, and could 
be seen as an effective example of political solidarity. However, the Visegrád group 
(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) strongly argued against this mandatory 
mechanism, which was decided by a majoritarian decision in the European Council 
(European Council 2015). Moreover, the Hungarian and Slovakian governments went to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to repeal the decision. However, the ECJ ruled against 
the complaints by Hungary and Slovakia in September 2017 (Byrne 2017). 
The rising nationalistic and xenophobic claims for tighter border controls, the 
temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement by the German and Austrian 
governments, and the enhancement of security surveillance have weakened the 
establishment and implementation of the solidarity mechanism at the national level. The 
recent numbers of relocated immigrants from Greece and Italy to the other member states 
show that hardly any country has fulfilled its obligations. For instance, Germany agreed 
to relocate approximately 27,000 refugees from Italy and Greece, whilst around 9,200 
people have arrived so far in Germany (up to November 2017). Similar levels of de jure 
commitments to relocate and de facto relocations are documented for almost every EU 
member state (European Commission 2017b). Previous studies, based on a liberal 
intergovernmentalism perspective, explained the failure of the European solidarity 
mechanism with asymmetrical involvement of the EU member states, the rising of right-
wing populist parties and a lack of core state powers (Biermann et al. 2019; Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2018; Zaun 2018) The present study highlights the positive framing of 
solidarity in the German discourse 2015 and Germany’s direct involvement in the 
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migration crisis. This enhanced the political pressure by Germany to vote for a solidarity 
mechanism in the European Council. Hence, Germany’s discursive and political influence 
in the EU might have contributed to the opposition by least affected member states and 
national delays in the implementation of the relocation mechanism. Moreover, the present 
study demonstrates that the salience of political solidarity between EU member states 
puts the fundamental question of EU Affairs back on the political agenda: namely, who 
cooperates with whom, and is it for European or national (or mutual) benefit? 
Conceptually, this is the first study to investigate political solidarity in greater detail, and 
it shows how essential it is for the European integration process in hard times.  
Second, meanings of solidarity are linked to various scales. Investigating the scale 
of solidarity offered a more nuanced understanding of what solidarity means in public 
discourses. When addressing issues around migration, the most dominant scale was that 
of the intergovernmental, although the transnational scale was also particularly visible in 
2010–14. The discourse networks have shown that the intergovernmental scale was 
predominantly linked to political solidarity, while the transnational scale was often 
addressed in claims of cultural solidarity. Following the meso approach that the 
meaning(s) and scale(s) of solidarity constitute concepts of solidarity, two dominant 
concepts of solidarity have been identified. On the one hand, intergovernmental political 
solidarity refers to structural and institutional aspects of cooperation and support among 
EU member states. On the other hand, transnational cultural solidarity is based on 
motivational and ideational characteristics. People and countries should show solidarity 
with others, because their actions are guided by shared norms and values.  
The present study bears some limitations. The findings of the German public 
debate are not representative for public discourses in other EU member states. Germany is 
the most powerful EU member state and its role in the migration crisis in 2015 was 
exceptionally important. Merkel’s slogan “we can do it” and the popular statement 
“refugees welcome” served to create a rather atypical public discourse on migration and 
refugee issues, since it was mainly framed in a positive manner, while Germany received 
a high number of asylum seekers in a short period of time. This provided an important 
context in which claims about solidarity became very prominent within the German 
discourse. Since Germany was strongly affected by the migration crisis, the public 
 78 
discourse reflects the expectation that other EU member states are obliged to show 
solidarity with Germany and other countries dealing with incoming asylum seekers. That 
said, this study does not focus on the refusal of solidarity in other EU member states. But 
given that solidarity was so present in the German discourse, it was a crucial case to 
consider in analysing the applicability of the meso-level approach. Further studies should 
apply the new meso approach to solidarity in other countries (both EU and non-
European), as well as to other policy areas so as to test the present findings in other 
contexts. 
The study has also not investigated the actor constellation in the discourse that is 
done in most discourse network studies (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). The 
focus was on outlining the meso approach to solidarity and conceptualising the meaning 
and scale dimension. Nonetheless, future studies should investigate more systematically 
who is calling for solidarity and who is addressed by whom in public debates on 
solidarity. 
In addition, looking at quality media outlets with the discourse network analysis 
favours a selection process of opinions and actors with regard to national executives 
(Koopmans and Statham 2010). Even though daily quality newspapers are still important 
for the public discourse, insofar as they set the agenda and mobilise the public, future 
studies should consider online media outlets or parliamentary debates to scrutinise the 
discursive construction of solidarity. Instead of deploying an extensive manual coding of 
newspaper articles and a quantitative analysis of the claims, a qualitative approach to 
investigate the discursive side of solidarity might be another future venue. Furthermore, it 
might be worthwhile looking at solidarity beyond times of crisis, investigating long-term 
trends and conceptual changes that might influence the understanding of what solidarity 
means and how actors draw upon it in hard times. 
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2.6 Appendix 
2.6.1 Political claims analysis 
The coding of the newspaper articles follows the political claims analysis (PCA) by Ruud 
Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; Koopmans and Statham 2010) and used the package 
RQDA in the R environment (Huang 2016). The main idea of the PCA is that newspaper 
texts contain many statements by different actors. Instead of focusing on the whole article 
as the unit of analysis or almost only on the content, the link between a statement and the 
speaker is stressed. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Koopmans and 
Statham (2010: 55) define claims as ‘public speech acts (including protest events) that 
articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or 
potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors’. 
Therefore, claims represent the plurality of actions and demands made by actors in the 
public. The components of a claim can be differentiated by following a logic of questions 
regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, 
addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY’ (de Wilde 2014: 52). These 
questions are the grammar of the claims-making method, help the coder to identify claims 
as well as make the coding transparent and comprehensible. 
In my project, four core codes are necessary in order to constitute a claim: 1) the 
speaker, 2) the act, 3) the issue and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all of these four 
codes in a statement, the claim is not coded. The other mentioned components by de 
Wilde are coded if detectable. The codes are differentiated into sub-codes to allow for a 
fine-grained coding and analysis (Table 6). Following the claims-making logic, newspaper 
articles can contain many claims, but also no claims at all. There are two limitations for the 
coding processes: First, I do not code claims that refer to events of migration that are older 
than 6 months from the date that it is reported in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would 
include references to migration processes in the 19th century or after World War II. Second, 
I only code a claim once in each newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique 
in its composition in each article. Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes the claim is 
seen as a new one. 
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Table 6: Codes and sub-codes in the Political Claims Analysis (Appendix Chapter 2) 
codes sub-codes 
time & source A_year, B_source 
claimant C_claimant_type, D_claimant_scope, E_claimant_function, 
F_claimant_party, G_claimant_nationality, X_special_claimant, XX_person 
action H_action 
issue I_issue, J_issue scope 
addressee K_addressee_type, L_addressee_scope, M_addressee_function, 
N_addresse_nationality, P_addressee_party, Q_addressee_evaluation 
frame R_position, S_justification, T_justification_scope 
 
For the present study, the sub-codes “S_justification” and “T_justification_scope” are most 
relevant. Although optional in the sense of only coded when a justification and a concrete 
scope could be identified, both sub-codes are in the focus of the meso-relational approach 
to solidarity. Both, the reason why an actor claims something as well the concrete scope to 
which s/he refers to and justifies the claim is of interest in order to study the discursive 
construction of solidarity more closely. 
For instance, an article reports about a speech by German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. At the beginning of the article, she is quoted demanding financial assistance 
(monetary solidarity) for Greece and demands a European solution. In the middle of the 
text, Merkel is cited again, but here, she calls for liberalising the public health sector in 
Greece in order to reduce the sovereign debt. Thus, the speaker is the same (Merkel), the 
act is the same (verbal statement), the issue is also the same (Euro crisis), but the position 
is different. While the first statement is about monetary solidarity and a pro-solidarity 
statement, the second statement refers to structural reforms and austerity actions in 
Greece. That is why both claims can be coded in the same article. 
No inter-coder reliability test could be obtained, because I had no financial 
capacity to fund other researchers to code with me. Thus, the coding was only done by the 
author. Extensive coder training, previous own experiences and applications of the 
method as well as the guidance by the codebook of de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn (2014) 
shall try to compensate the lack of the inter-coder reliability test. 
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Regarding the coding of the selected 'solidarity statements', I applied a 
nominalistic approach. This means that I have only coded claims with the mentioned term 
'solidarity'. This strengthens the validity and the reliability of the coding procedure for 
such a polysemic concept. The results are based on the following keyword lists in the 
database Factiva. The keyword string is: (Flüchtling* or Flucht* or Migrant* or 
Einwander* or Zuwander* or Asyl*) and Solidar* and (EU or Europ*). An Asterisk 
controls for multiple endings of a word. Duplicates of articles were excluded from the 
article population. 
Using 'Solidar*' in the keyword search has the disadvantage that the threshold for 
selecting articles is rather high. By applying the nominalistic approach, the meanings of 
solidarity can be grasped from the actor's claims. In a deductive-inductive coding process, 
it was possible to start with preliminary understandings of solidarity, based on previous 
studies, and then during the coding process, include new, join similar as well as 
reconsider existing meaning categories during the coding procedure. This helped to grasp 
the various meanings of the contested concept of solidarity. However, looking at the 
concrete term ‘solidarity’ might create a 'nominalistic fallacy'. Two reasons justify this 
decision and minimise the concerns: First, since the focus of this study is on solidarity, the 
study makes a more valid contribution by setting a rather strict threshold for the selection 
of articles and claims. Second, the high threshold positively influences the coding 
procedure, because the coding decision whether the coded claim is about solidarity is 
already made. Consequently, the coding concentrates on the meaning and scale of the 
solidarity claims. This increases the validity and reliability of the coding. Moreover, I had 
an previous extensive coder training on the political claims analysis and the coding of 
claims follows the published codebook by de Wilde et al. (2014) who have coded 
newspaper articles and parliamentary debates in a similar way. The following claim is an 
example from the Süddeutsche Zeitung: 
“We need more solidarity. We need more humanity”, claimed Michael Roth, the German 
Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. “We are very, very open to develop 
a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before”, he 
emphasised (Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 2015). 
The speaker is Michael Roth and coded as SPD politician, he makes a verbal statement in 
the public, talks about the migration crisis and his position is pro-solidarity. Thus, the 
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statement is a claim. Additionally, the justification of the claim is coded. Since Roth talks 
about new European political mechanism that should foster cooperation among the EU 
member states, the justification of the claim is coded as ‘political solidarity’. The 
justification scope is then international with the focus on the EU. 
Based on previous studies (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Statham et al. 2005), the 
initial expectation was that solidarity is often expressed on demonstrations/protest events 
and related written statements by actors that are covered in the news. Thus, it would have 
been interesting to distinguish between different ‘acts of solidarity’ in the media coverage. 
However, verbal and written statements by institutionalised actors are the most common 
act of claiming solidarity. 59 per cent of all claims are made verbally while 28 per cent of 
the claims are written statements. Since the ‘act’ dimension is also not in the focus of this 
study, because the main interest is the analysis of meanings and scales of solidarity, the 
‘act’ dimension is not reported in this study. 
Due to the coding of the ‘position’ category, every claim was coded whether it 
expresses a pro or contra solidarity position (e. g. ‘solidarity is needed, because …’ as pro-
position or ‘solidarity is not necessary, because…’ as contra-position). I expected a 
polarised discourse on solidarity and the aim was to analyse ‘conflict networks’ (Leifeld 
2016b). However, the findings show that 96 per cent of all claims (344 claims in total) are 
pro-solidarity on the position dimension. Dividing the time period as performed in the 
study, it shows that there is hardly any polarisation at any time. 
 
Table 7: Percentage of pro-solidarity claims in German newspapers per year (Appendix 
Chapter 2) 
Country\year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 100 per 
cent 
90,3 per cent 100 per 
cent 
91,8 per 
cent 
100 per 
cent 
99,2 per 
cent 
 
If actors claim meanings of solidarity, then they refer to it in a positive pro-solidarity 
manner. This leads to the conclusion that focusing on polarisation is less interesting than 
expected from previous research (Leifeld 2016a; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). Thus, the 
‘position’ dimension is left out for this study. The non-polarisation of solidarity in this 
study cannot be analysed in greater detail, but two aspects are reflected here. On the one 
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hand, solidarity seems to be having a very positive connotation in the everyday language. 
Even though, it is rather unclear what solidarity might mean, opposing solidarity in 
public discourses seems rather uncommon. This raises further considerations how to 
study a concept that actors hardly oppose although the consequence is not necessarily 
solidary politics. ON the other hand, the missing articulated opposition to solidarity 
might be an artefact of the structure of the data. Instead of confronting calls to solidarity, 
actors might not talk about solidarity at all. They use different frames and concepts in 
order to legitimise their (on-solidary) politics. Since the data gathering and coding relies 
on a nominalistic approach to solidarity, such public claims on non-solidarity are seldom 
captured in this study. 
2.6.2 Discourse network analysis 
The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the discourse network 
analysis (DNA) (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56) and since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme 
and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into network data. 
The DNA brings together discourse analysis and social network analysis by focusing on 
the interconnectedness of concepts and actor appearances in discourses (Leifeld 2013; 
Leifeld 2016a; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). 
Actors argue with particular concepts and this communicative action can be 
understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. By referring either more or less 
to one concept, this could be understood as a repetitive account on arguing for a specific 
policy solution. Other actors might use the same concept in the debate and build up a 
relation to the concept too. Since different actors have different interests we could assume 
that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors. Based on 
shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network analysis can detect 
specific actor networks or concept networks to examine which actors are relatively close 
or distant to each other. Lastly, actors and concepts can be studied in affiliation networks, 
showing two types of networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). The 
discourse network graphs 2 and 3 as well as the eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987; 
Hanneman and Riddle 2011) are computed and visualised with the R package igraph 
(Csárdi and Nepusz 2006). The Fast Greedy algorithm works as bottom-up approach. It is 
assumed that closely connected nodes form subgroups. To identify these, the algorithm 
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tries to improve the modularity score in order to detect closely linked nodes (Clauset et al. 
2004). Hence, subgroups are revealed. The modularity score of each network controls for 
the subdivision of the network. The scale goes from 0 to 1. The closer the value is to 1, the 
more densely connected subgroups are within and less linked to nodes in other 
subgroups. The modularity value is an indicator to scrutinise how well the division of the 
network by the community detection algorithm works (Newman 2006). However, there is 
no specific threshold for the modularity score to be more or less accurate. The higher the 
score, the better it is, but it should also be validated by the applied data. For this purpose, 
the label propagation community detection algorithm (Raghavan et al. 2007) and the 
walktrap community detection algorithm (Pons and Latapy 2005) have been also 
computed and the results are shown in Table 8. It lists the modularity score and the 
number of identified communities by the three different community detection algorithms. 
Although the differences are small, the Fast Greedy algorithm performed best in both 
discourse networks. 
 
Table 8: Comparison of community detection algorithms (Appendix Chapter 2) 
 Fast Greedy 
algorithm 
(Modularity/length) 
Walktrap algorithm 
(Modularity/length) 
Label propagation 
algorithm 
(Modularity/length) 
Discourse network 
2010-2014 
0.32 / 3 0.29 / 3 0.29 / 3 
Discourse network 
2015 
0.33 / 3 0.32 / 2 0.32 / 2 
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Table 9 lists all nodes in the meaning-scale networks based on their eigenvector centrality 
values in two time periods 2010-2014 and 2015. 
 
Table 9: Centrality values in German discourse networks (2010-14 and 2015) (Appendix 
Chapter 2) 
2010-2014                                                                          2015 
meanings and scales value meanings and scales value 
political solidarity 1,000 intergovernmental_EU 1,000 
intergovernmental_EU 0,789 political solidarity 0,977 
transnational migrants/refugees 0,761 cultural solidarity 0,242 
cultural solidarity 0,363 transnational migrants/refugees 0,123 
social solidarity 0,261 monetary solidarity 0,071 
monetary solidarity 0,089 national 0,037 
transnational_with specific group 0,080 transnational_with specific group 0,034 
legal solidarity 0,052 social solidarity 0,025 
international_conflict zone countries 0,047 national_diverse population 0,008 
misuse of solidarity 0,044 Other 0,001 
national_diverse population 0,025   
national 0,016   
transnational_EU citizens 0,007   
international_countries of origin 0,002   
economic solidarity 0,000   
Note: The scales are in italics in order to identify them easier in the table. The centrality value of the 
meaning-scale network is the eigenvector centrality. It is based on the number of edges a concept 
and a scale share and how the node (meaning or scale) is linked to other central nodes in the 
network. The scale of eigenvector centrality is from 0 to 1. The closer the value of the node to 1 is, 
the more influential is the node in the network.  
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3 The politics of solidarity in Europe’s migration crisis: 
Media discourses in Germany and Ireland in 2015
19
 
3.1 Introduction 
More than one million refugees and migrants came to Europe in 2015. This situation 
triggered a public debate about the role of solidarity in refugee issues. The former UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon spoke about Europe’s migration crisis as a “crisis of 
solidarity” (Ban 2016). Solidarity was one of the central concepts in Europe's migration 
crisis and the related media debate. How can we make sense of these public references to 
solidarity? Even though part of the answer might be that the naming of solidarity is 
window dressing, this might underestimate the relevance of ideas in political and societal 
debates. Instead of dismissing a closer examination of solidarity or focusing on traditional 
analyses of solidarity20, I will take a closer look at the discursive construction of solidarity in 
the media (Wallaschek 2019c). 
I argue that solidarity has multiple meanings and by reconstructing these from the 
discourses, I demonstrate the conceptual plurality of solidarity. I assume that solidarity is 
a “contested concept” (Gallie 1956). Varies concepts are raised by actors to argue for or 
against solidarity. These discursive struggles about solidarity have been barely considered 
in recent studies (Stjernø 2009; Wallaschek 2016a). I will show that political, cultural and 
social solidarity are the most salient types of solidarity while security and demarcation are 
the strongest counter-concepts to solidarity in the media debate in 2015. Focusing on this 
year gives a crucial insight into the climax of media coverage of migration and refugee 
issues during the crisis.  
The chapter proceeds as following: First, the theoretical framework of my 
ideational research is briefly outlined and concepts of solidarity are described. After that, 
                                                     
19 Chapter 3 will be published in the edited volume ‘Europeanisation and Renationalisation. Learning 
from Crises for Innovation and Development’, edited by Ulrike Liebert and Anne Jenichen at Budrich 
Academic Publishers in 2019. I would like to thank Anne Jenichen, Ulrike Liebert, Sandra Reinecke 
and the reviewer for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this text. 
20 Traditional studies on solidarity either investigate social policy and welfare state issues or 
examine opinions and attitudes of individuals on solidarity (e. g. Boräng 2015; Ciornei/Reechi 2017; 
Oorschot 2000). 
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the method, case selection and data are presented, before the results of my analysis are 
shown. The final section reflects on the findings and future research perspectives. 
3.2 An ideational-discursive approach to solidarity 
An ideational-discursive framework focuses on the ideational foundations of politics and 
locates ideas in a broader discursive-institutional framework (Béland/Cox 2011; Schmidt 
2012). In general, ”interpretive approaches to political science focus on the meanings that 
shape actions and institutions, and the ways in which they do so” (Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 
17). Depending on certain beliefs and ideas, arguments can change. Politicians adjust their 
reasoning or propose new ideas. Different interpretations of a political problem are 
reconstructed by analysing the claims and justifications of actors. Investigating the 
different rationales helps understand what actors perceive as a problem and how they 
deal with it (Hajer 1995: 42–45). 
While previous studies have shown the relevance of ideas and frames in political 
decision making processes (e. g. Blyth 2015; Wonka 2016), solidarity as a specific concept 
is less investigated. Closa and Maatsch (2014) have demonstrated that solidarity is used as 
a justification in parliamentary debates about the Euro crisis. Based on this, it is assumed 
that solidarity is also a relevant concept in Europe’s migration crisis. However, solidarity 
might have different meanings and actors deploy their own understanding of solidarity. 
Based on this and according to the theoretical work on solidarity, solidarity is 
distinguished into different concepts of solidarity.21 In the following, political, cultural and 
social solidarity are briefly described due to their high salience in the German and Irish 
media discourse. 
Political solidarity is based on claiming that a certain we should work together in a 
political context to deal with an issue. This could include new legislative actions, creating 
political instruments or changing politics in general. Many actors reflect about the 
political context and conclude that in order to create solidary relations, political 
institutions and policies have to be changed (Kneuer/Masala 2015). 
                                                     
21 On the theoretical foundations of solidarity, see Bayertz (1998), Brunkhorst (2002) and Wallaschek 
(2016b). 
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Cultural solidarity emphasises shared norms or traditions between the giver(s) and 
taker(s) of solidarity, such as the European enlightenment, religious roots or speaking the 
same language. To share a common cultural background or to belong to the same cultural 
group is a crucial aspect for acting in solidarity within this justification (Walzer 2006). This 
cultural framing is used to highlight the values on which the EU is built upon, or it is used 
to criticise others who seem to ignore these. 
Social solidarity refers to welfare and social policy issues as well as to helping in the 
neighbourhood, supporting integration of refugees and migrants by local communities 
and organisations (Ferrara 2014; Hamann/Karakayali 2016). Social solidarity can be seen 
as the ideational base for volunteers and citizens. This justification is related to helping 
migrants and refugees who are settled in the local context. 
It has to be noted that each concept of solidarity can have a different geographical 
scope. Solidarity can refer, as Ciornei and Recchi (2017) have shown, to the international 
or transnational level, but also to the national or even sub-national level. This 
differentiation is taken into account for the following analysis to encounter solidarity in its 
plurality. 
3.3 Case selection, method and data 
This chapter investigates notions of solidarity in the German and Irish media arena in 
2015. Political actors such as national governments present their politics to the general 
public. By articulating their positions to a broader audience, they legitimise their political 
actions (Koopmans and Statham 2010). Despite the existence of unequal power structures 
and resource disparities (Kriesi et al. 2007; Van Dalen 2012), the media arena is a place 
where numerous actors with different political positions appear. Although readership is 
declining, printed newspapers are crucial, because “thresholds for audience members are 
particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large” (Wessler et al. 2008: 5). By 
focusing on newspapers, I identify and reconstruct concepts of solidarity in the debate on 
the migration crisis. I examine the media coverage in 2015 in the Irish Times (IT) and Irish 
Independent (IInd) for Ireland as well as the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Die Welt 
(DWe) for Germany. These selected quality daily newspapers are among the most 
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important ones in their respective country, have a large circulation and represent the 
political cleavage of centre-left and centre-right positions. 
It can be expected that the German debate was more politicised due to the high 
influx of refugees, and that German actors might refer to the idea of solidarity more often. 
Ireland was – at least partly due to its geographical location - not in the centre of taking in 
refugees and thus the Irish debate might have been less intense. I will illustrate these 
expected differences by examples from the newspaper material. 
The selection of newspaper articles is based on a keyword search in the database 
Factiva. I selected 767 articles from four quality newspapers and coded 551 claims with 
the RQDA package in R (Huang 2016). The coding is based on the Political Claims 
Analysis, developed by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; 2010) and further 
elaborated by Pieter de Wilde (2013). A claim contains four elements: Actors (claimants) 
speak (action) about something (issue) and express an opinion (position) about it. 
Additionally, I emphasise the category of justification, because I am interested in the 
reasons why actors argue for or against solidarity and in the geographical scope actors 
refer to in their justification. Regarding the manual coding of the claims, I applied a 
nominalistic approach. This means that I have only coded claims with the term solidarity 
or close synonyms in it. This strengthens the validity and the reliability of the coding 
procedure of such a contested term like solidarity, but decreases the number of 
identifiable claims in newspapers. The following Table 10 presents an overview of the 
amount of claims and articles in the four selected newspapers. 
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Table 10: Amount of claims and articles in four newspapers 
source/time period Claims in 2015 Articles in 2015 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 218 (39 %) 394 (51 %) 
Die Welt 198 (36 %) 223 (29 %) 
Irish Times 86 (16 %) 95 (13 %) 
Irish Independent 49 (9 %) 55 (7 %) 
Total 551 (100 %) 767 (100 %) 
 
Note: The results are based on a keyword search. For Germany: “(Flüchtling* or Flucht* or Migrant* 
or Einwander* or Zuwander* or Asyl*) and Solidar* and (EU or Europ*)”. For Ireland: "(Refugee or 
escape or Migrant* or Migration* or Immigrant or Immigration* or Asyl*) and (solidar* or mutual w/1 
support* or cooperat*) and (EU or Europ*)". An Asterisk controls for multiple word endings. 
Duplicates of articles were excluded. 
 
In comparison, the German discourse is denser and includes more articles and claims than 
the Irish discourse. Furthermore, the centre-left newspapers SZ and IT contain more 
articles and claims than the centre-right newspapers. The next section gives a brief 
overview about Europe's migration crisis in 2015 and after that the most frequently used 
concepts of solidarity – political, cultural and social solidarity – will be analysed. Then, 
the anti-solidarity justifications demarcation and security are examined. 
3.4 Solidarity in Europe´s migration crisis  
2015 was a turbulent year in terms of immigration and asylum seeking. Migrants and 
refugees22 coming from conflict zones in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Central 
Asia challenged the EU border regime, the Dublin agreements and revealed the 
“asymmetric way”, in which the EU migration and asylum policy was developed (Monar 
2014: 620). 
The public attention on migration issues and solidarity was very high in the long 
summer of migration, starting from August until the beginning of October 2015.23 
                                                     
22 Migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons have different legal statuses and 
rights. I describe these people as “refugees and migrants” if both groups could be meant in a 
statement, following a suggestion by the UNHCR (2015). 
23 The long summer of migration is a depiction of the events in 2015 from pro-movement activists 
(Kasparek and Speer 2015).  
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Especially three distinct events created a lot of media coverage. On August 28th, a lorry 
with several dozen dead migrants was found at a highway in Austria inducing a public 
outburst. Shortly after, on August 31st, and as a reaction to the increasing amount of 
refugees, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said what later became a key slogan: ”We 
can do it and where something hinders us, it must be overcome” (2015).24 Lastly, on 
September 3rd, a picture from the three-year-old boy Alan Kurdi, lying dead on a beach at 
the Turkish coast, received a lot of media attention and produced public reactions about 
the deadly journey of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean. 
The following analysis includes the whole year 2015 demonstrating that even 
before these incidents, solidarity was discussed in the media and among the main political 
stakeholders. Looking at the specific justifications for pro- or contra solidarity claims 
helps to understand how solidarity is framed.  
3.4.1 Three notions of solidarity 
The most prevalent concepts of solidarity in 2015 are political, cultural and social 
solidarity. From a total number of 551 claims, 112 claims (20 per cent) contained the 
justification political solidarity while in 52 claims (10 per cent) cultural solidarity was used 
as a justification for political actions in times of crisis. Social solidarity was deployed 30 
times (5 per cent) in 2015.25  
Political solidarity refers mainly to the scope of the EU, for example improving the 
European asylum policies. For instance, the journalist Martin Wolf argues for active 
solidarity with border states such as Greece, and the German politician Michael Roth 
demands a European solidarity mechanism. 
Solidarity is also needed to help overstretched countries on the frontiers, notably Greece and 
Italy. It is hard to see how the border-free Europe of today will be maintained without a 
well-resourced border protection and immigration service (IT, September 23rd).  
“We need more solidarity. We need more humanity”, claimed Michael Roth, the German 
Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. “We are very, very open to develop 
a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before”, he 
emphasised (SZ, June 24th). 
                                                     
24 The translations of all German statements in the text are my own. 
25 The rest of the claims either contained no justification which is the case in 19 per cent of all claims 
or referred to other justifications. The salience of the solidarity justifications, first political then 
cultural and third social solidarity holds true for the German and Irish case. 
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By focusing on solidarity among EU member states, the statements create a new 
dimension of exclusion, because migrants and refugees are not an active part in this claim 
and justification. European solidarity is addressed and frames migrants either as passive 
or even as a threat to the EU (member states), as Wolf states when he is arguing for more 
border protection. Solidarity here strengthens the social bonds among the member states 
and marks the exclusion of refugees. These examples underline the relevance of political 
solidarity as a crucial frame of how to engage politically in the migration crisis. Across the 
newspapers and among the actors, establishing solidary mechanisms seems to be 
perceived as the most important way to deal with the crisis and create co-operation 
among the EU member states. 
The cultural framing of solidarity is used to highlight the values on which the EU 
is built upon, or criticism is raised why other actors disregard this fundamental principle. 
The following example shows not only the cultural framing of solidarity, but also the 
partly exchange of ideas and opinions via national newspapers. In this case, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier and Sigmar Gabriel, both German social democrats (SPD), wrote an opinion 
piece together in which they emphasised solidarity as a common ground for cooperation 
among EU member states, which was published in several European newspapers, 
including the Irish Times: 
Europe is facing a great challenge for our generation. Never before have so many people fled 
political persecution and war as today, many seeking refuge with us in Europe. […] As 
Europeans, we owe it to ourselves and to the world to rise to the great challenge posed by 
these people looking for help. The response so far does not meet the standards that Europe 
must set for itself. […] We need a European asylum, refugee and migration policy founded 
on the principle of solidarity and our shared values of humanity (IT, August 27th). 
This sort of claim can be found among different actors. The president of the German 
Employers’ Associations, Ingo Kramer, argued similarly in the discussion on a common 
solidarity mechanism among EU member states that the EU is foremost a community of 
solidary values: 
Ingo Kramer said, the EU is ”a community of solidary values, not a community of benefits”. 
And whoever does not accept refugees could not demand solidarity from other countries [in 
other circumstances] […] (SZ, November 25th). 
Referring to cultural solidarity emphasises the ideational foundations of the EU and 
demands a value-driven account of politics in the migration crisis. In 2015, it was 
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especially used to criticise others who oppose solidarity actions and to demand more 
solidarity. 
Lastly, social solidarity refers to welfare and social policy issues as well as to 
helping in the neighbourhood and supporting the integration of refugees by volunteers. 
Social solidarity is related to the transnational level by working as the base of voluntary 
actions for refugees. It is also related to local contexts in which migrants and refugees 
settled in. 
Many Irish people want to help directly. […] I suggest that a website based on the likes of 
Daft.ie or Airbnb could be set up through funding from the Department of the Environment. 
[…] We could call it RAFT.ie (Refugee Accommodation, Food and Transport), where families 
with spare rooms could offer a safe 'life-raft' to bring refugees closer to safety. Householders 
can upload photos of the rooms, the numbers they can take and the period of time they can 
host one refugee, a family or a couple. You might be able to give English lessons, help with 
form-filling, introduce people into the community, help children with school integration - or 
just provide warmth, clothing and food, and help them find work. Simply make them feel 
safe (IInd, October 31st). 
Citizens are also quite visible in the debate on social solidarity due to their letters to the 
editor or reports about their local activities. 
The […] solidarity is needed for another task: helping refugees integrate successfully. This is 
going to be difficult and costly. They will need assistance with learning the language and 
housing. Richer countries will have to assist the less-well-off ones. A revitalised European 
economy would also help (IT, September 23nd). 
This demonstrates that solidarity is not only an elitist concept or is not just used in 
headlines for newspaper articles. The coverage of concrete solidarity actions by ordinary 
citizens or the public demand to act in solidarity with refugees shows the variety of 
solidarity in the discourse. Not only political actions on the European level are discussed, 
but also the social activities that happened in 2015 (Hamann and Karakayali 2016). 
The use of one of these justifications in the media debate is not exclusionary. For 
instance, actors refer to political as well as cultural solidarity depending on the actual 
debate or event. So, the identification of different notions of solidarity underlines the need 
to carefully investigate public debates on solidarity in Europe’s migration crisis. There is 
not necessarily a fixed actor preference towards one notion of solidarity over another type 
of solidarity. Moreover, there are also justifications in opposition to solidarity and I will 
present two of them – demarcation and security – in the following section. 
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3.4.2 Unmaking solidarity: Demarcation and security 
The most dominant justifications for opposing solidarity are demarcation and security. In 
551 claims in 2015, demarcation and security were used each 43 times (taken together 16 
per cent of all claims) and most often in the German discourse. Demarcation is the 
strongest reason for non-solidarity and is against the border crossing of migrants. As the 
following report in the Irish Times shows, setting up fences and creating special police 
forces shall demonstrate the sovereign national power. 
An additional steel border fence is now being erected [at the Hungarian border], and more 
than 2,100 police officers and cadets will form fast-reaction "hunting" units, equipped with 
four-wheel-drives, helicopters and dogs, to respond to incidents. Hungary's parliament is 
expected to debate the deployment of soldiers to the border (IT, August 31st). 
Demarcation frames in their extremist versions are physical attacks and hate speeches 
against incoming refugees and are linked to racist and nationalist arguments (Jäckle and 
König 2017). The next media report on a radical right-wing protest in Italy shows that 
such anti-refugee protests were already happening before the long summer of migration. 
Members of Casa Pound, a neo-fascist organisation, appeared in Rome. As soon as the bus 
with 19 African refugees arrived who were to be accommodated at the Casale San Nicola, 
right-wing extremists waved the Italian flag, shouted hate slogans, raised their right arm for 
the fascist salute and blocked the entrance (SZ, July 22nd). 
The demarcation justification can be seen in protest and demonstrations against a so 
called abuse of asylum or in claims for the deportation of irregular refugees. Claims for 
demarcation fundamentally contest the need for solidarity. 
The justification for security shifts the statement from solidary actions to issues of 
border control and safety. Instead of helping refugees, border control and surveillance of 
the Mediterranean by Frontex should be enhanced to stop irregular migration and 
prosecute human traffickers. The refugee disappears in this justification. This re-shaping 
of the migration crisis by focusing on smugglers and human trafficking can be observed at 
the European level as well. In April 2015, a 10-point action plan to deal with the increasing 
numbers of refugees was presented at a European Council meeting which focused on 
security issues. 
A 10-point action plan on migration was outlined at a joint foreign and home affairs 
European Council meeting on April 20th. The action plan focuses primarily on military action 
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against smugglers and refers, for example, to ”systematic efforts to capture and destroy 
vessels used by the smugglers” (IT, April 23rd). 
Besides setting up national fences and border control, migration processes are seen as 
threats to national societies as well as the European community. Instead of showing 
solidarity with refugees who come to Europe, the claim for solidarity is reversed and used 
to justify security measures at the national and European borders.  
Warsaw wants to prevent a revision of asylum law based on the population of the EU 
member states. Until now Poland receives only few refugees in relation to its population size 
– in 2014 only 114 Syrians have applied for asylum. It is not surprising that the head of 
government Ewa Kopacz primarily insists on better border security in the Mediterranean at 
the EU summit in Brussels. “Our solidarity primarily rests upon strongly supporting 
Frontex. We will send our border police officers” (DWe, April 25th). 
The security justification is mostly facilitated by far right and conservative politicians, but 
also by politicians from the so called Visegrád Group (Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic 
and Hungary) as the claim by the former Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz illustrates. 
The justification is used to either prevent further European cooperation or to focus on 
smuggling and human trafficking; instead of helping refugees or establishing legal routes 
for them. 
The contrasting justifications to solidarity demonstrate that even though claims for 
solidarity are the most frequent ones, the contestation of solidarity is an essential part of 
the discourse as well. Proposing political solidarity as a European mechanism to take in 
refugees or relocate refugees among EU member states is one side. The other side is 
giving up the Schengen Agreement and renationalising border control and refugee 
policies. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Solidarity became a crucial concept in the public debate in Europe in 2015. This chapter 
aimed at revealing the different meanings of solidarity and the discursive counterparts to 
solidarity. Solidarity is not a concept with one uncontested meaning, but has a variety of 
understandings. The three most salient meanings – political, social and cultural solidarity 
– were examined in the debate on Europe’s migration crisis. The reconstructed notions of 
solidarity in the discourses emphasise the careful assessment of solidarity claims. 
Solidarity can contain different notions which refer to various perceptions of the 
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migration crisis. Looking more precisely at these constructions helps us to understand 
how actors understand and make sense of crisis situations by referring to solidarity. 
The use of political solidarity in both national discourses demonstrates that the 
media debate goes beyond the framing of renationalisation or Europeanisation in times of 
crisis. Both processes are captured in the discussion on solidarity which underlines the 
relevance of both national solidarity and European solidarity in the debate on the 
migration crisis. The framing of cultural solidarity in 2015 was almost always related to 
common European values and norms, respectively the lack of these by the criticised 
actors. This cultural Europeanisation of solidarity is a hint towards the high importance of 
solidarity as a fundamental idea in European societies and the European treaties. Social 
solidarity is used as a justification in the debate in regard to voluntary work and support 
for refugees. It has an explicit transnational dimension in the German and Irish context by 
showing solidarity with foreigners in need. 
The demarcation and security justifications in the debate were often put forward 
as a renationalisation of politics and sovereignty. European cooperation and co-ordination 
were addressed as the demand to strengthen border control and surveillance measures in 
the Mediterranean. Extreme forms of these claims were expressed as physical attacks and 
right-wing radical speeches against refugees and volunteers in the migration sector. Even 
though pro-solidarity claims were far more frequent than anti-solidarity claims, the 
discourse has shifted in 2015 from more pro-solidarity at the climax of the long summer of 
migration to more anti-solidarity discourses in the winter. This underlines the 
contestation of solidarity in the discourse and that the call for solidary actions is not a 
given consensus. 
The debate about the refugee situation in Europe is about refugees, not with 
refugees. I have identified some claims made by migrants, but in general these voices 
have been invisible and silenced as previous studies demonstrated (KhosraviNik et al. 
2012; Lünenborg et al. 2011). If public discourses include more migrants and refugees 
voices in the future, they would be less paternalistic and contain more accounts on what 
refugees need and say how a solidary relationship in Europe should look like. 
Europe’s migration crisis is seen as a European issue in German and Irish 
newspapers. The used geographical scopes in the justification corroborate this finding. 
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Political solidarity mostly refers to the international level within the EU and suggests that 
solidary actions should happen among the EU member states. Social and cultural 
solidarity bear a strong transnational dimension by claiming voluntary actions with 
refugees and migrants. Security claims contain either a more national or a more 
international dimension. Border control and surveillance are proposed as measures in the 
nation-state but also as joint actions at the Southern European borders. Only demarcation 
contains this explicit national(istic) framing in Germany and Ireland. 
This discourse similarity in the geographical scope of concepts can be seen as a 
first hint towards a shared understanding of solidary problem solving. National solidarity 
is neither in Germany nor in Ireland the dominant notion while claims for types of 
international and transnational solidarity are made in Europe’s migration crisis. Even if 
security measures are often not in line with international solidarity obligations, the claims 
for joint security actions still demonstrate the political will to cooperate within the EU. In 
times of renationalisation and Euroscepticism, European cooperation is more than ever 
necessary. In 1950, Robert Schuman declared that Europe “will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity” (Schuman 1950). Nowadays, the 
concrete achievements as well as solidarity are at stake. It should be in the interest of the 
political elites and national populations to strengthen the idea of solidarity as a crucial 
value and a guiding principle for political actions in the European Union.  
Future research should investigate the (changing) actor constellation in Europe 
more concretely to account for different party positions on migration and asylum policies. 
Analysing public discourses in Central and Eastern European countries might also reveal 
different actor constellation due to their sceptical view on European solidarity in the 
migration crisis. Moreover, future studies could examine the influence of different media 
systems on the coverage of such a European issue and the role of social media for the 
discussion on solidarity in Europe’s migration crisis.  
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4 Framing solidarity in the Euro crisis: A comparison of 
the German and Irish media discourse
26
 
The article analyses the framing of solidarity in the Euro crisis discourse. 
Previous research has argued that the Euro crisis and the debtor-creditor 
constellation highlights the political conflict around solidarity in the EU. 
Based on a discursive institutionalist framework, the article investigates the 
different meanings of solidarity as well as the constellation of actors in 
Germany and Ireland from 2010 to 2015. Whilst Germany as the biggest 
creditor country is understood as a potential giver of solidarity, Ireland as a 
debtor country is conceptualised as a potential receiver of solidarity. The 
discourse network methodology is applied to study the relation of framing 
and actor presence. The findings show that the ideational structure of both 
discourses is different, but the actor constellation is rather similar. In 
particular, solidarity and austerity are linked in the German discourse, while 
the Irish discourse focuses predominantly on responsibility and solidarity, 
and less so on austerity. The actor constellation shows a dominance of 
German actors in both countries, highlighting the central position of 
Germany within the Eurozone. The article is the first study to analyse the 
construction of solidarity in the Euro crisis and contributes to the study of 
solidarity in hard times. 
Keywords: discursive institutionalism; solidarity; Euro crisis, discourse network 
analysis; Germany; Ireland 
  
                                                     
26 Chapter 4 is published online in New Political Economy on March 5th 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2019.1586864. I would like to thank the participants of the joint 
BIGSSS/InIIS colloquium, the UCD SPIRe Seminar Series and the panel audiences at the ECPR 
general conference 2017 and DVPW section conference ‘Internationale Politik’ in 2017 for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. In particular, I appreciate the feedback by Sebastian Haunss, 
Aidan Regan, Sandra Reinecke, Marcus Wolf and Arndt Wonka. Moreover, I am grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers for their comments on the article. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Euro crisis was dominated by the austerity paradigm, which gave rise to new 
financial institutions such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the form of 
intergovernmental treaties and a new supranational supervisory institution referred to as 
the ‘Troika’ (from 2015 on, ‘the institutions’). Formed by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), the European Commission (EC), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it 
supervised the bailout programmes in the ‘GIPS’ countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain) (Blyth 2015; Schmidt 2016; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). 
Nonetheless, claims on solidarity were also articulated in the Euro crisis. The 
demand to help the crisis countries emphasised the crucial value of solidarity in the EU 
integration process and called for a European and democratic solution to the crisis 
(Lahusen and Grasso 2018a; Sangiovanni 2013). In times of crisis, calls for solidarity are 
often articulated to deal with uncertainty and perceived threats. Solidarity claims are then 
an appeal to cooperate and strengthen the social bonds between members of a 
community. With regard to the EU, the creditor and debtor state constellation in the Euro 
crisis can be understood as a question of solidarity in terms of who is cooperating with 
whom and on what grounds (Hutter et al. 2016). The ‘GIPS countries’ are understood as 
potential receivers of solidarity, because they demand that other member states help them to 
recover and share the economic and financial burden. Other EU member states who have 
not been negatively affected by the crisis, such as Finland, Austria or Germany, are 
expected to show solidarity with the crisis countries and could be conceptualised as 
potential givers of solidarity. Therefore, we would expect that actors from the debtor 
countries predominantly claim solidarity, criticise Germany as the main creditor state for 
its ordoliberal policies, and attack the ‘Troika’ for its strict conditionality. Hence, solidarity 
is understood as oppositional to austerity and as a strategic idea deployed by the political 
opposition in parliamentary debates (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Wonka 2016). 
However, based on an analysis of solidarity in the Euro crisis discourse in 
Germany and Ireland from 2010 to 2015, I will demonstrate that solidarity is a ‘polysemic 
idea’ that is strategically used by national executives and is connected to other ideas in the 
debtor and creditor discourse in ‘coalition magnet patterns’ (Béland and Cox 2016). The 
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German discourse is structured by the ‘austerity-solidarity’ pattern, linking the two ideas 
that are seen as necessary to resolve the Euro crisis. The Irish discourse, by contrast, is 
shaped by the ‘responsibility-conditionality-solidarity’ pattern. Regarding the actor 
constellation, I demonstrate that German government actors dominate the public 
discourse and act as ‘ideational leaders’ (Stiller 2010). This emphasises the crucial position 
of Germany and German actors in influencing the crisis discourse of the debtor country 
Ireland. 
Germany and Ireland represent the creditor-debtor divide which has impacted 
both the EU and the public debate around the Euro crisis (Frieden and Walter 2017). 
Germany is the largest EU economy, the biggest creditor in the Eurozone, and a highly 
influential EU member state. Ireland is a small open economy that was named the ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ with a low debt rate and booming (FDI-oriented) economy just before the outbreak 
of the crisis. In 2011, it requested financial aid from the EU and was part of the bailout 
programme until the end of 2013 (Roche et al. 2017). Many scholars have investigated 
Germany’s hegemonic role in the Euro crisis (Bulmer 2014; Matthijs 2016), but Ireland 
remains somewhat under-researched. The division of Southern European states with a 
demand-led growth strategy and Northern European countries with an export-led growth 
strategy (Hall 2014), or Matthijs and McNamara’s (2015) framing of ‘Northern Saints and 
Southern Sinners’, ignores the political, economic, and socio-cultural circumstances that 
have brought each crisis state (and in particular Ireland) to its specific position. In fact, 
previous research has shown that Ireland does not fit into any of these groups (Hardiman 
et al. 2017; Regan and Brazys 2018). 
Focusing on the mass media highlights that political actors present their ideas to a 
broader audience in order to legitimise their political decision-making and influence and 
mobilise public opinion (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Statham and Trenz 2013). Printed 
quality newspapers are crucial, because ‘thresholds for audience members are particularly 
low and societal reach is exceptionally large’ (Wessler et al. 2008: 5). Discourse network 
analysis (DNA) is applied to investigate the framing and actor constellation in both 
national discourses. The DNA bridges the gap between content-oriented and actor-
centred methods by focusing on the interconnectedness of speakers and statements in 
public debates (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). 
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The article makes three main contributions. First, it sheds light on the multiple 
meanings of solidarity and how ideas are linked by actors in public discourses in the Euro 
crisis. Second, it compares the sub-discourse on solidarity in a creditor and a debtor state, 
and by doing so reveals the main differences (i.e. in the ideational structure) and 
similarities (i.e. in the actor constellation). While austerity and solidarity are closely linked 
in the German discourse, the Irish discourse draws together solidarity and responsibility. 
Third, the article demonstrates the dominance of (German) government actors in both 
discourses.  
The text proceeds as follows. After introducing the general theoretical framework 
of discursive institutionalism, I discuss the literature on actor visibility and framing. The 
third section presents the data and the network methods. Then, the context of the Euro 
crisis is briefly described, before the results are presented. The last section summarises 
and discusses the findings. 
4.2 Agency and ideas in discursive institutionalism 
Discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008) emphasises the role and relevance of ideas in 
political processes. It is ‘concerned with the substantive content of ideas and the 
interactive processes of discourse and policy argumentation in institutional context’ 
(Schmidt 2012: 85). Ideas guide actions; they ‘help us to think about ways to address 
problems and challenges that we face and therefore are the cause of our actions’ (Béland 
and Cox 2011b: 4). The discursive-institutionalist approach does not assume that there are 
predefined interests that are fixed and can only be reversed through ‘external shocks’. 
Instead, communicative exchanges in institutional settings enable and constrain actors’ 
perceptions and interests (Blyth 2002). Recently, the relevance of agency in a discursive 
institutionalist framework has been stressed. Ideas are put forward by actors or are 
articulated to confirm or challenge existing ideas (Boswell and Hampshire 2017). To this 
end, Sabina Stiller’s ideational leadership approach is included to account for the agency 
dimension in discursive institutionalism. 
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4.2.1 Ideational leaders in the Euro crisis: Political parties, European actors, 
civil society groups 
In her book on institutional change in the German welfare state, Stiller (2010) argues that 
recent social policy reforms (Riester pension reform, Hartz unemployment reform) have 
been made possible because key policy-makers pushed for them and influenced the 
agenda to realise the reforms. Stiller demonstrates that both individual and collective 
actors can substantially change the public discourse. She argues that political agents and 
especially members of government have the capacity to work with ideas. Ideas are seen as 
resources which allow actors to overcome others’ resistance, propose alternative policies 
or mobilise their peers for matters of consensus (Stiller 2010: 26). The last aspect can lead 
to the establishment of a discourse coalition (Hajer 1995). Stiller (2010: 33) defines 
ideational leadership as ‘key policy-makers who use strategies that are idea-based 
(“ideational”), and purposively aim for the achievement of change, even in view of reform 
resistance (“leadership”)’. 
The ultimate goal of actors in public discourses is to exercise discursive power in 
the form of agreement with others or by dominating the public agenda with their specific 
framing (Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). Being a public entrepreneur for a certain idea 
increases your reputation for future agenda-setting processes and legitimises your work 
as an interest group or scholar on a policy reform (Kingdon 1995; Seeleib-Kaiser 2016). 
The parliamentary opposition or the smaller coalition partner could use the public forum 
to set an alternative agenda and gain more public attention. Ministers of government can 
also act as ideational leaders to support their staff and ministries in turf battles against 
other ministries or in dealing with different competences in the EU and national arena 
(Stiller and van Gerven 2012; Wenzelburger 2011). To sum up, ideational leadership can be 
exercised by different interest groups (trade unions, employers’ associations, religious 
groups), journalists, public intellectuals, experts or NGOs, and is not limited to 
government actors as Stiller suggests. 
In order to specify the actor dimension, three main research strands on political 
parties, European actors, and civil society organisations in the Euro crisis are considered. 
First, scholars have shown that political parties strongly shape national public discourses 
on European integration (Hutter et al. 2016; Koopmans 2007; Senninger and Wagner 2015). 
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Parties justify their political actions and politicians legitimise their decisions in public. In 
particular, national executives receive media attention and thereby influence public 
opinion and the public understanding of the causes and consequences of the Euro crisis. 
Kriesi and Grande (2015) corroborate that national executives dominate the public debate 
on the Euro crisis. The regular intergovernmental meetings of the European Council 
(‘crisis summits’), the meetings of the Euro group as well as the temporary Franco-
German ‘Merkozy’ tandem (Crespy and Schmidt 2014) emphasise the importance of 
intergovernmental decision-making processes in the Euro crisis. Nonetheless, the conflict 
between government and opposition on European issues seems to be crucial, revealing 
different positions on austerity and solidarity (Closa and Maatsch 2014; Maatsch 2014). 
I expect that national political parties in general and national executives in 
particular act as ideational leaders and dominate the discourse in the creditor state 
Germany as well as in the debtor state Ireland. German actors, especially Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble, might shape the discourse 
with their statements. Germany’s hegemonic position – although contested and 
domestically constrained (Bulmer 2014) – as the most influential EU member state 
(economically and politically) and the largest creditor state in the Euro crisis, favours their 
public leadership in the Irish newspapers. 
Second, previous research has demonstrated the increasing relevance of 
international and European actors in hard times. Bauer and Becker (2014) argue that the 
European Commission (EC) is the ‘unexpected winner’ of the Euro crisis due to its 
involvement in the Troika, its regular appearances in public debate as well as its agenda-
setting role in European affairs. Schmidt (2016) has stressed the role of the EC but also the 
position of the ECB, claiming that both supranational institutions ‘rule by stealth’ in the 
Euro crisis. Their democratic legitimacy is weak (EC) or non-existent (ECB), but both have 
far-reaching influence on national legislation, for instance on the budgetary right of the 
national parliaments via the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, they initiate crisis solutions such 
as the announcement of ‘whatever it takes’ by ECB president Draghi in the summer of 
2012 and the declaration to buy bonds – outright monetary transactions (OMTs) – from 
the crisis countries if they commit to certain conditions. 
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Thus, I expect that supranational EU institutions play a role in the solidarity 
debate in the Euro crisis. The presidents of these institutions (EC – Barroso, then Juncker; 
ECB – Trichet, then Draghi; European Parliament – Schulz) might claim ideational 
leadership in the public debate. While the German discourse is more dominated by 
domestic actors (Bulmer 2014; Kriesi and Grande 2015), European and international actors 
might be more central in Ireland due to its debtor status and the direct involvement of the 
Troika in the Irish bailout programme (2011–13). Troika representatives and Irish 
government officials might justify austerity measures as ‘alternativlos’ (without any 
alternative). This might trigger more political conflict and give the political party 
opposition the momentum to mobilise against the austerity policies of the national 
government and the Troika, and to propose more solidarity-oriented policies. 
Third, Statham and Trenz (2013) have argued that the politicisation of the public 
sphere could open up the discourse for other actors and give a voice to less powerful 
actors such as NGOs or social movements. Consequently, the expected actor expansion 
and intensity of the debate might enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy. However, 
scholars have shown that the public space for protest movements and non-party actors on 
European issues is rather limited (Dolezal et al. 2016; Koopmans 2007). Furthermore, 
Serreccino et al. (2013) demonstrate that Ireland has not experienced a large anti-austerity 
movement which could have pushed for a solidary solution to the crisis.27 Still, the focus 
on solidarity claims in this study might favour the aforementioned presence, because 
protest movements and critical NGOs such as Attac or trade unions view austerity 
policies rather critically. Thus, I expect that they act as ideational leaders by demanding a 
transfer union or Eurobonds in the Euro crisis, or by claiming solidarity with Greece or 
Ireland. 
4.2.2 Coalition magnet patterns in the Euro crisis: Meanings of solidarity 
Besides the perspective on agency, the role of ideas is further elaborated. Béland and Cox 
(2016) have theorised ideas and identify three criteria for an idea to become a ‘coalition 
magnet’. First, the idea can be ‘effectively manipulated’ (Béland and Cox 2016: 429) and is 
                                                     
27 Scholars have argued that the protest about austerity in Ireland was channelled by the ballot box 
in the ‘earthquake elections’ of 2011 in which the ruling coalition (Fianna Fáil and the Green Party) 
was fundamentally out-voted by the people (Allen and O’Boyle 2013: 109–125). 
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rather ‘ambiguous or polysemic’ (Béland and Cox 2016: 431). Second, key actors promote 
the idea. These can be actors in the formal decision-making process or crucial veto 
players. Lastly, the idea brings together actors with varying belief systems. Additionally, 
the idea might serve as a coalition magnet if it is new in the discourse or is re-interpreted 
by certain actors and thus bears a new meaning which is then articulated in times of crisis 
(Béland and Cox 2016; Blyth 2002). 
Coalition magnets mostly consist of particular ideas such as ‘sustainability’ that 
strongly resonate in the public discourse and are articulated in a ‘policy window’ 
(Kingdon 1995). In the case of sustainability, the concept is linked to broader issues of 
population and global health policies to attract various policy-makers and policy 
entrepreneurs (Béland and Katapally 2018; Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al. 2019). I adapt the 
understanding of coalition magnets for the present study. Instead of defining one 
particular idea as a coalition magnet, it is likely that in order to influence the discourse 
and attract key policy actors, various ideas are linked in the discourse and form ideational 
patterns. These ‘coalition magnet patterns’ structure the discourse. To this end, the present 
study looks at coalition magnet patterns that shape the public solidarity discourse in the 
Euro crisis. 
Previous research on the Euro crisis has emphasised the dominant role of austerity 
in the crisis management. Blyth (2015) has reconstructed the emergence of the idea of 
austerity in history and in particular in the Euro crisis. It has also been demonstrated that 
economic ideas, especially austerity and ordoliberalism, have strongly shaped the public 
debate on the Euro crisis in the EU (Lovering 2017; Ojala and Harjuniemi 2016; Schmidt 
2016). In contrast, cultural frames have not played a crucial role in debates on the 
European integration project. If these are used, then it is not necessarily by Eurosceptic 
parties, but rather by mainstream parties and particularly conservative parties in the Euro 
crisis debate (Grande et al. 2016; Wonka 2016). 
Another central issue is redistribution in hard times. It has been demonstrated that 
(German) voters were critical of the bailout programme in the Euro crisis and would have 
given less money to the crisis countries due to their fear that the economic and financial 
burden might be too high (Bechtel et al. 2014). Nonetheless, having a more left-leaning 
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political orientation and preferring cultural openness and tolerance increases support for 
redistributing resources among EU citizens (Kuhn et al. 2018; Lahusen and Grasso 2018a).  
On solidarity and distributional politics in the Euro crisis, Closa and Maatsch 
(2014) investigate the framing of solidarity in the parliamentary debates on the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in several EU countries. The members of the national 
parliaments had to decide and justify their position on the EFSF. The authors identified 
solidarity as one of the key frames in the debate and operationalised solidarity as 
referring to human rights and social justice. They demonstrate a strong divide between 
government and opposition actors in using claims on solidarity in parliamentary 
speeches. While government representatives used mostly utilitarian and economic frames 
to justify their vote for the EFSF, the left parliamentary opposition called for solidarity and 
criticised the EFSF fundamentally.  
The problem of understanding solidarity in terms of human rights and social 
justice is not just that it conflates cultural (based on shared norms) and social (based on 
redistribution) framings of solidarity. It also misses the fact that solidarity contains further 
meanings, too. In fact, solidarity might be a ‘polysemic’ idea (Béland and Cox 2016) that 
attracts many actors, but remains ambiguous. Hence, I examine the multiple meanings of 
solidarity and how actors deliberately claim solidarity in public debates. Drawing on 
previous research, I identify seven meanings of solidarity. 
The most prominent concept is social solidarity which is used in research on welfare 
states. It refers to institutions that create redistribution mechanisms (Baldwin 1990). 
Schelkle (2017) has pointed to risk-sharing as monetary solidarity in her analysis of the 
economic and financial structure of the EU in the Euro crisis. Monetary solidarity is then a 
liability statement for all members of the Eurozone supporting each other in case of 
hardship. Cultural solidarity emphasises that shared norms and a shared identity form the 
basis of acting in solidarity (Jones 2014). Political solidarity refers to institutions and 
mechanisms which enable cooperation among political entities to deal with problems and 
challenges in a burden-sharing manner (Kneuer and Masala 2015). Solidarity is one of the 
guiding (legal) principles in the EU treaties (Sangiovanni 2013). The legal phrase ‘pacta 
sunt servanda’ (agreements must be kept) can be understood as a legal solidary procedure 
in which actors, who have signed an agreement, have to comply with it, including the 
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obligations and rights that result from it. Economic solidarity considers public investments 
and coordinated strategies to support growth and employment as actions of mutual aid 
(Sommer 2013). Lastly, misuse of solidarity contains the term solidarity, but actors question 
the legitimacy of another’s initial call to solidarity.  
I expect four of these definitions to act as nodal points in the respective coalition 
magnet patterns. Monetary and economic solidarity might prominently feature in both 
discourses and form a solidarity pattern, because both meanings are directly linked to the 
causes and consequences of the Euro crisis as well as to the conflict around new 
institutional structures like the ESM. Moreover, cultural and social solidarity might create 
another solidarity pattern, because solidarity is a crucial value in the EU treaties, and the 
increase in the unemployment rate alongside cuts in the welfare sector in the crisis 
countries might prompt actors to promote and claim solidarity as important ideational 
resources to overcome the crisis situation. 
4.3 Research design and methods 
The study analyses newspaper articles from two German and two Irish daily quality 
newspapers from 2010 until 2015. While Germany and Ireland represent ideal cases of the 
creditor and debtor constellation in the Euro crisis (Frieden and Walter 2017), the four 
newspapers are chosen because of their broad readership and large circulation. Choosing 
a centre-left (Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Irish Times) and a centre-right (Die Welt and 
Irish Independent) newspaper in each country controls for left/right political ideologies in 
the media arena and assures that different positions and actors in the media are covered. 
Previous studies have shown that quality newspapers are still the main gatekeepers in 
Western European countries and report more on political events than tabloids (Koopmans 
and Statham 2010; Reinemann et al. 2012). However, printed quality newspapers are elite-
centred, and less institutionalised actors are less represented than government and 
political party actors (Koopmans 2007). 
Based on a keyword search string in the database Factiva that includes the term 
‘solidarity’, increasing the likelihood of coding relevant articles on solidarity in the Euro 
crisis, I selected in total 1,606 articles and identified 619 solidarity related claims in the 
four newspapers. The coding procedure follows that of the political claims analysis (PCA) 
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(Koopmans and Statham 1999) and was adapted from the codebook by de Wilde et al. 
(2014). The claims-making method focuses on the relation between an actor and their 
public statements. Claims are therefore defined as ‘public speech acts (including protest 
events) that articulate political demands, calls for actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, 
actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective 
actors’ (Koopmans and Statham 2010: 55). Following the grammar of the PCA, 
information on the claimant, the action, the issue, the position, and the justification have 
been coded. The following excerpt from the SZ illustrates the coding: 
Before the start of the EU summit in Brussels, Merkel suggested the establishment of a new 
European Investment fund. This shall support countries which consolidate their budgets and 
simultaneously have to finance reforms to foster growth and employment. Germany 
proposes ‘a new form of solidarity’ in the public discussion, claims Merkel in the Bundestag 
(Angela Merkel, SZ, October 2012). 
The claimant is Chancellor Merkel, who makes a verbal statement (action) in the German 
Bundestag on the Euro crisis (issue), favours a solidarity instrument (position) in the form 
of a European Investment Fund to foster growth and employment in the crisis countries 
(justification). German newspapers contained 368 claims while 251 claims were identified 
in the Irish newspaper articles from 2010 to 2015 (see also the appendix of chapter 4). 
Figure 10 shows the salience of solidarity claims in the newspapers. Salience is calculated 
by dividing the total number of claims by the selected number of articles per newspaper 
in each year. 
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Note: The black lines are the German newspapers, the grey ones are the Irish newspapers. The 
dotted lines are for centre-right newspapers, while solid lines show the centre-left newspapers. 
 
The salience of solidarity claims differs between Germany and Ireland and the 
newspapers. The Irish newspapers, the Irish Times in particular, cover relatively many 
solidarity claims per article. This underlines the relevance and direct impact of the Euro 
crisis in Ireland. German newspapers have a rather low salience compared to the Irish 
newspapers. The four newspapers cover solidarity claims most similarly in 2012 and 2013 
which are the crucial years of the Euro crisis. For Ireland in particular, 2013 marks the end 
of the austerity programme. The rise of solidarity claims in 2015 can be explained by the 
intense debate on the future of the Euro after the electoral victory of the leftist party 
Syriza in Greece and the heated discussion about a third bailout programme for Greece. 
The discourse network methodology is applied to investigate the actor 
constellation and the framing process in an interdependent manner (Leifeld 2016b; Leifeld 
and Haunss 2012). Discourse networks are affiliated networks, because they contain two 
types of nodes (actors and meanings) that are connected. For instance, if two actors refer 
Figure 10: Salience of claims in German and Irish newspapers 
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to the same concept, they are linked via the concept that they have used in separate 
claims. By studying the relations between ideas and actors, we can examine ideational 
leaders and their use of various ideas in public discourse. By doing so, the potential 
coalition magnet patterns and ideational leaders can be studied simultaneously. 
The discourse networks are examined by applying the eigenvector centrality as well 
as the walktrap community detection algorithm. Eigenvector centrality is calculated by the 
number of edges a node has to other nodes, and also considers the centrality of the tied 
nodes. The centrality shows whether the node is linked to central nodes in the network 
(Bonacich 1987). Thus, identifying ideational leaders and the nodal points in the coalition 
magnet patterns relies not only on the number of claims an actor makes in the public 
discourse or how often an idea is mentioned, but also on whether key actors refer to these 
ideas and connect central ideas and ideational leaders. The basic assumption of the 
walktrap community detection algorithm is that random walks on the edges in a network 
will stay within a certain community. Based on a certain length of steps, the detection 
algorithm identifies nodes that are reached (Pons and Latapy 2005). This reveals sub-
structures within large network structures and helps to analyse which ideas are closely 
connected and form the suggested ideational patterns. 
4.4 Ireland and Germany in the Euro crisis28 
In December 2009, the Greek government admitted that its national finances were 
incorrect and less sustainable than originally reported. This triggered a European-wide 
debate about debt, economic growth, and financial help in the EU. After the first Greek 
bailout programme, the new institutional intergovernmental treaties – European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) – were 
created. 
In 2011, Ireland requested financial help from the EU. Before the crisis, Ireland was 
the poster child of the EU as a small, open, and prosperous economy. Unlike Germany 
(and France), Ireland had never violated the terms of the Stability and Growth Pact in the 
                                                     
28 Table 11 in the appendix of chapter 4 includes an overview of the government and party 
constellation in Germany and Ireland, showing who was in government, the party affiliations of 
key politicians, and how these changed during the analysed time period. 
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Eurozone. Due to the global financial crisis of 2008 and the entanglement of Irish banks 
with US, German, and French banks, the Irish government had to bailout six Irish banks 
(with 64 billion Euros) in order to avoid the collapse of the Irish banking system, a further 
contagion effect on other banks and to prevent moral hazard. Accordingly, the Irish 
sovereign debt rate increased dramatically from 25 per cent of GDP in 2007 to nearly 120 
per cent in 2012. At the end of 2009, 348 billion Euros of Irish debt were held by German, 
French, Austrian, Belgian, and Dutch banks. As Hall sums up, with the bailout situation 
and the creation of the EFSF and EFSM for the Eurozone, ‘[t]he countries of Northern 
Europe were essentially bailing out their own banks’ (Hall 2012: 364).  
The EU’s political response to the crisis was strict austerity. In this regard, the Irish 
case is exceptional, because, as Roche et al. (2017) show, the Irish government opted for an 
austerity programme (debt reduction, financial consolidation, cuts in social spending, etc.) 
before the Troika came in. The ‘auto-austerity’ of Ireland, as Roche et al. call it, prepared 
the ground for the Troika’s austerity programme, which was less strict than the one in 
Greece (Hardiman et al. 2017). Moreover, others have argued that Ireland is hardly 
comparable to the other crisis countries, because of its different political, social, and 
economic factors. Ireland follows a different growth regime, driven by FDI (foreign direct 
investments) and an export-oriented liberal market economy. These aspects were the 
reason for the relatively fast economic recovery rather than the austerity programme as 
proclaimed by the Troika and the EC (Regan and Brazys 2018). 
In contrast to the Irish case, Germany was hardly affected by the Euro crisis. The 
German economy faced a recession after the global financial crisis, but its export-oriented 
growth strategy and Keynesian economic policy helped it to recover quickly. Politically, 
Germany was stuck ‘between hegemony and domestic politics’ (Bulmer 2014) in the Euro 
crisis. On the one hand, European actors demanded that the German government take the 
lead and show its European orientation in practice. German politicians often referred to 
the normative and economic advantages of the European integration project (Wendler 
2014). On the other hand, Germany only insisted on bailing out crisis countries under 
strict conditionality and if they adopted austerity measures. It has been argued that this in 
turn worsened the Euro crisis in 2012–13 and led to further bailout programmes in Greece, 
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as well as giving more political authority to supranational institutions (Blyth 2015; 
Matthijs 2016). 
Beyond the Irish and German cases, the trajectory of the Euro crisis further 
unfolded in 2011 when Portugal as a third country (after Greece and Ireland) requested a 
bailout programme. Moreover, a European-wide discussion on the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) was initiated. In 2012, a second bailout package for Greece was agreed, 
and Spain and Cyprus had to ask for financial help. At the same time, the Fiscal Compact 
as well as the ESM were established, and in the summer of 2012 the ECB president Draghi 
(2012) declared that the ECB ‘is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And 
believe me, it will be enough’. In 2013, the Irish government tried to improve market 
confidence by announcing it would leave the bailout programme in the same year, which 
happened in December 2013. There were huge protests in Greece against the Troika, while 
Cyprus was the next country to be bailed out. Portugal left the bailout programme in 2014 
and the ECB’s newly established ‘stress test’ for national banks showed that several banks 
were still short in liquidity and would face severe problems in an upcoming crisis. At the 
end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, the breakdown of the Greek government and 
Syriza’s electoral victory shaped the Euro crisis debate as well as the subsequent 
negotiations on the third bailout programme with adjusted conditions for Greece. The 
Greek referendum on new austerity measures in July 2015 dominated coverage of the 
Euro crisis until summer 2015. After that point, Europe’s migration crisis dominated the 
media agenda on solidarity, and discussion around the Euro crisis almost ‘disappeared’ in 
the last few months of 2015. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Solidity and solidarity in the German discourse 
The German discourse is strongly shaped by the understanding of financial solidity and the 
meaning of monetary solidarity, and each forms a dominant coalition magnet pattern. In 
terms of ideational leadership, German Chancellor Merkel, former EC president Barroso 
as well as the German conservative parties CDU and CSU are the most central actors in 
the discourse (Table 14 on the eigenvector centrality values of the actors and meanings in 
the appendix of chapter 4). The focus on financial solidity (or fiscal consolidation) 
 114 
demonstrates that the solidarity discourse is strongly influenced by the leading ‘austerity 
paradigm’ in the Euro crisis and is claimed by government actors. Solidarity can only be 
shown with crisis countries if sovereign debts are reduced and a balanced budget is 
reached (Schwarze Null). As Merkel put it in her speech at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos in 2011: 
‘The level of debt is the biggest threat to the prosperity of our continent’, said Merkel in a 
fierce speech in front of more than 1,000 participants. There has been great solidarity for 
some countries in the last months, but this is just one side of the coin. ‘Solidarity has to be 
coupled with solidity and stability’, claimed Merkel. It’s the only way to save the Euro. 
(Angela Merkel, SZ, January 2011) 
This viewpoint is shared by many actors (Figure 11). Journalists (Hagelücken, Siems), the 
presidents of the EC (Barroso, Juncker) and the German governing parties and politicians 
(CDU, CSU, Westerwelle29, Merkel) refer to the concept of financial solidity and defend it 
against other policy proposals such as Eurobonds or a banking union. This strong link of 
solidarity and financial solidity is underlined by the meaning of the German word Schuld 
which has two meanings: ‘debt’ and ‘guilt’. The paternalistic narrative was that the Euro 
crisis happened because of wrongdoings in the ‘GIPS’ countries (‘lazy Greeks’), and, 
therefore, they have to demonstrate that they can do better before the other EU member 
states can help (act in solidarity). 
In line with recommendations from the IMF and others, a haircut for Greece is 
discussed in the German media. It is argued that the Greek sovereign debt is too big to be 
potentially repaid to the creditors. By paying horrendous interest rates for the loans, this 
creates more budget imbalances. As the journalist Siems argues, a debt reduction would 
be a sign of solidarity among the EU member states and could stabilise the fragile 
Eurozone. 
Greece deserves a fair chance. Thus, it is right to foot the bill together. Solidarity, however, 
does not mean that the Greeks have to be saved from insolvency at all costs. Only a haircut 
gives a chance for a fresh start. If the country gets deeper into levels of debt despite more 
and more cutbacks, it should be clear to everybody that the previous way is dangerous and 
wrong. (Dorothea Siems, Welt, September 2011)  
                                                     
29 Guido Westerwelle (FDP) was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition 
between 2009 and 2013. His network visibility only results from this time period. 
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Note: The affiliation network contains 39 nodes (14 meanings and 25 actors), 104 edges and 8 
sub-groups. The network density is 5.2 (mean degree centrality) and the modularity is 0.41. Nodes 
with fewer than three edges as well as the code ‘no justification’ have been excluded from the 
graph. The size of the nodes is based on eigenvector centrality. The thickness of the edges 
represents the amount of claims that an actor made to a meaning of a concept. Dark grey labels 
represent ideas, light grey labels are for actors. The sub-groups that the walktrap community 
detection algorithm identified are framed in the network. The arrows indicate the directed network 
structure. 
 
Further meanings of solidarity occupy a less central position and form a smaller coalition 
magnet pattern which had less impact on the trajectory of the Euro crisis in the German 
discourse. For instance, the SZ journalist Prantl and the German Green Party stress 
European values on which agents should act (cultural solidarity), while the French 
politicians Macron and Hollande argue for new European institutions such as Eurobonds 
in order to share the crisis burden (political solidarity) or demand a coordinated economic 
policy to make large public investments in the crisis countries (economic solidarity). 
Figure 11: Affiliation network of the German discourse (2010-15) 
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With regard to the representation of other actors in the German discourse, the 
party opposition is almost out of the picture. The former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is 
the only social democrat to appear, while Die Linke is completely absent. Die Grünen party 
is marginally connected to the main coalition magnet patterns and the AfD rejects any 
solidarity actions in the Euro crisis. Thus, the discourse network predominantly consists 
of politicians in government. Moreover, journalists, European actors and those from 
private finance contribute to the debate. Accordingly, the first two formulated 
expectations on ideational leadership are mainly corroborated: First, political parties 
dominate the discourse. However, Closa and Maatsch’s (2014) finding that the opposition 
predominantly makes solidarity claims is not confirmed. In fact, the opposite is shown. 
Second, government actors are the most central actors in the solidarity discourse, which 
supports the expectation on the dominance of national executives. Third, the expectation 
that the solidarity discourse gives rise to NGOs and civil society groups is rejected. This 
actor group is not present in the German discourse on solidarity in the Euro crisis. This 
underpins previous research findings that national executives are the ‘winners of 
Europeanised public debates’ (Koopmans 2007). Moreover, government actors use 
solidarity in a strategic manner by framing and linking this concept to others in the public 
discourse.  
To sum up the network structure of the German solidarity discourse, the ideational 
struggle is mostly about what comes first: austerity or solidarity. And as we have seen 
during the course of the Euro crisis, austerity trumped solidarity. Thus, financial solidity 
is the central idea in the main coalition magnet pattern and for the German conservative 
politicians in government. Monetary solidarity is the opposing centre of the pro-solidarity 
coalition magnet pattern for some oppositional actors who challenge austerity. Claims on 
economic solidarity are rather marginal and do not play a central role in the discourse. 
4.5.2 Responsibility, conditionality and solidarity in the Irish discourse 
The Irish discourse is strongly shaped by the meanings of responsibility, conditionality, and 
monetary solidarity. Each is part of a coalition magnet pattern. The ideational leaders are 
Merkel and Schäuble, the two Irish newspapers, former EC president Barroso, and the 
Irish politicians Cowen and Gilmore (see Table 14 on the eigenvector centrality values of 
the actors and meanings in the appendix of chapter 4). 
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Arguing for responsibility is the most dominant claim in the debate (Figure 12) 
and constitutes a central coalition magnet pattern. The Irish discourse focuses on the 
misbehaviour of bankers and top managers and their greed during the banking crisis.30 
Irish politicians claim that bankers should now act in solidarity with the Irish people and 
show public responsibility for their wrong actions. European actors also referred to this 
understanding as demonstrated in this statement by the former EC president Barroso: 
Mr Barroso said the financial sector must make a ‘fair contribution’ to cover the costs that 
financiers have shifted on to taxpayers. […] ‘The financial sector has benefited from a lot of 
solidarity, and it is time to return the favour by showing great responsibility.’ (José Manuel 
Barroso, Irish Times, September 2010) 
Another understanding of the term in the Irish case is the responsibility of the less 
affected countries in the Euro crisis to help those that need support. In particular, Irish 
politicians claim that because they have implemented the austerity measures and reduced 
pubic spending and debts, Germany and others have to act responsibly, ease the 
conditionality of the Troika agreement, and support Ireland in its economic recovery. 
From the Irish perspective, these claims are also a reminder to the French and German 
governments that the Irish state has bailed out not only its own banks, but also, due to 
financial interdependencies, German and French banks. The Irish Independent reports the 
statement of the prime minister of Ireland, Enda Kenny, on Ireland leaving the bailout 
programme: 
Mr Kenny emphasised the need for a deal on Ireland’s legacy bank debt of 64bn [Euros] to 
help exit the bailout programme and return to borrowing on the markets. ‘Solidarity is not a 
one-way street and the funding countries giving assistance to Ireland are not doing so in 
vain. But as it is a two-way street, the support that has been committed to by Europe needs 
to be followed through to ease our exit from the programme,’ he said. (Enda Kenny, Irish 
Independent, January 2013) 
A third understanding of responsibility is especially linked to German claimants in the 
Irish discourse. Those actors address the crisis countries and in particular Ireland in acting 
responsibly, avoiding moral hazard and preventing any contagion for other Eurozone 
members. Hence, the potential giver of solidarity reverses the solidarity relation, 
                                                     
30 During the global financial crisis, Ireland had a severe banking crisis in which six Irish banks 
faced insolvency and the state had to bail them out. In 2013, journalists from the Irish Independent 
obtained audio material from meetings of top managers at the Anglo-Irish Bank (AIB) – one of the 
banks that was rescued – revealing how fraudulent and risky bankers had speculated and that they 
were well aware that the Irish state would bail them out in any case. 
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expecting crisis countries to bear the burden (act responsibly) of bailing out their banks 
resulting in rising levels of debt and higher interest rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The affiliation network contains 43 nodes (15 meanings and 28 actors), 103 edges and 7 
sub-groups. The network density is 4.68 (mean degree centrality) and the modularity is 0.47. All 
nodes that had fewer than two edges as well as the code ‘no justification’ have been excluded from 
the graph. The size of the nodes is based on eigenvector centrality. The thickness of the edges 
represents the amount of claims that an actor made to a meaning of a concept. Dark grey labels 
represent ideas, light grey labels are for actors. The sub-groups that the walktrap community 
detection algorithm identified are framed in the network. The arrows indicate the directed network 
structure. 
 
The Irish discourse (like the German one) also reports on the Euro crisis in other 
countries, most prominently the Greek crisis. The following statement by a representative 
of the German government is a good example of the claimed conditionality in the Euro 
Figure 12: Affiliation network of the Irish discourse (2010-15) 
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crisis discourse that forms its own coalition magnet pattern with German politicians 
referring to it. 
Steffen Seibert, a spokesman for Chancellor Angel Merkel, said Greek ‘obligations aren’t 
erased by election day’, restating that EU ‘solidarity’ depended on Greek ‘reform readiness’. 
(German government, Irish Times, January 2015) 
By talking about obligations, reforms, and solidarity, the potential giver of solidarity 
(Germany) determines the conditions for the receiver of solidarity. Arguing for ‘reform 
readiness’ and ‘obligations’ indicates that solidarity is not impossible and can be given, 
but only under specific conditions. In contrast to the demand of financial solidity, 
structural reforms, and cutbacks in the public sector, the claiming of ‘conditionality’ is 
more vague, but no less powerful. By linking it to solidary actions in the future, these 
claims resonate in the public and find many supporters. 
The actor constellation in the Irish solidarity discourse is more diverse than in the 
German one. Nonetheless, national executives are the most dominant actors in the 
solidarity discourse in Ireland. In this regard, political parties (particularly German ones) 
act as ideational leaders in the discourse. It is no surprise that the Irish Prime Ministers 
(Taoiseach) Cowen and Kenny as well as the Labour politicians Gilmore and Burton are 
present in the Irish discourse, even though they are not visible in the German discourse at 
all. However, it is intriguing that German party actors feature prominently and inhabit 
leading positions in the discourse (Merkel, Schäuble, Steinbrück, Gabriel). The appearance 
of SPD politicians Gabriel and Steinbrück is notable, as they had not been visible in the 
German discourse network.31 
Moreover, other national executives – such as the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras or 
the former French president Sarkozy – are also represented in the Irish debate. European 
actors are present in the Irish discourse. Barroso has a leadership position in the 
discourse; Juncker as president of the EC and Rehn as European Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro also appear in the Irish discourse, but do 
not have a leading position due to their fewer claims in the Irish discourse. The third 
expectation that civil society organisations might profit from the solidarity discourse is 
                                                     
31 In this regard, it is also interesting that Macron and Hollande are present in the German 
discourse and yet not visible in the Irish one, while the opposite is the case with Sarkozy. 
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hardly supported. But, in contrast to the German discourse, civil society actors are at least 
marginally present, and Noel Ward, as representative of an Irish trade union, is visible. 
Another divergence from the German network is that individual journalists are 
less central in the Irish solidarity discourse than the newspapers themselves (Irish Times 
and Irish Independent). This is mainly an artefact of the data material, because many 
articles in the Irish newspapers do not name an author and, thus, the respective 
newspaper was coded as the statement giver. 
To sum up the network structure of the Irish discourse, responsibility and 
conditionality act as key ideas and form large coalition magnet patterns, with German 
and Irish national executives as the ideational leaders. Monetary solidarity attracts Irish 
politicians, Irish newspapers, and EU officials who form a pro-solidarity pattern. Like the 
German case, several minor coalition magnet patterns that include less central actors exist, 
but are rather marginal. 
4.6 Discussion 
The article has investigated the framing of solidarity in the Euro crisis in the German and 
Irish media discourse. It is the first empirical study to highlight the different meanings of 
solidarity and to show how ideas are linked and form coalition magnet patterns in the 
discourses of creditor and debtor countries. Moreover, the actor dimension has been 
analysed by applying the ideational leadership concept, focusing on the role of political 
parties, European actors, and civil society actors in the Euro crisis discourse. 
The study yields novel insights into the Euro crisis discourse. First, various 
meanings of solidarity are deployed by actors in their public statements. In particular, 
monetary solidarity is one of the most dominant meanings in both discourses and has 
formed a pro-solidarity coalition magnet pattern in each country. This underlines that the 
Euro crisis was a crisis of the common currency and due to the lack of a common 
monetary policy besides the ECB’s focus on price stability and inflation. Any European 
cooperative scheme in this area was hindered by the ‘no bailout’ clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Art. 125) which in the aftermath of saving bad banks led to higher levels of 
national debts. Besides, a new European financial architecture was established with the 
 121 
ESM and the Fiscal Compact. Nonetheless, conditionality and a focus on budgetary 
balance (Schuldenbremse) are inscribed in these institutions. 
Claims on monetary solidarity suggest policy proposals such as a banking union 
or a haircut for crisis countries in order to support them and establish a sustainable 
recovery. These proposals had in fact less influence on the intergovernmental decision-
making process. The banking union was established in 2012, but with a rather vague 
supervisory mandate for the ECB. A haircut was agreed for Greece, but it was limited and 
had little impact on the Greek recovery. In the case of Ireland, a haircut was rejected by 
the ECB and EC although the Irish government (and the IMF) argued for this to 
precipitate the economic recovery. Thus, monetary solidarity was debated among the key 
actors, but in the end financial solidity won the ideational battle. 
Accordingly, even though ‘solidar*’ was included in the keyword string to select 
articles, financial solidity remains the central idea of the dominant coalition magnet pattern 
in the German discourse on solidarity and among the more central meanings in the Irish 
case. This demonstrates the strong link between solidarity and financial solidity, because 
the latter is framed as a solidary action for the crisis countries. This corroborates the 
findings of Galpin’s qualitative media analysis (2017) on the beginning of the Euro crisis 
debate. 
Second, the actor constellation in the German and Irish discourse resembles the 
actor visibility in previous studies on the Euro crisis. Political parties and national 
executives are the ideational leaders of the solidarity discourse, European actors inhabit a 
limited leadership position in the Irish discourse, and the (hoped-for) emerging civil 
society participation in public debates is not corroborated (Koopmans and Statham 2010; 
Statham and Trenz 2013). However, not only are political parties strongly present in both 
discourses, but German actors especially acted as ideational leaders in the public debate 
in Germany and Ireland. While no Irish actor is present in the German discourse, 
Chancellor Merkel and Minister of Finance Schäuble occupy central discourse network 
positions. Additionally, other German actors – such as the SPD politicians Gabriel and 
Steinbrück or the state secretary in the Ministry of Finance Kampeter – are featured with 
their claims in the Irish media. This underlines the central position of Germany in the EU 
and Eurozone as well as the agenda-setting power of German government actors in public 
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debates. In contrast to Closa and Maatsch’s (2014) finding that the opposition make most 
claims to solidarity, the study shows that governmental actors are the ones who invoke 
solidarity in the media. One reason for this strong focus on solidarity in their public 
claims might be the conceptual ambiguity of solidarity as well as its general positive 
framing. Solidarity seems to be almost unopposable. Hence, instead of arguing against 
solidarity directly, government actors link solidarity to other concepts such as financial 
consolidation so as to justify their decisions and mobilise the public. In turn, civil society 
actors are largely absent, which might be explained by their less institutionalised role in 
politics, the role of the media as gatekeeper to focus on certain political actors, and the 
scarcity of NGOs – besides Attac and FinanceWatch – who have expertise on financial and 
monetary issues in the EU. 
If, following Hutter et al. (2016), we understand the Euro crisis discourse as a 
debate about solidarity, then the article demonstrates that the framing of solidarity in the 
Euro crisis is far from conclusive in respect of who should act in solidarity with whom 
and on what grounds. Solidarity is strategically used in order to legitimise political 
decisions on austerity and mobilise public opinion to present structural reforms and 
budgetary cuts as necessary first steps before solidarity can be claimed and received. The 
framing in the debtor context revealed ideational differences with respect to the centrality 
of responsibility and the vague demand for ‘conditionality’ in the Euro crisis. 
Nevertheless, the discourse structures and the quoted statements demonstrate that in 
‘acting responsibly’ or demanding ‘reforms’, one is mainly referring to austerity. 
The study has some limitations. The focus on daily quality newspapers betrays a 
selection bias as to which actors are represented in the media. Moreover, looking at actors’ 
public statements is rather elite-centred. Since the study is interested in how actors frame 
solidarity in the Euro crisis and how their claims resonate with others, it makes sense to 
focus on elites’ public claims. Future research could look at online media outlets or social 
media platforms. The comparison of Germany and Ireland has emphasised the unique 
positions of both countries within the spectrum of creditor and debtor countries in the 
Eurozone. However, generalisable conclusions from the discourse network analysis 
cannot really be drawn for other debtor or creditor states. Future comparative studies 
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should examine other affected Euro crisis states to assess the idea of, and the political 
conflict over, solidarity in the EU. 
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4.7 Appendix 
4.7.1 Government constellation in Germany and Ireland 
The following information is on the German and Irish government during the analysed 
time period. Table 11 summarises the government constellation and party affiliation of the 
Chancellor and Taoiseach respectively, and the Minister of Finance, as well as which party 
was the major opposition party in the country. It shows that the conservative CDU/CSU 
was in government for the whole time period and also the central government members – 
Chancellor and Minister of Finance – did not change. The political situation in Ireland was 
different, because in the midst of the Euro crisis, an ‘earthquake election result’ changed 
the coalition government (Allen and O’Boyle 2013: 109–125). 
 
Table 11: Government constellations in Germany and Ireland (Appendix Chapter 4) 
Time 
period 
German government Irish government 
Time 
period 
2009–13 
CDU/CSU, FDP 
Chancellor: Angela Merkel 
Minister of Finance: Wolfgang 
Schäuble (both CDU) 
Biggest opposition party: SPD 
Fianna Fáil, Green Party 
Taoiseach: Brian Cowen 
Minister of Finance: Brian Lenihan 
(both Fianna Fáil) 
Biggest opposition party: Fine Gael  
2007–11 
2013–17 
CDU/CSU, SPD 
Chancellor: Angela Merkel 
Minister of Finance: Wolfgang 
Schäuble (both CDU) 
Biggest opposition party: Die 
Linke 
Fine Gael, Labour Party 
Taoiseach: Enda Kenny 
Minister of Finance: Michael 
Noonan (both Fine Gael) 
Biggest opposition party: Fianna 
Fáil 
2011–16 
Note: CDU – Christian Democratic Union of Germany; CSU – Christian Social Union in Bavaria; 
FDP – Free Democratic Party; SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany; Die Linke – The Left. 
 
4.7.2 Method: Political claims analysis 
The coding of the newspaper articles follows the political claims analysis (PCA) of Ruud 
Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; Koopmans and Statham 2010), and used the package 
RQDA in the R environment (Huang 2016). The main idea of the PCA is that articles and 
reports in newspapers contain many different statements by different actors. Instead of 
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focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis, or the content, the link between a 
statement and the speaker is emphasised. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. 
Claims are defined as ‘the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to 
action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the 
interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors’ (Koopmans 2007: 189). 
The components of a claim can be differentiated by following a logic of questions 
regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, 
addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY’ (de Wilde 2014: 52). These 
questions are the grammar of claims and help the coder to identify the claim, making the 
coding transparent and comprehensible. 
Regarding the coding procedure, no inter-coder reliability test could be obtained, 
because I had no financial capacity to fund other researchers to code with me. This gap 
should be addressed by extensive coder training (Krippendorff 2004), my own previous 
experiences and applications of the method, as well as the guidance offered by the 
codebook of de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn (2014), who have coded newspaper articles 
and parliamentary debates in a similar manner. 
In my project, I focus on four core codes in a claim: 1) the speaker; 2) the action; 3) 
the issue; and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all four codes in a statement, the 
potential claim is not coded. The other components that de Wilde mentions are coded if 
detectable. The codes are differentiated into sub-codes to allow for a fine-grained coding 
and analysis (Table 12). The following statement by German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
illustrates the coding of a claim: 
Merkel also briefly talked about the Greek debt crisis. The long-lasting infringement of the 
stability pact has brought Greece into this situation and not the [financial – author] 
speculation. Therefore, short-term solidarity was not the solution. There is no alternative to a 
rigorous austerity programme. (Angela Merkel, Welt, March 2010). 
Merkel is the speaker (claimant), even though she is indirectly quoted in the 
centre-right newspaper in 2010 (source and time). She makes a verbal statement (action) 
about the Euro crisis (issue) and expresses her opinion that austerity measures are 
unavoidable in Greece (position is coded as contra-solidarity with the justification 
‘financial solidity’). 
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Table 12: Codes in the Political Claims Analysis (Appendix Chapter 4) 
codes sub-codes 
time & source A_year, B_source 
claimant 
C_claimant_type, D_claimant_scope, E_claimant_function, 
F_claimant_party, G_claimant_nationality, X_special_claimant, XX_person 
action H_action 
issue I_issue, J_issue scope 
addressee 
K_addressee_type, L_addressee_scope, M_addressee_function, 
N_addresse_nationality, P_addressee_party, Q_addressee_evaluation 
frame R_position, S_justification, T_justification_scope 
 
The reported results in the study are based on the following keyword lists in the database 
Factiva. For Germany: ‘(Eurozone* or finanz* or Währung* or Schuld* or Kredit*) and 
Solidar* and (EU or Europ*)’. For Ireland: ‘(Eurozone* or financ* or currency* or *debt* or 
*credit*) and (solidar* or mutual w/1 support* or cooperat*) and (EU or Europ*)’. An 
asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. Duplicates of articles were excluded from 
the article population. 
Accordingly, I applied a nominalistic approach in the selection and coding 
‘solidarity statements’. This means that I have only coded claims with the mentioned term 
‘solidarity’ or close synonyms. Using ‘Solidar*’ in the keyword search has the 
disadvantage that the threshold for selecting articles is rather high. By applying the 
nominalistic approach, the meanings of solidarity can be grasped from the actor’s claims. 
In a deductive-inductive coding process, it was possible to start with preliminary 
understandings of solidarity, based on previous studies, and then include new, join 
similar, and reconsider existing meaning categories during the coding procedure. This 
helped to grasp the various meanings of the contested concept of solidarity. However, 
looking at the concrete term ‘solidarity’ might create a ‘nominalistic fallacy’. Two reasons 
justify this decision and minimise the concerns: First, since the focus of this study is on 
solidarity, the study makes a more valid contribution by setting a rather strict threshold 
for the selection of articles and claims. Second, the high threshold positively influences the 
coding procedure, because the coding decision about whether the coded claim is about 
solidarity is already made. Consequently, the coding concentrates on the framing of the 
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solidarity. This increases the validity and reliability of the coding procedure for such a 
polysemic concept. 
Following the PCA logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims, but also no 
claims at all. There are two limitations for the coding processes: First, I do not code claims 
that refer to events of migration that are older than six months from the date when it is 
reported in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration 
processes in the 19th century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in 
each newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each 
article. Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes, the claim is seen as a new one. 
For instance, an article reports a speech by Angela Merkel. At the beginning of the 
article, she is quoted demanding financial assistance (monetary solidarity) for Greece and 
demands a European solution. In the middle of the text, Merkel is cited again, but here 
she calls for liberalising the public health sector in Greece in order to reduce the sovereign 
debt. Thus, the speaker is the same (Merkel), the act is the same (verbal statement), the 
issue is also the same (Euro crisis), but the position is different. While the first statement is 
about monetary solidarity and a pro-solidarity statement, the second refers to structural 
reforms and austerity actions in Greece. That is why both claims can be coded in the same 
article. 
In this study, the codes ‘XX_person’ and ‘S_Justification’ are selected to analyse the 
affiliation networks of actors and meanings in the solidarity discourse. Although the 
justification code is optional in the sense of only being coded when a justification could be 
identified, the central sub-codes identify why actors argue for solidarity. Thus, every 
claim that does not entail a justification is not included in the empirical analysis. Both the 
reason why an actor claims something and the actor itself are of interest in order to study 
the framing of solidarity and the actor constellation from a relational perspective. 
Besides the multiple meanings of solidarity that have been coded, I also coded 
other frames as long as they are linked to solidarity in the specific claim. By doing so, the 
coding accounts for not only the various meanings of solidarity, but also how actors use 
other frames in their statements on solidarity. For instance, an actor claims solidarity with 
a crisis country, but not for any solidary reason; rather, it is a matter of justice with people 
in need. Then, the claim is coded with the frame ‘justice’. Another example is the frame of 
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‘financial solidity’. This is an in-vivo frame, taken from the coding material, because 
actors often used this frame instead of claiming austerity, structural reforms or financial 
consolidation. Actors claim that solidarity is important in the crisis and will be shown, but 
only if financial solidity is implemented and demonstrated by the crisis countries. 
Therefore, the claim is coded as solidarity related, but the frame that is used in order to 
justify the claim is ‘financial solidity’ (see the claim by Merkel above). 
4.7.3 From the PCA to the discourse network analysis 
The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the discourse network 
analysis (DNA) (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56), and since the PCA provides a clear coding scheme 
and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into network data. 
The DNA brings together discourse analysis and social network analysis by focusing on 
the interconnectedness of concepts and actor appearances in discourses (Leifeld 2013; 
Leifeld and Haunss 2012). 
Actors argue with particular concepts and this communicative action can be 
understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. By referring more or less to one 
concept, this could be understood as a repetitive account, arguing for a specific policy 
solution. Other actors might use the same concept in the debate and build up a relation to 
the concept too. Since different actors have different interests, we could assume that they 
deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different actors. Based on shared 
concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network analysis can detect specific 
actor networks or concept networks to examine which actors are relatively close or distant 
to each other. Lastly, actors and concepts can be studied in affiliation networks, showing 
two types of networks (Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). The discourse 
network Figures 11 and 12 as well as the network statistics regarding the eigenvector 
centrality of the nodes and the community detection algorithm in the text are computed 
and visualised with the R package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006). The eigenvector 
centrality is defined as the number of edges a node has; it also considers the edges to 
other central nodes in the network. Thus, eigenvector centrality does not just count the 
number of edges as in degree centrality in order to measure how central a node is; it also 
considers the close environment of the node in the network. The scale is from 0 to 1 and 
the closer the value is to 1, the more central the node is in the network (Bonacich 1987). 
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The Walktrap community detection algorithm was developed by Pons and Latapy (2005). 
The main assumption is that by performing random walks on the edges of a network, 
closely connected nodes could be identified that form a sub-group within the network. A 
certain parameter about the length of such random walks has to be defined to detect sub-
groups. I followed the default option in igraph and used four steps for the random walk. 
The recommendation is to use between three and five steps in the algorithm. An 
advantage of the Walktrap algorithm is that it works as a bottom-up detection algorithm. 
Instead of forcing the network into a predefined number of communities, the algorithm 
identifies communities based on the network structure. 
Other community detection algorithms, proposed by Girvan and Newman (2002) 
or Clauset et al. (2004) do not perform well on the discourse networks (Table 13) and are 
not suitable for discourse networks. The analysis of actors and meanings in public 
discourses suggests that the respective networks are directed, because actors strategically 
use meanings in their statements to persuade others and mobilise the public. The 
algorithm by Girvan and Newman assumes non-weighted edges. However, using only 
the information about whether or not an actor refers to a concept would miss crucial 
information on the discourse structure. The algorithm suggested by Clauset et al. assumes 
an undirected network structure, as in friendship networks (both persons indicated as 
friends). Hence, this algorithm, which is integrated in the igraph package as Fast Greedy 
community algorithm, is not really suitable. 
 
Table 13: Comparison of the network modularity and the number of communities 
(Appendix Chapter 4) 
 
Walktrap community 
algorithm 
(Pons and Latapy 2005) 
Edge Betweenness 
community algorithm 
(Girvan and Newman 
2002) 
Fast Greedy 
community 
algorithm (Clauset et 
al. 2004) 
German 
discourse 
0.41, 8 communities 0.1, 26 communities - 
Irish discourse 0.47, 7 communities 0.13, 28 communities - 
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Table 14: Eigenvector centrality in the German and Irish discourse (2010-15) (Appendix 
Chapter 4) 
German discourse Irish discourse 
Actors and Meanings Value Actors and Meanings Value 
financial solidity 1,000 A. Merkel 1,000 
A. Merkel 0,844 responsibility 0,899 
J. M. Barroso 0,298 conditionality 0,887 
CSU 0,225 monetary solidarity 0,684 
R. Brüderle 0,221 Irish Independent 0,648 
D. Siems 0,185 J. M. Barroso 0,521 
CDU 0,158 W. Schäuble 0,518 
G. Westerwelle 0,158 financial solidity 0,463 
European Commission 0,149 social solidarity 0,435 
monetary solidarity 0,147 Irish Times 0,351 
Conditionality 0,127 B. Cowen 0,345 
private finance 0,086 E. Gilmore 0,309 
A. Hagelüken 0,085 B. Lenihan 0,279 
Die Grünen 0,081 misuse of solidarity 0,249 
C. Hulverscheidt 0,078 J. Burton 0,244 
J.-C. Juncker 0,076 J.-C. Juncker 0,23 
SZ 0,076 S. Kampeter 0,216 
Responsibility 0,075 self interest 0,212 
misuse of solidarity 0,060 political solidarity 0,210 
Necessity 0,049 justice 0,200 
Cypriot government 0,043 German government 0,152 
Business 0,036 legal solidarity 0,148 
C. Gammelin 0,034 EU 0,139 
self interest 0,027 C. Day 0,136 
cultural solidarity 0,026 E. Kenny 0.120 
N. Piper 0,024 P. Steinbrück 0,113 
political solidarity 0,022 N. Sarkozy 0,112 
H. Schmidt 0,015 Fine Gael 0,109 
H. Prantl 0,015 S. Collins 0,106 
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legal regulations 0,014 civil society 0,106 
E. Macron 0,014 Société Générale 0,087 
F. Hollande 0,014 O. Rehn 0,074 
economic prosperity 0,014 necessity 0,072 
R. Sikorski 0,012 CDU 0,057 
economic solidarity 0,010 N. Ward 0,055 
AfD 0,009 M. Higgins 0,055 
F. Eder 0,009 S. Gabriel 0,039 
legal solidarity 0,008 cultural solidarity 0,023 
Justice 0,001 economic solidarity 0,016 
  
M. Wolf 0,013 
  
other justification 0,011 
  
legal regulations 0,007 
  
A. Tsipras 0,006 
 
Note: The eigenvector centrality value goes from 0 to 1. The closer the value of a node is to 1, the 
more central the node. The words in italics are the meanings in the Figures 11 and 12 and shall 
increase the readability of the table. 
 
 
Table 15: Number of claims in the German and Irish newspapers (Appendix Chapter 4) 
Time period SZ Welt Irish Times Irish Independent Total Germany Ireland 
2010 27 19 38 14 98 46 52 
2011 47 30 46 6 129 77 52 
2012 63 30 28 13 134 93 41 
2013 38 24 23 14 99 62 37 
2014 10 8 11 9 38 18 20 
2015 40 32 33 16 121 72 49 
2010–15 225 143 179 72 619 368 251 
 
  
 132 
Table 16: Number of articles in the German and Irish newspapers (Appendix Chapter 4) 
Time period SZ Welt Irish Times Irish Independent Total Germany Ireland 
2010 73 49 56 21 199 122 77 
2011 122 75 66 20 283 197 86 
2012 136 71 60 24 291 207 84 
2013 98 84 44 31 257 182 75 
2014 84 62 46 28 220 146 74 
2015 144 110 58 44 356 254 102 
2010–15 657 451 330 168 1606 1108 498 
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5 Contested solidarity in the Euro crisis and Europe’s 
migration crisis: A discourse network analysis
32
 
The article analyses the solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis and Europe’s 
migration crisis and examines which, and how, meanings of solidarity are 
put forward and which political parties participate in these debates. The 
discourse coalition and coalition magnet approaches are combined to 
examine the two different discourse dynamics of demanding solidarity 
(migration crisis) or being criticised for not showing solidarity (Euro crisis) 
in the German media discourse (2010–2015). By applying the discourse 
network methodology, the interdependence of framing and actor visibility is 
analysed. It is demonstrated that solidarity is linked to austerity and thereby 
solidarity claims are reinterpreted by an influential party conservative 
discourse coalition in the Euro crisis. The migration crisis discourse is 
shaped by one large discourse coalition, including all mainstream parties 
arguing for political solidarity. In 2015, political solidarity becomes contested 
by security and demarcation claims in the migration crisis. The study 
contributes to the development of the ideational research framework and 
demonstrates the different trajectories of solidarity in Europe in hard times. 
Keywords: Coalition magnets; discourse coalition; discourse network analysis; Euro 
crisis; Europe’s migration crisis; solidarity 
 
 
                                                     
32 Chapter 5 is under review after being re-submitted (2. round) at the Journal of European Public 
Policy. I would like to thank Sebastian Haunss, Raphael Heiberger, Ulrike Liebert, Sandra Reinecke, 
Aidan Regan, Arndt Wonka as well as the three anonymous reviewers for their comments and 
suggestions on this article. I also want to express my gratitude to the participants of the joint 
BIGSSS/InIIS colloquium and the panel audience at the ECPR General Conference in 2018 for their 
feedback. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis have had a substantial impact on European 
politics. The Euro crisis has drastically demonstrated that the European integration 
process was mainly driven by market integration and the prospects of a common currency 
union, ignoring different national economic growth models (Johnston and Regan 2016; 
Scharpf 2002). The crisis was predominantly addressed by austerity measures and strict 
debt conditionality (Blyth 2015) and thereby neglected necessary steps of social and 
political integration (Offe 2016). 
The migration crisis has shown that the Common European Asylum system 
(CEAS) is not a burden-sharing system, because the Southern European countries are 
mainly responsible for external border control and assessing asylum procedures. The aim 
of harmonising national migration and refugee policies was therefore not completed and 
lacks supranational authority by the EU institutions. The tension between external border 
enforcement by the Dublin Regulations and the internal open borders Schengen 
agreement is inscribed in EU migration policies (Bauböck 2018; Thielemann 2014). 
The common aspect in both crises is the public appeal to solidarity. Claiming 
solidarity or criticising the lack of solidarity in times of crisis is a crucial site of conflict in 
respect of how the two crises should be solved and who should act in solidarity with 
whom and on what grounds (Hutter et al. 2016). Beyond the empirical observation of calls 
to solidarity in hard times, the concept of solidarity has recently sparked theoretical 
discussions (Banting and Kymlicka 2017; Habermas 2013; Sangiovanni 2013; Wallaschek 
2018a). Solidarity touches upon central issues in political and social sciences with regard 
to collective actions under stress, modes of cooperation and conflict in politics, and the 
normative principles to which actors refer. This raises the question of what the public 
appeal to solidarity means and how political actors frame the idea of solidarity in times of 
crisis.  
Accordingly, the article asks how the solidarity discourse in the Euro crisis and 
Europe's migration crisis is framed and which political party actors are most active in the 
public solidarity discourse in times of crisis. In particular, I examine which meanings of 
solidarity are debated and most salient in the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis 
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and to what extent these meanings are present in both crises. Germany’s double 
involvement in these two severe crises, as well as the country’s leadership position in the 
EU, makes the German public discourse an interesting case to study. 
An ideational research framework is applied to account for the agency and ideas 
dimension. Hajer’s (1995) discourse coalition approach is adopted, investigating agents’ 
cooperation and conflicts in discursive struggles on solidarity, in addition to the coalition 
magnet approach proposed by Béland and Cox (2016) accounting for when and how an 
idea becomes influential (or not). Hence, the present study is concerned with how 
politicians and parties propose to resolve the crises rather than why the crises evolved 
and which integration theory best explains the crises trajectories. 
The German mass media arena is selected from 2010 to 2015 to analyse the use and 
contestation of solidarity. Political parties strongly shape the debate on European issues 
and are the key decision-makers, and as such it is crucial to observe how political parties 
and politicians frame solidarity and link these claims to the trajectories of the two crises 
(Helbling et al. 2010; Koopmans and Statham 2010). The discourse network methodology 
is adopted to study the interdependence of actor and concept formation in the public 
solidarity discourse (Leifeld 2016b).  
I demonstrate that meanings of solidarity in the Euro crisis have been 
reinterpreted by austerity frames. Solidarity and austerity claims are linked and thus 
create a unique framing strategy, justifying the Euro crisis management in the German 
discourse. In the migration crisis, I show that political solidarity is the predominant 
meaning in the discourse, but it is strongly contested by a security-oriented framing of 
migration. This has hindered the establishment of a solidary framework and contributed 
to the failure of solidarity in Europe’s migration crisis. 
The article contributes to the existing literature in two ways: Conceptually, it 
elaborates the ideational research framework by combining the discourse coalition and 
coalition magnet approach. Empirically, it expands our understanding of solidarity by 
separating the idea into its various meanings and showing which parties frame solidarity 
in the respective crises.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the approaches discourse 
coalition and coalition magnet patterns are introduced and linked to the literature on 
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actors and issue framing in the public sphere. The research design section lays out the 
data selection and the discourse network methodology. Finally, the findings are presented 
and further implications are discussed. 
5.2 Ideational research: Discourse coalitions and coalition 
magnets 
Discursive institutionalism has been established as a fourth institutionalism in the field of 
comparative political economy (Schmidt 2008). Starting from criticising historical 
institutionalist accounts for not taking ideas seriously, discursive institutionalism is 
‘concerned with the substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse 
and policy argumentation in institutional context’ (Schmidt 2012: 85). Although recent 
ideational research goes beyond the initial claim that ‘ideas matter’ and investigates how 
ideas actually come to matter, scholars still criticise the unclear agency dimension and 
argue that ideas can evolve and disperse across other policy areas (Ban 2016; Boswell and 
Hampshire 2017; Carstensen 2011; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016). In view of this, some 
key questions arise: Which actors play a role in the promotion of ideas, and how do 
certain ideas become powerful while others do not? To this end, the discursive 
institutionalism framework is extended via the discourse coalition approach of Hajer 
(1995) and the coalition magnet approach of Béland and Cox (2016).  
5.2.1 Discourse coalitions and actors in times of crisis 
The ideas that actors prefer depends largely on their perceptions of the world and how 
they make sense of political problems. Actors can establish discourse coalitions to push 
for their preferred options through strategic interactions (Hajer 1995). A discourse 
coalition is ‘a group of actors who share a social construct’ (Hajer 1993: 45). Hajer analyses 
the social construct of acid rain in Great Britain, showing how different discourse 
coalitions make sense of it through various problem definitions and solutions. These 
framing strategies highlight that it is not shared interests that constitute the basis of the 
discourse coalition, but rather the shared use of ideas. The discourse coalition approach 
has been used in policy studies, focusing on the framing of policy processes and how 
discourse coalitions influence the decision-making process. Moreover, it has emphasised 
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the role of agency in the research on public deliberations and discourses, as well as the 
cooperative aspect of forming argumentative clusters by actors in the pursuit of political 
goals and in seeking to influence policy decisions (Hajer 2002; Haunss 2017; Leifeld 2013; 
Rennkamp et al. 2017).33 
To substantiate the discourse coalition approach, previous research on actor 
constellations in national public spheres with regard to European issues is considered. 
First, national political parties dominate the public debate, legitimising their position and 
arguing against their opponents so as to influence public opinion (Koopmans 2007; 
Koopmans and Statham 2010). Mainstream parties might then be the most present actors 
while radical left or right parties are less influential in public debates (Hutter et al. 2016; 
Senninger and Wagner 2015). However, it has been demonstrated that the party 
opposition uses solidarity claims in parliamentary debates during the Euro crisis to 
criticise the government and its lack of solidarity with other crisis countries (Closa and 
Maatsch 2014). Hence, I expect the formation of two discourse coalitions: a governing 
party discourse coalition, and a party opposition coalition. The first might be more 
present in the discourse.  
Second, government representatives account for the largest quantity of statements 
in the public discourse (Kriesi and Grande 2015; Van Dalen 2012). The Euro crisis and the 
migration crisis were mainly approached at the intergovernmental level of the European 
Council meetings (Schimmelfennig 2015; Zaun 2018). Therefore, the public dominance of 
national executives is expected. In particular, I expect that Chancellor Merkel as well as 
the federal ministers for the policy areas (Finances, Foreign Affairs, Interior) are most 
visible in the governing discourse coalition. 
Third, scholars have pointed out that supranational institutions have increased 
their political power during the Euro crisis (Bauer and Becker 2014; Schmidt 2016). 
Despite the international and supranational character of the European Commission or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), individual representatives are most often affiliated 
with political parties. Since it has been argued that supranational bodies such as the 
                                                     
33 Hajer also analyses metaphors and story-lines in his study. These conceptual tools are not 
deployed because analysing metaphors needs a different focus and methodological tool than 
analysing solidarity claims. Story-lines are also not investigated because this would suggest a 
stronger focus on individual motives and behaviour to reconstruct story-lines. 
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European Commission are structured by partisan ideologies (Hartlapp et al. 2014; Hix 
2008), individual international actors such as European Commissioners are included in 
the study. The presidents of the European Commission (Barroso, Juncker) as well as the 
respective Commissioners for Home Affairs (Malmström, Avramopoulos) and Monetary 
Affairs (Rehn, Moscovici) are expected to form a distinct EU discourse coalition with 
individual ties to the respective partisan discourse coalition in both crises. 
5.2.2 Coalition magnets and frames in times of crisis 
The discourse coalition approach focuses on actors in discourses and how they are bound 
together by a social construct. However, Hajer does not elaborate on the term ‘social 
construct’. How and under what circumstances social constructs are the ideational glue 
for discourse coalitions is not theorised by Hajer. In order to fill this conceptual gap, the 
coalition magnet approach by Béland and Cox (2016) is adopted. It conceptualises an 
influential idea as a ‘coalition magnet’ and thereby sheds light on the ideational basis of 
discourse coalitions. 
Béland and Cox name three criteria for an idea to become a coalition magnet. First, 
an idea is broadly interpretable by different actors which means it is rather ‘ambiguous or 
polysemic’ (Béland and Cox 2016: 431). Second, key actors pick up the idea and promote 
it. Finally, an idea has to bring various actors together. An additional criterion might be a 
crisis situation. Blyth argues that crises are constructed to some extent, because actors 
debate about the origins, content, and range of a crisis. Due to the conflicts that arise out 
of the disagreement on how to understand and solve the crisis, uncertainty is created and 
spread (Blyth 2002). The Euro crisis and the migration crisis created institutional 
uncertainty in the EU in relation to how to deal with crisis countries or a large number of 
incoming asylum seekers. In such times, ideas matter most and account for ideational-
institutional change. 
Recent studies on coalition magnets demonstrate how they bear a certain 
ambiguity to which multiple actors can connect their policy beliefs and expectations 
(Khayatzadeh-Mahani et al. 2019). Moreover, coalition magnets appeal to the public as 
strong positive ideas that can hardly be discredited. For instance, Kiess et al. (2017) show 
how the idea of the ‘social market economy’ worked as a ‘coalition magnet’ in the German 
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discourse on labour market reforms during the global financial crisis in 2007/08. Thus, a 
coalition magnet also mobilises political power and helps actors to reach their goals. 
Linking the coalition magnet approach with previous studies on framing in times 
of crisis helps to contextualise which ideas become influential. From a post-functionalist 
perspective, it has been argued that current political conflicts are driven by either 
economic or cultural issues, expecting that cultural conflicts become more important than 
economic conflicts. This might lead to a nationalistic backlash (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 
Kriesi et al. 2012; Teney et al. 2014). However, the Euro crisis is mostly debated in 
economic terms. The focus on sovereign debt, a banking crisis or the loss of trust in the 
capitalist market are the main frames in the public debate (Grande et al. 2016; Kaiser and 
Kleinen-von Königslöw 2017). The parliamentary debates on the bailout programmes also 
emphasise the economic conflict among the political parties, demonstrating a divide 
between left parties with a more Keynesian philosophy and conservative-right political 
parties who favour a neoclassical economic approach (Maatsch 2014). To some extent, 
cultural frames play a role for political actors in the public debate. Galpin (2017) has 
shown, in her qualitative frame analysis on the German Euro crisis discourse, that the 
austerity frame was linked to the cultural framing of solidarity. Only if crisis countries 
followed the austerity paradigm and made the necessary ‘reforms’ could they expect 
solidarity in return. 
With regard to the framing in the migration crisis, scholars have demonstrated the 
crucial role of security frames in the migration crisis which underpin the policy 
orientation towards a securitisation of migration policies in Europe. In turn, humanitarian 
claims in the discourse on Europe’s migration crisis have been less identified (Greussing 
and Boomgaarden 2017; Musarò and Parmiggiani 2017; Vollmer 2014). 
While the cited studies have focused on the general framing of the crises and 
partially included solidarity as one frame among others, the present study focuses on 
solidarity claims for two reasons. First, in the discourse on the crises, scholars agree that 
solidarity is lacking, but attribute different meanings to it. Hall (2012: 367–368) states that 
social solidarity is eroding in the Euro crisis, while Biermann et al. (2019: 258) speak of 
‘temporary solidarity’ and Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018: 192) of ‘multilateral 
solidarity’ as missing types of voluntary burden-sharing in the migration crisis. Börzel 
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and Risse (2018) attribute cultural, political, and economic issues to solidarity by stating 
that solidarity is about who is part of the European community and how resources are 
redistributed in the wake of the crisis. Therefore, the present study differentiates 
solidarity by suggesting several meanings that are discursively constructed by actors in 
the public. By considering coalition magnet patterns for the analysis of meanings of 
solidarity, the interconnectedness of these meanings can be studied. Second, analysing the 
use of solidarity identifies which of these meanings is most dominant, how they are 
linked, and which political parties refer to similar meanings of solidarity during the crises 
discourses. 
5.2.3 The discursive construction of solidarity 
By discursive construction of solidarity, I mean the articulation and framing of solidarity 
by actors. Solidarity does not just exist; it has to be appealed to and argued for by actors 
so as to resonate in discourses and mobilise the public on how the Euro crisis or the 
migration crisis should be solved (Wallaschek 2019c; Wallaschek 2019a). Assuming that 
solidarity is contested (Gallie 1956), which means that actors argue about the proper 
meaning of the term without coming to an agreement, the study analyses meanings of 
solidarity and identifies which one is dominant in the mass media. I highlight five 
meanings of solidarity for the present study: cultural, social, political, economic, and 
monetary solidarity. Table 17 summarises the meanings of solidarity that have been 
identified from the solidarity literature. 
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Table 17: Meanings of solidarity in the German discourse during both crises (2010-15) 
Meanings of 
solidarity 
Description 
Cultural solidarity Promoting shared norms, rights, and identity to act in solidarity 
Social solidarity Referring to redistributive policies as well as volunteering of people 
Political solidarity 
Setting up new legislative actions and new political instruments in a 
solidary way 
Economic 
solidarity 
Supportive actions for member states in economic terms 
Monetary 
solidarity 
Risk-sharing and establishing financial creditability and liability among 
members of a currency union 
 
Note: Further meanings of solidarity and other concepts have been coded, but are not displayed in 
the table. An overview of the meanings of solidarity is included in Table 20 of the appendix of 
Chapter 5. 
 
Cultural solidarity refers to promoting shared norms, rights or a common identity to 
undertake solidary actions. Closa and Maatsch (2014: 833) understand solidarity as 
supporting universal justice and human rights in their frame analysis of parliamentary 
debates on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Others have highlighted the 
transnational support of citizens in other countries in the Euro crisis (Wonka 2016) or 
emphasised a shared European identity and belonging to the EU community as 
constitutive of cultural solidarity (Galpin 2017). I expect that cultural solidarity is salient 
in the migration discourse, because it touches upon humanitarian values that are 
inscribed in the EU treaties as guiding principles. 
Social solidarity focuses on the distributional politics behind solidarity actions. In 
particular, welfare policies are considered as solidary, because they redistribute resources 
and create mutual social relations via institutional mechanisms. Citizens might support 
redistribution for people in need and show solidary attitudes (Baldwin 1990; Gelissen 
2000). I expect that social solidarity is prevailing in the Euro crisis discourse due to high 
unemployment rates and cuts in social spending in the crisis countries, highlighting the 
need to redistributive resources to people in need. 
Political solidarity is about creating new political-institutional settings that foster 
cooperation and support among political actors. It is a source of legitimacy for political 
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actions – especially in times of crisis (Kneuer and Masala 2015). Since the EU lacks the 
supranational authority in migration policies, I expect that political solidarity is most 
prominent in the migration discourse. 
Economic solidarity is about supportive actions for economies. These are related to 
public investment plans and coordinated strategies to support growth and employment. It 
is often related to Keynesian understandings of macroeconomics (Sommer 2013). I expect 
that economic solidarity is hardly visible in the Euro crisis discourse due to the prevailing 
austerity paradigm. 
Monetary solidarity refers to financial liability created among members of a 
community. It is a risk-sharing mechanism dealing with uncertainty and diversity among 
member states in monetary and financial issues. The newly established ESM is seen as a 
mechanism that provides monetary solidarity in time of crisis (Schelkle 2017). I expect that 
monetary solidarity is crucial in the German Euro crisis discourse. 
To sum up, social solidarity and monetary solidarity are expected to be most 
relevant in the Euro crisis and might act as distinct coalition magnets. Economic solidarity 
might be demanded too, but it might be less central than the other two meanings of 
solidarity. In the migration crisis discourse, cultural and political solidarity might be 
predominately used and are expected to be coalition magnets. Beyond the use of 
solidarity, I also expect that actors refer to other frames in the solidarity discourse. 
Specifically, I expect austerity frames in the Euro crisis, as Galpin (2017) has highlighted in 
her qualitative analysis of the German crisis discourse. Furthermore, I expect security and 
demarcation claims in the migration crisis due to the prevalence of border control issues 
and the contestation of the Dublin Regulations and the Schengen agreement (Börzel and 
Risse 2018; Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). 
5.3 Data and Methods 
The German mass media arena is selected for both crises from 2010 to 2015. Analysing the 
German discourse considers Germany’s position in the two crises and the different 
expectations of receiving or giving solidarity. Claus Offe (2016: 139–151) points out that 
Germany was criticised for its lack of solidarity with the ‘GIIPS countries’ (Greece, 
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Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain), insisting on ordoliberal austerity policies in the Euro crisis 
(Blyth 2015; Matthijs 2016). In the migration crisis, however, Germany criticised other 
member states, in particular the Visegrád countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia), for their lack of solidarity in establishing new European cooperative 
mechanisms. These different perceptions – in terms of who should act in solidarity with 
whom and how actors justify these decisions – makes comparing the German media 
discourse in both crises an intriguing case study. 
The two German daily quality newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Die 
Welt (Welt) have been selected from 2010 to 2015. SZ and Welt have a high circulation and 
readership and represent the political cleavage of ‘centre-left’ and ‘centre-right’.34 A broad 
representation of opinions, news, and actors can be studied in these media outlets. Printed 
quality newspapers are still the main gatekeepers in the public debate in European 
countries and previous research has demonstrated that tabloids cover less politically 
relevant information (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Nossek et al. 2015; Reinemann et al. 
2012).  
The newspaper articles were coded in the R package RQDA (Huang 2016) by 
applying the claims-making method (Koopmans and Statham 1999). Claims are defined as 
public speech acts (including protest events) that articulate political demands, calls for 
actions, proposals, or criticisms, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity 
of the claimants or other collective actors (Koopmans and Statham 2010: 55). 
Four core codes constitute a claim: the speaker, the act, the issue, and the position. If one 
of these four codes cannot be identified, the claim is not coded. The coding of the selected 
newspaper articles was adapted from the codebook by de Wilde et al. (2014) (more 
information on the coding process is included in the appendix of chapter 5). 
Based on a keyword search in the database Factiva 1,155 articles on solidarity in 
the migration crisis and 1,108 articles on solidarity in the Euro crisis have been selected.35 
In sum, 673 claims were coded for the migration crisis and 367 claims were coded for the 
                                                     
34 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) is often selected as a ‘center-right’ newspaper in 
Germany. However, the FAZ is only available in the Factiva database from August 2013 on. 
Selecting the FAZ would have severely limited the data material and the scope of the analysis. 
35 Regarding the selection of ‘solidarity claims’, I applied a nominalistic approach. This means that I 
only coded claims if the word stem ‘solidar*’ was mentioned (appendix of chapter 5 on the 
keyword search string). 
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Euro crisis.36 Figure 13 gives an overview on the frequency of claims, differentiating 
between the centre-left newspaper SZ and the centre-right newspaper Welt as well as both 
crises. 
 
Figure 13: Number of claims in Europe's migration crisis and in the Euro crisis 
 
Note: The dotted graphs show the number of claims in centre-right newspaper Welt and the solid 
graphs display the number of claims in the centre-right newspaper SZ. The grey lines show the 
number of claims in the Euro crisis while the black lines are for Europe’s migration crisis. 
 
The frequency of claims in the two newspapers follow similar paths in Europe’s migration 
crisis and the Euro crisis debate. While SZ and Welt show two rather uniform graphs from 
2010 to 2013, the number of claims is higher in the SZ than in the Welt. In 2015, the SZ 
covers solidarity claims almost twice as much as the Welt. In the Euro crisis, the SZ 
                                                     
36 Within this amount of claims, it is possible that the same claim appears in both newspapers 
which is then counted twice. A ‘double claim’ can be understood as a crucial reference point for the 
public debate which thereby created public attention. Hence, both claims were coded. 
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features more claims on solidarity with a peak in 2012. From 2012 to 2014, the coverage in 
both newspapers decreases, but then rises again in 2015. 
In order to explain these discourse dynamics, the co-evolution of articulating ideas 
and actor constellations is studied from a discourse network perspective (Leifeld 2016b; 
Leifeld 2016a; Leifeld and Haunss 2012). The communicative action of an actor using a 
concept is defined as a relation between an actor and a concept. Discourse networks are 
affiliation networks that consist of two types of nodes which are connected via edges. 
These only exist between different types of nodes in affiliation networks (Borgatti and 
Halgin 2011). 
To translate the discourse coalition and the coalition magnet approach into the 
network methodology, the eigenvector centrality is computed (Bonacich 1987). It takes 
into account the number of edges of each node and the edges to other central nodes. The 
higher the value (from 0 to 1), the more likely it is that the node acts as a coalition magnet 
or key actor in a discourse coalition. To strengthen the perspective on influential ideas and 
actors, the edge weight has to be at least two in the Euro crisis discourse network. In 
Europe’s migration crisis, a threshold of an edge weight of at least three is applied to 
account for the higher number of claims in this crisis debate. This means that an actor has 
to refer to a concept at least two (respectively three) times to be included in the discourse 
network. This helps to focus on the central actors and ideas. Moreover, it is based on the 
expectation that referring to a concept only once can been seen as a rather random 
connection, but claiming an idea more often stresses its importance for the actor and the 
whole discourse over time. 
5.4 Results 
The findings are presented in two steps, by first looking at the coalition magnets in the 
Euro crisis discourse and the migration crisis discourse. I then present the discourse 
networks for the specific discourse coalitions. The following Table 18 summarises the 
main characteristics of the two discourse networks. 
 
 146 
Table 18: Overview about the two crisis discourse networks 
Network statistics Euro crisis discourse 
Europe’s migration crisis 
discourse 
Number of nodes 
(actors/concepts) 
25( 16/9) 30 (19/11) 
Number of edges 70 152 
Strongest edge 
11 (A. Merkel to financial 
solidity) 
11 (Grünen to political 
solidarity) 
Network density (mean degree 
centrality (Nooy et al. 2011)) 
2.08 2.2 
Network centralisation 0.79 0.83 
most central actors 
least central actor 
0.80 (A. Merkel) 
0.00 (AfD) 
0.49 (Grünen) 
0.00 (G.  Müller) 
Most central concept 
Least central concept 
1.00 (financial solidity) 
0.00 (misuse of solidarity) 
1.00 (political solidarity) 
0.00 (justice) 
 
The Euro crisis started in Greece in December 2009 at which point the Greek government 
admitted to having reported false numbers of debt and economic growth. The following 
political and financial developments into the most severe crisis of the EU peaked with the 
Greek referendum in July 2015 concerning the third bailout programme (or 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’). The subsequent defeat in the European Council and 
an even stricter agreement on the bailout terms has marked the end of an intense debate 
on the Euro crisis. In the same year, the migration topic came to public attention and 
dominated the media coverage from summer 2015 onwards. Nonetheless, after the ‘Arab 
Spring’ of 2011 and an increase in the number of migrant shipwrecks in the Mediterranean 
in 2013 and 2014, solidarity was already debated (Wallaschek 2018b). The asymmetries of 
the EU asylum policies and under-development of the EU Justice and Home Affairs in this 
policy gained public attention. 
5.4.1 Coalition magnets: The dominance of austerity and contested political 
solidarity 
The discourse on solidarity in the Euro crisis is reinterpreted by claims on financial 
solidity. Financial solidity is the uncontested coalition magnet in the public discourse. 
Claims on solidarity and financial solidity are linked in the German public discourse. The 
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solidarity discourse in Europe’s migration crisis is shaped by the coalition magnet political 
solidarity. However, this meaning of solidarity is contested by other concepts such as 
demarcation or legal regulations. 
Table 19 provides an overview of the concepts used in both discourses. To control 
for different centrality measures, the eigenvector centrality and the normalised degree 
centrality are shown. In both centrality measures, financial solidity and political solidarity 
are on the first position in their discourse network. The gap between the first and the 
following positions is very wide and indicates how crucial both concepts are in their 
discourses. The following second and third positions in Table 19 are the same concepts in 
each centrality score. 
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Table 19: Coalition magnets in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis 
Concepts Euro crisis Migration crisis 
 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Normalised degree 
centrality 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Normalised degree 
centrality 
conditionality 0,113 0,042 - - 
cultural 
solidarity 
0,024 0,083 0,154 0,069 
demarcation - - 0,227 0,172 
economic 
solidarity 
0,070 0,167 - - 
financial 
solidity 
1,000 0,375 - - 
justice - - 0,000 0,034 
legal 
regulations 
- - 0,157 0,103 
misuse of 
solidarity 
0,000 0,042 0,000 0,034 
monetary 
solidarity 
0,026 0,125 0,000 0,069 
necessity 0,024 0,042 - - 
political 
solidarity 
0,048 0,125 1,000 0,414 
responsibility 0,023 0,083 - - 
security - - 0,100 0,069 
social 
cohesion 
- - 0,000 0,034 
social 
solidarity 
- - 0,123 0,069 
sovereignty - - 0,017 0,069 
 
Note: The eigenvector centrality scale is from 0 to 1. The closer the value is to 1, the more central 
the concept. The degree centrality is normalised by dividing the number of edges a node has and 
the total number of edges in the respective network. The higher the value, the more central the 
concept. The underlined values indicate the three highest centrality values, increasing the 
readability of the table. The hyphen indicates that the concept has not appeared in the network 
discourse, while the value 0 shows that the concept appeared but is not central in the network. 
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Both discourses have a rather different ideational structure. Some understandings of 
solidarity are only deployed in one of the crisis discourses (including social solidarity in 
the migration crisis, economic solidarity in the Euro crisis, among others). Besides 
meanings of solidarity, other concepts such as sovereignty, responsibility or, most 
prominently, financial solidity do not feature in both discourses. Hence, discourses are 
structured along coalition magnets that attract actors and offer a way to frame the crisis in 
a specific way. 
The following statements from the beginning of the Euro crisis illustrate the ideational 
reinterpretation of solidarity by referring to ‘financial solidity’ as a necessary component 
of any solidarity action. Thus, solidarity is demanded, but only if the austerity regime 
persists: 
Merkel also briefly talked about the Greek debts crisis. The long lasting infringement of the 
stability pact has brought Greece into this situation and not the [financial, author] 
speculation. Therefore, short-term solidarity was not the solution. There is no alternative to a 
rigorous austerity programme. (Welt, March 18th 2010). 
President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso proclaimed: ‘Without solidarity, 
there is no stability.’ (Welt, April 28th 2010). 
Merkel’s position is indirectly quoted in the centre-right newspaper saying that austerity 
measurements are unavoidable in Greece. She blames Greece for its precarious situation 
and argues that there is no other way than austerity. Barroso stresses that solidarity has to 
be shown in order to save the Eurozone in his comment on the first Greek bailout 
programme. 
The EU established the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010, the 
intergovernmental treaty ESM and the Fiscal Compact in 2012 and stressed that solidarity 
is given, but only under certain circumstances, including austerity measures. The 
following debates on bailout programmes37 for Greece or even a potential ‘Grexit’, 
financial turmoil in Spain and Cyprus, as well as the establishment of the ESM underpin 
                                                     
37 In the German debate, bailout programs are semantically redefined as ‚Rettungspakete’ or 
‚Rettungsschirme’ (rescue packages or rescue umbrellas). This underlines the discursive link of 
austerity and solidarity: Together with other EU member states, Germany is spanning his umbrella 
and sends a package to rescue crisis countries from its sovereign debt with its credits. Because of 
that, certain conditions can be requested such as structural reforms and austerity policies. That the 
bailout programs have also recapitalised German, Dutch and French banks who gave risky loans to 
these countries were hardly debated. 
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the ideational focus on austerity. Claims on linking solidarity and austerity prevailed over 
the whole time period. 
Examining the migration crisis, the debate about reforming the European asylum 
and migration policies started before 2015. Several ship incidents in the Mediterranean (e. 
g. at the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013), as well as an increasing number of asylum 
seekers coming to Italy and Greece from Syria in 2012 to 2014, induced a lasting debate 
about reform. In particular, a European solution and new political instruments were put 
forward to deal solidarily with the migration movements: 
‘Calling for an active admission of Syrian civil war refugees and the “protection in the 
region” approach do not contradict each other, but are interdependent’, said [Vice chairman 
of the Greens in the Bundestag Josef, author] Winkler with regard to the government’s 
position. His party demands that Germany takes in refugees unbureaucratically. ‘We also see 
this as an act of solidarity with the European border countries which have provided a lot of 
assistance in the refugee admission.’ (Welt, September 4th 2012).  
In 2015, such claims have been reformulated and demanded from a wide range of party 
actors. Although political solidarity is the most salient concept in the migration crisis 
discourse, ‘demarcation’, ‘legal regulations’ or ‘security’ also gained public attention 
before and during the crisis. Security measures against migrants are justified, a re-
nationalisation of border control is suggested or cooperation among EU member states is 
refused. Since the establishment of the Dublin Regulations, the country which an asylum 
seeker first enters has to deal with its asylum procedure, while other EU member states 
are not obliged to do anything. Additionally, these claims stress that the existing legal 
regulations should not be altered. 
Germany is protesting against Italy’s refugee politics which is claiming to give visas to 
thousands of Tunisian immigrants, to let them pass to other EU member states. ‘Italy has to 
deal with its refugee problem on its own’, said the [German, author] Federal Minister of the 
Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich to the ‘Welt’. (Welt, April 11th 2011). 
 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) harshly rejected those ideas which were also 
presented by her Austrian counterpart Werner Feymann in Brussels. Relocating asylum 
seekers among the EU member states is demanded again and again, said the Chancellor. She 
thinks, however, that the discussion on refugee policy should be based on the existing legal 
regulations (SZ, October 26th 2013). 
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Hence, the rise of xenophobic and nationalistic claims and the contestation of the 
Schengen agreement in 2015 have a pre-story that rests on previous claims with a similar 
framing. The constancy of both coalition magnets demonstrates that even in times of 
crisis, actors use similar ideas in public debates. 
5.4.2 Discourse coalitions: The omnipresence of conservative politicians 
The most central actors are (German) conservative party politicians in the Euro crisis. 
German Chancellor Merkel and the two German parties CDU and CSU, as well as the 
President of the European Commission Barroso (2004–14), are most visible and form a 
discourse coalition. Regarding the migration crisis, the key actors in the debate are the 
German parties Die Grünen, SPD, and CSU, as well as German Chancellor Merkel. They 
form one large and encompassing discourse coalition. The expectation about a governing 
party and party opposition discourse coalition is not confirmed (Figure 14). 
In the Euro crisis discourse, the central role of conservative parties and politicians 
during the Euro crisis underlines their influence in shaping the solidarity discourse. They 
are supported by claims from the German liberal party (FDP) politicians Westerwelle 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2009–13) and Brüderle (Minister of Economics, 2009–11). 
Hence, the German government coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP between 2009 and 2013, 
that is, amid the main phase of the Euro crisis, engaged in the public discourse by linking 
the solidarity discourse with claims on financial solidity. 
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Figure 14: Solidarity discourse networks in the Euro crisis (2010-15) 
Note: The bipartite network consists of actors that are shown as circles and concepts displayed as 
squares. The size of the nodes and labels is based on the eigenvector centrality. The bigger the 
size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. The thickness of the edges as well as 
the edge labels indicate how strong actors and concepts are linked. The discourse network only 
shows edges with an edge weight of at least 2, focusing on the most prevalent links between actors 
and concepts. The codes ‘no party affiliation’ and ‘no justification’ have been deleted from the 
network. 
 
The reinterpretation and linking of solidarity and austerity became an important topic 
during the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2014. As the CDU 
frontrunner David McAllister highlighted in an interview: 
The CDU wants to keep the Euro stable and ensure that Europe emerges strengthened from 
the crisis. Solidarity and solidity belong together. Therefore, we are against a systemic 
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communitarisation of national debts. We will not support Eurobonds or debt repayment 
funds. On this issue, we have the support of a very large majority of German citizens, said 
David McAllister, the frontrunner of the CDU in the EP elections in 2014 (Welt, February 8th 
2014).38 
The debate on solidarity and solidity continued in 2014/15. It was then linked to the 
electoral victory of the left party alliance Syriza in Greece in January 2015, as well as to the 
following negotiations about a third bailout programme between the Greek government, 
the Troika, and the Eurozone members. The pressure on the Greek government after the 
referendum in July 2015 to accept new (and even stricter) conditions and supervision by 
the Troika supports the central role of austerity in the Euro crisis. Thus, financial solidity 
acts as a coalition magnet for the biggest discourse coalition that consists of the mentioned 
German party actors and Barroso. With the highest number of claims, Merkel stands out 
as the most central actor in the discourse network. 
Social democratic parties, in particular the German SPD, refer to both austerity and 
meanings of solidarity. They are rather undecided when it comes to how to solve the Euro 
crisis. They argue that solidarity should be shown with the crisis countries based on 
shared values such as human dignity and equality (cultural solidarity), that EU member 
states should cooperate and form an ‘ever closer union’ (political solidarity) or should 
establish a European public investment plan or a transfer union (economic solidarity) in 
order to solve the Euro crisis. Yet, none of these solidarity claims became salient in the 
discourse. Moreover, social democrats demanded austerity measures as necessary to 
reduce the level of national debts (financial solidity). This argumentative support 
contributed to the strength of financial solidity as a coalition magnet in the Euro crisis. 
Other actors and concepts were rather marginal in the discourse on the Euro crisis 
from 2010 to 2015. The German green party focused on cultural solidarity claims, while 
the appearance of the radical right party AfD at the beginning of its establishment is based 
on its Eurosceptic focus. AfD politicians demand that Germany should leave the 
Eurozone, reintroduce the Deutsche Mark (DM) and that any solidarity actions are 
illegitimate. Non-German actors such as the French President François Hollande (2012–
                                                     
38 In figure 14, David McAllister is not present as a single node, because his claim is subsumed 
under the party label ‘CDU’. Only actors with more than two claims and a crucial public or 
political position were coded by name. This coding strategy is adapted from other discourse 
network studies (Fisher et al. 2013; Haunss 2017). 
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17), the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski (2007–14) or the European 
Commissioner Olli Rehn (2009–14) are less central in the discourse, which emphasises the 
strong domestic focus of the German solidarity debate on the Euro crisis. Accordingly, 
other coalition magnets or discourse coalitions are not identified. 
Regarding the migration crisis, the party opposition receives public attention and 
influences the solidarity debate (Figure 15). The German green party (Die Grünen) and 
the social democrats (SPD) argue for a European solution and new political instruments to 
deal solidarily with the migration movements (political solidarity). Nonetheless, 
Chancellor Merkel and the CSU are also strongly represented in the discourse. The 
European Commissioners for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström (2010–14) and Dimitris 
Avramopoulos (since 2014) are also quite visible in the discourse and demand a European 
solution that fosters cooperation between EU member states and reforms to the existing 
CEAS. 
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Figure 15: Solidarity discourse networks in Europe's migration crisis (2010-15) 
Note: The bipartite network consists of actors that are shown as circles and concepts displayed as 
squares. The size of the nodes and labels is based on the eigenvector centrality. The bigger the 
size of a node, the more central the node is in the network. The thickness of the edges as well as 
the edge labels indicate how strong actors and concepts are linked. The discourse network only 
shows edges with an edge weight of at least 3, focusing on the most prevalent links between actors 
and concepts. The codes ‘no party affiliation’ and ‘no justification’ have been deleted from the 
network. 
 
The concern that the Southern European countries are left with the incoming asylum 
seekers and are over-burdened is shared by many European, as well as social democratic, 
green, and left actors. For instance, the German SPD politician Michael Roth demands a 
European solidarity mechanism and justifies this with political solidarity in the centre-left 
newspaper: 
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‘We need more solidarity. We need more humanity’, claimed Michael Roth, the German 
Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. ‘We are very, very open to develop 
a mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before’, he 
emphasised (SZ, June 24th 2015). 
He refers positively to solidarity at the beginning of his statement and becomes more 
concrete at the end by suggesting a solidary scheme in which EU member states 
participate in the future. The responsibility to act in solidarity is predominately attributed 
to the EU member states instead of addressing refugees and migrants. 
In 2015, radical right parties such as the AfD and right-conservative politicians like 
the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (since 2010) demand national border control, 
claim to re-establish national sovereignty, and refuse a fair sharing of burdens among the 
EU member states. The prevalence of the call to solidarity in 2015 and evidence of how 
party actors seek to reinterpret the term are provided in the following statement by the 
Polish Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz (2014–15) in 2015: 
Warsaw wants to prevent a revision of asylum law based on the population of the EU 
member states. Until now Poland receives only few refugees in relation to its population size 
– in 2014 only 114 Syrians have applied for asylum. It is not surprising that the head of 
government Ewa Kopacz primarily insists on better border security in the Mediterranean at 
the EU summit in Brussels. ‘Our solidarity primarily rests upon strongly supporting Frontex. 
We will send our border police officer’ (Welt, April 25th 2015). 
Although showing solidarity is contested among the political actors, the European 
Commission proposed several ‘institutional packages’ in 2015. Among these was the 
relocation of 160,000 refugees who had already been registered in Greece, Hungary, and 
Italy across the other EU member states, following a certain quota for each country in 
September 2015 (European Commission 2015). The European Council approved it by a 
majority vote two weeks later. This led to conflicts among the member states, because the 
Visegrád countries voted against it and brought it to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
to repeal the decision. However, the ECJ ruled against it in September 2017 (Byrne 2017). 
Nonetheless, other countries such as Belgium or Austria have also delayed or slowed 
down the relocation of refugees from Greece and Italy (European Commission 2017a). 
This means that though the particular meaning of political solidarity was established in 
the European solidarity mechanism and approved by the member states, the resistance of 
several EU member states has brought down the idea of political solidarity (Zaun 2018). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The article analysed the German media discourse on solidarity in the Euro crisis and 
Europe’s migration crisis. The aim was to analyse meanings of solidarity and the specific 
party constellation in both crises discourses from a network perspective. Since Germany 
was criticised for its lack of showing solidarity in the Euro crisis, but demanded solidarity 
from other EU member states in the migration crisis, it was expected that solidarity is 
differently framed in the respective crisis discourses. 
To conceptualise the agency and ideational dimension in the discursive 
institutionalist framework, the discourse coalition and coalition magnet approach were 
combined. Understanding influential ideas as coalition magnets, which attract various 
and key actors and can be widely interpreted, sheds light on how discourse coalitions are 
established. As Béland and Cox note, the polysemic nature of concepts might matter for 
creating a coalition magnet, but it might also prevent ideas from becoming influential. 
Hence, deploying rather ambiguous ideas might lead to unexpected outcomes and in turn 
create uncertainty in terms of how actors can frame ideas. As shown in the Euro crisis 
discourse, actors strategically reinterpreted solidarity and combined it with financial 
solidity so as to legitimise their decisions. These conceptual questions, as well as the 
suggested combination of both approaches, provide a fruitful perspective for future 
discursive institutionalist analysis. 
The two main findings of the discourse network analysis are as follows. First, the 
framing of solidarity differs in the two crises, which corroborates the formulated 
expectation on the perceived solidary obligations in Germany. In the case of the Euro 
crisis, austerity claims were prevalent, while meanings of solidarity were too contested 
among the actors. Solidarity was reinterpreted by way of the ‘financial solidity’ concept. 
This prevented economic and monetary solidarity from becoming powerful coalition 
magnets in the discourse on the Euro crisis. Social solidarity was completely absent in the 
discourse. This ideational interlocking confirms Galpin’s (2017) qualitative account and 
supports the expectation that German actors frame the lack of giving solidarity mainly 
with regard to a necessary austerity regime in order to guarantee the survival of the 
Eurozone. The focus on national budget surveillance via the Fiscal Compact and the 
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remaining relevance of austerity policies in the EU underline the dominance of economic 
issues as previous studies have shown (Grande et al. 2016). 
The analysis of coalition magnets in Europe’s migration crisis has demonstrated an 
increasingly polarised discourse between a solidarity-oriented understanding in which 
political solidarity is closely linked to other meanings of solidarity, such as cultural 
solidarity, and a contra-solidarity perspective stressing security issues. The limitations of 
the CEAS in responding to the high influx of asylum seekers and a fair burden-sharing 
have opened a discursive opportunity to debate new cooperative institutional settings or 
to contest the Schengen agreement. Even though the implementation of these institutional 
reforms predominantly failed in the end (Biermann et al. 2019; Zaun 2018), such public 
discussions on reforming the CEAS were hardly imaginable before 2015. The solidarity 
debate underpins the high degree of potential conflict around the migration issue in the 
EU. 
Second, conservative parties and politicians are the most present party actors in 
both crises discourses. While they strongly dominate the Euro crisis discourse, the 
migration crisis discourse shows a broader discourse coalition that includes not just 
conservative actors, but also members of the Green party, SPD, and German Left party. 
Hence, the debate on solidarity in the Euro crisis is driven more by a left versus right 
cleavage, and a government versus party opposition conflict, than the migration crisis 
discourse. 
Closa and Maatsch’s (2014) finding that the party opposition mainly focuses on 
claiming solidarity in plenary debates is not corroborated for the media arena. 
Government and opposition actors use solidarity claims, and the former is more visible in 
both crisis discourses. Supranational actors such as members of the European 
Commission (e. g. Barroso, Malmström or Avramopoulos) have influenced the German 
public debates to some extent, which underscores their increased relevance in national 
media debates on European affairs. 
While liberal intergovernmentalism assumes rather fixed national preferences and 
complete information about the issue, the ideational approach has demonstrated that 
actors adapt their understanding of solidarity to the crisis situation. While economic and 
monetary solidarity have played a role in the Euro crisis, political and cultural solidarity 
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featured in the migration crisis. Despite the high rates of unemployment and strong cuts 
in the social sector, social solidarity has not received significant attention in the Euro 
crisis. While the first mentioned meanings have been linked to the reform process of the 
EMU and the understanding that the Eurozone, in order to survive, has to establish new 
institutional mechanisms (ESM, Fiscal Compact), claims on political solidarity in 
particular have substantially questioned the status quo of the CEAS. However, the reform 
process of establishing solidary institutions on the European level has been blocked by 
several EU member states. While Germany has hesitated to support such institutional 
reforms before 2015, it has changed its position due to the large number of incoming 
asylum seekers and supported a European framework in the wake of the migration crisis. 
These results bear some limitations and open the agenda for future inquiries. First 
and foremost, applying a nominalistic approach to solidarity presupposes that actors 
intentionally use the concept, and this also limits the data material. Moreover, it does not 
cover claims that use the idea of solidarity without mentioning the term. While this 
approach was useful to explore the meanings of solidarity in two different crises, future 
studies should extend the terminological scope of the study and utilise a broad 
conceptualisation of solidarity so as to capture further aspects of and debates on 
solidarity. The focus on quality newspapers leads to a selection bias towards statements 
by ‘elite’ actors and a ‘structural bias’ of the media towards government actors (Koopmans 
2007; Van Dalen 2012). However, the study was interested in how political parties frame 
solidarity and mobilise the public, and as such studying quality newspapers proved to be 
most apt. Nonetheless, meanings of solidarity can be analysed in other argumentative 
arenas such as parliaments, online media outlets or policy discourses. The claim on 
solidarity can also be related to historical crisis events, accounting for long-term ideational 
changes. 
The public appeal to solidarity strongly resonated in Germany during both 
European crises. Furthermore, the call to solidarity is far from being uncontested in the 
public sphere. In this regard, the present study has demonstrated how actors deal with 
crisis situations and how they frame and reinterpret solidarity as a potential solution 
when experiencing crises. 
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5.6 Appendix 
5.6.1 Political claims analysis 
The coding of the newspaper articles follows the framework of political claims analysis 
(PCA). PCA was developed by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; 2010). The main 
idea of PCA is that newspaper articles contain many different statements by different 
actors. Instead of focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis or almost exclusively 
on the content, the link between a statement and the speaker is emphasised. 
Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. A claim can include several actions, 
articulated or reported in the public sphere and, thus, represents the plurality of actions 
and demands made by actors. The components of a claim can be differentiated by 
following a logic of questions regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and WHEN, WHO makes a 
claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY’ (de 
Wilde 2014: 52). These questions are the grammar of claims and help the coder to identify 
the claim, making the coding transparent and comprehensible. In my project, I focus on 
four core codes of a claim: 1) the speaker; 2) the act; 3) the issue; and 4) the position. If I 
cannot identify all of these four codes in a statement, the potential claim is not coded. The 
other mentioned components by de Wilde are coded if detectable. The codes are 
differentiated into sub-codes to allow for a fine-grained coding and analysis (Table 20) 
and follows the published codebook by de Wilde et al. (2014) who have coded newspaper 
articles and parliamentary debates in a similar way. 
 
Table 20: Codes and sub-codes in the PCA (Appendix Chapter 5) 
Codes Sub-codes 
Time & source A_year, B_source 
Claimant 
C_claimant_type, D_claimant_scope, E_claimant_function, F_claimant_party, 
G_claimant_nationality, X_special_claimant, XXX_parties 
Action H_action 
Issue I_issue, J_issue scope 
Addressee 
K_addressee_type, L_addressee_scope, M_addressee_function, 
N_addresse_nationality, P_addressee_party, Q_addressee_evaluation 
Frame R_position, S_justification, T_justification_scope 
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The claimant gives the statement and has different forms: It could be a politician who 
states something in an interview or a journalist who writes an opinion piece. Collective 
actors such as the national government could be the claimant too. It is crucial that the 
subject of the statement is clearly identifiable. The claimant has further sub-categories: 
claimant type, claimant scope, then claimant function, claimant nationality, and finally the 
claimant party. Moreover, the sub-category ‘X_special claimant’ names any claimant with 
a full name while the sub-category ‘XXX_parties’ combines party organisation names and 
full names of politicians. For instance, German Chancellor and CDU politician Angela 
Merkel is named with a full name, while other CDU politicians who are less visible in the 
public sphere – i.e. fewer than two claims in the dataset – are subsumed under the 
overarching organisation (CDU). The action of the claimant must also be reported or 
stated in the text. That could be a verbal statement, passing a bill in parliament, 
demonstrating or even violently attacking someone. The action happens in a specific 
context – this is the issue. The issue is integration or migration for the migration crisis, 
and economy or finance for the Euro crisis. The claim has to refer to the crisis situation in 
Europe. Issues relevant to other regions in the world are not coded; with the exception if 
they affect Europe or are situated in a European context, e. g. a claim that Syrian refugees 
should be granted asylum in EU countries. The last core code is position which is 
important in order to see what the claimant thinks about the issue and what they demand. 
This means that the claim should be related to either pro- or contra-solidarity. The claim is 
coded as neutral if the claimant either argues for both positions or no positions. 
Following this logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims or no claims at 
all. There are two limitations for the coding procedure: First, I do not code claims that 
refer to events of migration that are older than six months from the date it is published in 
the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration processes in the 
19th century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in each newspaper 
article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each article. 
Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes, the claim is seen as a new one. 
For instance, an article reports a speech by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. At 
the beginning of the article, she is quoted demanding financial assistance (monetary 
solidarity) for Greece and a European solution. In the middle of the text, Merkel is cited 
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again, but this time, she calls for liberalising the public health sector in Greece in order to 
reduce the sovereign debt. Thus, the speaker is the same (Merkel), the act is the same 
(verbal statement), the issue is also the same (Euro crisis), but the position is different. 
While the first statement is about monetary solidarity and a pro-solidarity statement, the 
second statement refers to structural reforms and austerity actions in Greece. Hence, both 
claims can be coded in the same article. 
5.6.2 Identifying solidarity claims 
Regarding the coding of the selected ‘solidarity statements’, I applied a 
nominalistic approach. This means that I have only coded claims with the mentioned term 
‘solidarity’ in the newspaper article. This strengthens the validity and the reliability of the 
coding procedure for such a polysemic concept. The results are based on the following 
keyword lists in the database Factiva. For the Euro crisis: ‘(Eurozone* or finanz* or 
Währung* or Schuld* or Kredit*) and Solidar* and (EU or Europ*)’. For the migration 
crisis: ‘(Flüchtling* or Flucht* or Migrant* or Einwander* or Zuwander* or Asyl*) and 
Solidar* and (EU or Europ*)’. An asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. 
Duplicates of articles were excluded from the article population. 
The focus of the study is on the meanings of solidarity that are deployed in the 
discourse on the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis. Table 21 provides an overview 
of the various meanings of solidarity. 
 
Table 21: Meanings of solidarity in the two crises discourses (Appendix Chapter 5) 
Meanings Description 
Political solidarity 
Setting up new political mechanisms and instruments in a cooperative 
way 
Social solidarity Redistributing resources and people and groups volunteering 
Cultural solidarity Arguing for a shared identity and norms  
Legal solidarity Liability of members based on the signing of treaties and agreements 
Economic solidarity Support in the form of public investments and growth of the economy 
Monetary solidarity Risk-sharing and the reduction or share of sovereign debts to help others 
Misuse of solidarity Questioning the legitimacy of the call to solidarity 
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Besides the multiple meanings of solidarity which have been coded, I also coded other 
frames as long as they were linked to solidarity in the specific claim. By doing so, the 
coding not only accounts for the various meanings of solidarity, but also accounts for how 
actors use other frames in their statements on solidarity. For instance, an actor claims 
solidarity with a crisis country, because it is unjust how the high unemployment rate 
affects the population. Then, the claim is coded with the frame ‘justice’. Another example 
is the frame of ‘financial solidity’. This is an in-vivo frame, taken from the coding material, 
because actors often used this frame instead of claiming austerity, structural reforms or 
financial consolidation. Actors claim that solidarity is important in the crisis and will be 
shown, but only if financial solidity is implemented and demonstrated by the crisis 
countries. Therefore, the claim is coded as solidarity related, but the frame that is used in 
order to justify the claim is ‘financial solidity’. 
The political claims analysis shares most of the characteristics of the discourse 
network analysis (DNA) (Leifeld 2016b: 54–56) and since the PCA provides a clear coding 
scheme and methodology, the texts were coded as claims and later transformed into 
network data. Actors argue with particular concepts and this communicative action can be 
understood as a relation between an actor and a concept. By referring more or less to one 
concept, this could be understood as a repetitive account on arguing for a specific policy 
solution (Haunss 2017; Leifeld 2016a). Other actors might use the same concept in the 
debate and build up a relation to the concept too. Since actors have different interests, we 
could assume that they deploy a variety of concepts and share concepts with different 
actors. Based on shared concepts or the same actors who refer to a concept, network 
analysis can detect a specific actor or concept cluster within networks in order to examine 
which actors or concepts are relatively close to or distant from each other. Lastly, actors 
and concepts can be studied in affiliation networks, showing two types of networks 
(Borgatti and Halgin 2011; Leifeld 2016b: 64–71). The network graphs 2 and 3, as well as 
the network statistics regarding the eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987), are computed 
and visualised with the R package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz 2006). 
 
 164 
Table 22: Number of claims and articles in German newspapers in the Euro crisis 
(Appendix Chapter 5) 
 
Claims in SZ Claims in Welt Claims (total) SZ Welt Articles (total) 
2010 27 19 46 73 49 122 
2011 47 30 77 122 75 197 
2012 63 30 93 136 71 207 
2013 37 24 61 98 84 182 
2014 10 8 18 84 62 146 
2015 40 32 72 144 110 254 
2010–15 224 143 367 657 451 1,108 
 
 
Table 23: Number of claims and articles in German newspapers in Europe's migration 
crisis (Appendix Chapter 5) 
 
Claims in SZ Claims in Welt Claims (total) SZ Welt Articles (total) 
2010 8 6 14 37 23 60 
2011 24 26 50 49 39 88 
2012 10 8 18 59 28 87 
2013 46 60 106 73 55 128 
2014 54 74 128 95 80 175 
2015 219 138 357 394 223 617 
2010–15 361 312 673 707 448 1,155 
 
 
Table 24: Eigenvector centrality in the Euro crisis and Europe's migration crisis (Appendix 
Chapter 5) 
Euro crisis (2010–15) Europe’s migration crisis (2010–15) 
Actors and Meanings Value Actors and Meanings Value 
financial solidity 1 political solidarity 1 
A. Merkel 0,798 Die Grünen 0,491 
J. M. Barroso 0,284 SPD 0,423 
CSU 0,284 CSU 0,394 
CDU 0,284 A. Merkel 0,343 
 165 
R. Brüderle 0,213 conservative 0,307 
SPD 0,166 C. Malmstroem 0,300 
social democrat 0,162 CDU 0,263 
conservative 0,155 Die Linke 0,257 
G. Westerwelle 0,142 demarcation 0,227 
conditionality 0,113 T. de Maiziere 0,214 
economic solidarity 0,070 D. Avramopoulos 0,171 
political solidarity 0,048 legal regulations 0,157 
monetary solidarity 0,026 cultural solidarity 0,154 
necessity 0,024 social democratic 0,131 
cultural solidarity 0,024 M. Schulz 0,128 
responsibility 0,023 social solidarity 0,123 
F. Hollande 0,010 security 0,100 
Cypriot government 0,007 far right 0,058 
E. Macron 0,007 V. Orbán 0,029 
O. Rehn 0,004 sovereignty 0,017 
Die Grünen 0,003 E. Kopacz 0,002 
R. Sikorski 0,003 H. Seehofer 0,000 
misuse of solidarity 0,000 social cohesion 0,000 
AfD 0,000 monetary solidarity 0,000 
  
misuse of solidarity 0,000 
  
justice 0,000 
  
H.-P. Friedrich 0,000 
  
German government 0,000 
  
G. Müller 0,000 
Note: The scale of the eigenvector centrality score is between 0 and 1. The closer to one, the more 
central the concept or actor in the network. The concepts are displayed in italics to increase the 
readability of the table.  
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6 Conclusion 
This dissertation has sought to shed light on solidarity in Europe in times of crisis. The 
goal was to theorise solidarity from a discursive perspective and develop a conceptual 
approach to analyse actors’ public statements on solidarity. The suggested approach 
builds upon previous studies and offers a new and comprehensive approach for studying 
solidarity in its discursive manifestations. The need for such a new approach was made 
clear in light of the fact that previous work on solidarity seldom considers the discursive 
construction of solidarity. Although solidarity is a common term in social and political 
theory, as well as being widely used in everyday language, the research on solidarity so 
far has hardly taken into account that a) solidarity has to be appealed to in order to be 
relevant in political conflicts, b) actors attribute various meanings to solidarity and 
reinterpret the concept amid changing contexts, and c) solidarity operates across different 
scales that might stand in conflict with one another. Hence, one aim was to differentiate 
solidarity into various meanings and scales and investigate the actor constellation in 
solidarity discourses. 
This newly developed approach distinguishes between the meaning and scale of 
solidarity. While the meaning dimension refers to the content of solidarity, the scale 
dimension captures who is encompassed by the call to solidarity. Hence, both dimensions 
are connected. There cannot be a claim to solidarity that invokes a certain meaning, but 
does not include a scale of solidarity and vice versa. The discursive construction of 
solidarity approach was then later applied in various ways to the solidarity discourse in 
Germany and Ireland during two crises: the Euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis, 
respectively. The following two tables (Table 25 and Table 26) provide an overview, 
showing the most prevalent scales and meanings of solidarity. For this purpose, I left out 
the other justifications that have been coded and analysed in the Chapters 3-5. The 
colouring of the fields shall illustrate the dominant intersections of meanings and scales of 
solidarity, differentiated into the two crises discourses. 
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Table 25: Number of meanings and scales of solidarity in the Euro crisis 
 
Intergovern-
mental EU 
local national other 
Supra-
national EU 
transnational total 
cultural 
solidarity 
14 0 1 0 8 8 31 
social 
solidarity 
4 1 18 0 1 6 30 
monetary 
solidarity 
47 0 11 2 10 0 70 
political 
solidarity 
21 0 1 0 11 1 34 
economic 
solidarity 
22 0 6 0 0 4 32 
legal 
solidarity 
3 0 0 0 4 0 7 
misuse of 
solidarity 
27 0 2 0 3 0 32 
total 138 1 39 2 37 19 236 
 
Note: 0–10 (white), 11–20 (light grey), 21–30 (dark grey), >30 (black). 
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Table 26: Number of meanings and scales of solidarity in Europe's migration crisis 
 
global 
Intergovern-
mental EU 
Inter-
national 
National 
(exclusionary) 
National 
(inclusionary) 
other 
transnational migrant/ 
refugee 
Transnational total 
cultural 
solidarity 
1 19 3 4 9 0 68 6 110 
social 
solidarity 
0 2 0 2 2 2 54 4 66 
monetary 
solidarity 
0 8 9 6 0 3 4 1 31 
political 
solidarity 
2 155 6 4 0 0 55 6 228 
economic 
solidarity 
0 0 3 0 0 0 1 2 6 
legal 
solidarity 
0 3 0 0 0 0 6 2 11 
misuse of 
solidarity 
0 5 0 5 0 0 0 2 12 
total 3 192 21 21 11 5 188 23 464 
 
Note: 0–10 (white), 11–20 (light grey), 21–30 (dark grey), >30 (black). These numbers are not identical to the results of Chapter 2, because the Irish discourse 
is included in this table. 
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Two main differences in the ideational structure of the solidarity discourses can be identified. 
First, the Euro crisis discourse is more nuanced in respect of the number of meanings and 
scales of solidarity. Five meanings of solidarity have between 30 and 35 mentions in the Euro 
crisis. Only legal solidarity at the end of the ranking (7 mentions) and monetary solidarity on 
the first position (70 mentions) are exceptionally often or seldom invoked, respectively. This 
shows that the Euro crisis solidarity discourse is structured around various meanings with a 
strong focus on monetary solidarity issues. Given that the establishment of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 was a central institutional innovation that was intended 
to contain the financial crisis by sharing credit-liability among the EU member states, the 
strong visibility of monetary solidarity claims is not surprising. The intergovernmental EU 
scale is the most dominant scale of solidarity. For almost every meaning of solidarity, the 
intergovernmental EU scale is the most referred scale. This underlines the strong discursive 
and policy focus on dealing with the Euro crisis among the respective member states 
negotiating the crisis management between the government representatives. The national 
and supranational scales are only partially relevant. For instance, social solidarity is 
predominantly claimed on the national scale, while political solidarity is also debated on the 
supranational EU level. While social solidarity indicates that redistributive mechanisms are 
mainly addressed in the welfare nation-state, political solidarity arguments for an ‘ever 
closer union’ particularly resonated on the supranational level, but had negligible discursive 
leverage in terms of institutionally pushing the EU towards a new supranationalism. 
Second, the migration crisis discourse is highly centred on the meaning of political 
solidarity and oscillates between the intergovernmental EU and the transnational scale in 
relation to migrants and refugees. While the latter scale also attracts cultural and social 
solidarity as further meanings in the discourse, the intergovernmental scale is almost 
exclusively addressed in claims on political solidarity. This clear discursive focus shows that 
Europe’s migration crisis was first and foremost a political crisis, created by the 
asymmetrically developed EU migration and asylum policy (Monar 2014). The question of 
how to deal solidarily with incoming asylum seekers, despite the one-sided responsibility for 
(Southern) European border countries and an unwillingness to harmonise national migration 
policies, was debated since the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs. In particular, the 
tension between a common market including the free movement of goods, capital, services 
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and people (Schengen) and the externalisation of border control to the border countries 
displays the solidarity conflict in the EU. Therefore, while the debate on political solidarity – 
namely on new political instruments and mechanisms that create more cooperation between 
member states – can be said to have peaked in the ‘summer of migration’, it rests on previous 
public discussions. The focus on the intergovernmental scale shows, on the one hand, that 
member states still have the biggest say in migration policies, especially so in times of crisis. 
On the other hand, it shows that supranational claims on political solidarity are hard to fulfil 
due to the lack of supranational authority in the EU. The attempt to establish the EU 
solidarity scheme based on a proposal of the EU Commission, as well as the heated debate 
that followed, and its ultimate failure underline the fundamental conflict on migration issues 
in the EU. 
Nonetheless, the considerable amount of claims on the transnational level regarding 
social and cultural solidarity demonstrates not only that the migration debate entails 
member states discussing migration policies, but also that solidary actions regarding 
migrants and refugees are claimed and publicly covered. In particular, the year 2015 gave 
prominence to the voluntary actions of individuals and self-organised groups and the 
defence of human rights for migrants, all of which helped to put issues of migration into the 
public eye. Discussing solidarity in the context of migration showed that migration is a 
transnational phenomenon. Acting in solidarity means addressing migrants and refugees in 
a rather precarious situation, while at the same time it shows that human activities traverse 
borders – whether national or regional. In this sense, it is still a political question how actors 
should act and how institutions should be created to set up a new solidary structure that can 
deal with transnational human activities and migration movements. In addition to providing 
an overview and reflection on some of the key findings of the new meso-discursive approach 
to solidarity, I want to highlight six findings that broadly relate to the individual chapters of 
the thesis. Some of these findings are present in more than one chapter while others are 
shown in chapters, but have not been the principal focus of the chapter. 
6.1 Contributions 
First, I show that the recent crises experiences in Europe have triggered a new scholarly 
debate on the state and transformation of solidarity in Europe. In the Prelude, I review four 
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recent contributions to the debate on solidarity and discuss their strengths and weaknesses. 
Their biggest strength is that they shed new light on the concept. By investigating solidary 
attitudes and actions on the individual level (Della Porta 2018; Lahusen and Grasso 2018a), 
and as an institutional mechanism and guiding principle on the macro level (McNamara 
2017; Schelkle 2017), such research demonstrates the diverse ways in which the concept of 
solidarity can be operationalised. These studies also use the different crises as a starting 
point to engage in a discussion about how solidarity changes in times of crisis. While these 
works have proved both timely and useful, they are not without their flaws and limitations. 
My main concern is that much of this recent research refuses to engage in a stronger 
theoretical debate in terms of how actors make sense of the concept of solidarity and the 
different understandings of it that exist. Three of the four studies – with the exception of 
Schelkle – draw on ‘social solidarity’ as the predominant meaning of solidarity. This then 
narrows the scope of investigation into how solidarity is framed, understood, and enacted in 
times of crisis. In other words, if a concept is operationalised too specifically, then the 
question is whether it measures what the respondents and activists understand as solidarity, 
or what the researchers understand as solidarity. Therefore, I argue for a more open 
conceptualisation and suggest that the discursive construction of solidarity should be 
considered in future analyses. 
Second, the meso-discursive approach to solidarity offers a novel perspective on 
solidarity. By using the discrete dimensions of meaning and scale, I can overcome the 
shortcomings of previous research that focused on macro-structural and micro-behavioural 
aspects of solidarity. The meso approach does not presuppose any definition of solidarity, 
and more importantly, it does not exclusively focus on one particular type of solidarity. By 
suggesting various meanings and scales of solidarity, as laid out in Chapter 2, I show that the 
meaning of political solidarity and cultural solidarity are prominent concepts in the German 
solidarity discourse on Europe’s migration crisis. While social solidarity also plays a role in 
the pre-crisis debate, it is not as visible in the public debate as it is in the academic debate. 
This also shows that actors favour certain meanings in the migration context and do not 
randomly invoke meanings and scales of solidarity. The finding that political solidarity is the 
most visible meaning – both before and during the crisis – underlines the fact that a major 
driver of Europe’s migration crisis is in fact the incomplete EU migration and asylum policy. 
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The Dublin Regulations do not rest on a solidarity mechanism between member states in 
respect of how to deal with an increasing number of incoming asylum seekers. Hence, the 
solidarity debate largely focuses on this political-institutional gap in the asylum policies and 
how best to solve it. By applying the discourse network analysis to the study of meaning-
scale networks, I have been able to illustrate the meso approach with my collected data. 
Third, meanings of solidarity are also challenged by contra-solidarity claims. In 
Chapter 3, the claims analysis of the ‘summer of migration’ in 2015 in the German and Irish 
media provided an in-depth discussion of pro- and contra-solidarity concepts. During the 
climax of the crisis, political, cultural, and social solidarity were shown to be the most 
prominent concepts in both media discourses. I showed that the crisis provided a ‘discursive 
window of opportunity’ through which to raise various claims on solidarity. The 
aforementioned political solidarity regarding the EU asylum policy was discussed, reports 
about volunteering acts by NGOs and citizens helping incoming refugees (social solidarity) 
were published, and claims on human rights and humanitarian values were articulated to 
promote cultural solidarity. The other ideational side of the discourse, however, opposed 
solidarity and instead raised security and demarcation claims. It showed that a 
renationalisation of border control, stricter surveillance of the Mediterranean, and even racist 
physical attacks on pro-solidarity activists and refugees have been covered in the media 
outlets. This sheds light on the contestation of solidarity in public discourses. 
Fourth, I combined the agency and ideational dimension in the discursive 
institutionalist framework. While previous studies have claimed that either ideas or agents 
are not fully conceptualised (Boswell and Hampshire 2017; Carstensen 2011), I examined 
both dimensions in the thesis and used three different approaches to study the actor 
constellation and ideational structure in public discourses. The literature on ideational 
leadership highlights the capacity of individual actors to deploy ideas and strategically 
frame issues to overcome resistance or build coalitions in order to reach their (policy) goals. 
Studies on discourse coalitions point out the cooperative aspect of behaviour as 
communication. Actors share ideas and strategically deploy concepts as communicative 
resources. Therefore, the discourse coalition shows how actors work together and stand in 
conflict with each other by referring to different ideas. The coalition magnet approach 
focuses on the ideational dimension and how ideas can shape public discourses. These three 
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approaches provide a conceptual lens through which one can see how ideational leaders 
deploy certain ideas, how discourse coalitions are bound together and how coalition 
magnets evolve in public discourses. 
Fifth, meanings of solidarity are linked to other ideas in the crises discourses. I 
examined not only the presence of solidarity, but also how other ideas within the solidarity 
discourse are articulated and linked to solidarity. Chapter 5 focuses on single ideas that form 
the ideational glue for discourse coalitions in public debates. Hence, they act as coalition 
magnets in discourse coalitions. In the German Euro crisis discourse, financial solidity was 
the coalition magnet and thereby solidarity was reinterpreted to justify austerity measures. 
In the migration crisis, political solidarity was the coalition magnet, but solidarity was 
contested by security and demarcation claims. 
Chapter 4 conceptually elaborated the coalition magnet approach. While Béland and 
Cox (2016) argue that influential ideas might act as coalition magnets in public debates, I 
argued that it is rather likely that more than one idea can be understood as coalition magnet. 
Therefore, I noted that ideas form ‘coalition magnet patterns’ in discourses. These larger 
patterns serve to structure discourses and show how ideas are reinterpreted and shape the 
public discourse. In particular, the analysis of the Euro crisis discourse demonstrated that 
solidarity is reinterpreted and linked to austerity claims in the German case, while solidarity 
is linked to responsibility in the Irish debate. These connected ideas comprise the main 
coalition magnet pattern in each case and thereby shape the public debate. The application of 
the discourse network analysis in studying the co-occurrence of actors and ideas in public 
debate thereby proved to be a valuable methodological tool. 
Sixth, the appearance of actors is strongly driven by their position in (national) 
government. Government actors were the most visible ones in the Euro crisis and migration 
crisis debates, as well as in the German and Irish discourse. This supports previous work that 
shows that Government representatives are the winners of ‘Europeanised public debates’ 
(Koopmans 2007). Moreover, EU executives also play a role in the solidarity-crises 
discourses, but more so in the Irish than in the German discourse. Consequently, 
conservative party actors, who have been in (coalition) governments in Germany since 2005, 
in Ireland since 2007, and hold key positions in the European Commission, strongly 
influence both crises discourses. They shape the discourse by referring to the coalition 
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magnets like financial solidity, monetary solidarity or political solidarity. By doing so, they 
act as ideational leaders in the Euro crisis (Chapter 4.5) and are members of the main 
discourse coalition in each crisis (Chapter 5.4). This underlines the crucial and powerful role 
that Germany plays in the Euro crisis discourse (Bulmer 2014; Matthijs 2016). Moreover, the 
German debate is strongly structured by domestic actors. Few non-German politicians like 
Barroso or Hollande are present in the German solidarity discourse, while the Irish discourse 
is more diverse and yet still strongly influenced by the appearance of German actors. The 
identified actor constellation also highlights that the potential giver of solidarity (Germany) 
and German actors are more present in the Euro crisis discourse. Since German actors 
predominantly articulate the conditions under which solidarity can be granted, they set the 
tone for how solidarity is framed in public discourses. Interestingly, the actor presence in the 
German migration discourse highlights that if Germany demands solidarity from other EU 
member states, the number of ideologically different actors in the main discourse coalition 
increases (Chapter 5.4). The German parties – except the AfD – claimed that solidarity is 
needed in the migration crisis. This sheds light on shared and conflicting perceptions about 
the idea of solidarity in hard times. 
6.2 Limitations  
This thesis has its theoretical and empirical limitations, three of which I would like to discuss 
in greater detail: (1) the theoretical approach to solidarity; (2) the case selection; and (3) the 
media selection. 
(1) I avoided a substantive definition of solidarity and argued that solidarity can be 
identified by looking at statements including the term solidarity. This is tautological to some 
extent: I look for solidarity and what I find in the data material is solidarity. The 
identification and differentiation of solidarity in various meanings then is the consequential 
result. However, two reasons justify this decision. First, solidarity is a contested concept, 
meaning that is conceptualised in various ways. Choosing a single definition of solidarity to 
guide my empirical analysis of solidarity would have strongly inhibited my goal of 
analysing the discourse on solidarity. In this case, I would have only analysed one specific 
understanding of solidarity without taking into account that actors might understand 
solidarity differently. If I had followed the majority view of previous research on solidarity, I 
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would have focused on ‘social solidarity’. However, the meaning of social solidarity was 
hardly prominent in both crises discourses. This is influenced by the types of crises I 
examined. Nonetheless, social solidarity could have been a predominant idea in the Euro 
crisis due to the high unemployment rates in the crises countries, or the severe cuts in the 
social sector. Hence, the meso-discursive approach offered the opportunity to analyse the 
various meanings and scales of solidarity. The findings of the thesis can provide the basis for 
a more deductive examination of solidarity in future studies. 
Second, limiting the analysis to a nominalistic approach offers the opportunity to 
know when actors claim solidarity, because they mention the term. On this basis, the 
conceptual decision to not follow a substantive account on solidarity is less problematic, 
since I analyse data material that contains statements with the intentional decision by actors 
to use the word solidarity. Consequently, solidarity can be differentiated into various 
meanings. Since this is the first study to analyse solidarity discourses more closely and across 
crises and countries, it provides an important initial step for future studies on solidarity in 
discourses. Further studies could look into crises discourses without the specific focus on 
solidarity, but still consider meanings of solidarity in their discourse analysis. These 
meanings of solidarity could also be applied in more qualitative inquiries into how activists 
or citizens understand solidarity, or how they make sense of their civic or volunteering 
activities. The suggested discursive construction of solidarity approach is not limited to the 
nominalistic approach that was followed in this thesis. 
(2) Analysing the discourses in Germany and Ireland in both crises limits the 
explanatory significance of the findings. Although both countries can be placed within the 
creditor-debtor constellation that has strongly shaped the Euro crisis and might be 
characterised as strongly or weakly affected by the migration crisis, one could still criticise 
the case selection. For instance, it might be said that Italy or Greece are more suitable choices 
not only with regard to comparisons with Germany, but also in terms of the solidarity 
discourses evident in both crises. In fact, Greece and Italy were both affected by the Euro 
crisis and the migration crisis. However, then the question of how solidarity discourses are 
affected by a country’s crisis involvement could not have been addressed. Greece and Italy 
experienced a severe economic and financial crisis and had to also deal with a high number 
of incoming asylum seekers in a short period of time. Moreover, Italy faces economic 
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stagnation and low growth for two decades (Romei 2018). Even though Italy is often 
included in the acronym ‘GIIPS’ denoting the debtor countries, it was never a bailout 
country. The economic problems still facing Italy are not only related to the Euro crisis. As 
such, investigating how a crisis situation creates solidarity claims does not fit in the Italian 
case. Greece could have been selected, but the literature on the Greek sovereign debt crisis is 
already well-established and comprehensive; indeed, the topic has been examined from 
multiple perspectives and in respect of various issues (Blyth 2015; Copelovitch et al. 2016; 
Doudaki et al. 2016). By contrast, Ireland seems to represent something of a lacuna in the 
research on the Euro crisis. Ireland did not fit into the crisis country narrative that many 
pundits and researchers invoked (Chapter 4). Moreover, the research there is on Ireland in 
the Euro crisis has mainly focused on political-economic aspects (Hardiman and Regan 2013; 
Regan and Brazys 2018; Roche et al. 2017), leaving aside discourse-related questions (but see 
Leupold 2016). Hence, Ireland is an interesting case in exploring how actors refer to and 
demand solidarity from other actors, and what kind of solidarity is debated in the Irish 
media. 
Additionally, and more pragmatically, my language skills limit the reading and 
coding of texts. I do not speak Italian or Greek and thereby cannot select Greek or Italian 
newspapers for the political claims analysis. Any English or German translations of the text, 
or national newspapers that are published in English or German, would not represent a 
broad readership and large circulation. These would only be read by (German- or English-
speaking) minorities and are even more elite-centred than the other quality daily newspapers 
in the respective countries. 
 (3) Finally, we come to the issue of media selection. The analysis of national daily 
quality newspapers is elite-centred, relies on a pre-selection of ‘newsworthy’ claims, and 
includes a ‘structural bias’ towards the visibility of national executives in these outlets. 
Moreover, newspapers might have lost their function as gatekeepers to the public in the 
digital age. Even though such objections are valid to some extent, two reasons justify the 
focus on daily quality newspapers. First, print media is still the main gatekeeper and is 
perceived as an influential actor in public debates (Jandura and Brosius 2011; Koopmans and 
Statham 2010; Nossek et al. 2015). Key actors in politics, the economy, and society still try to 
be as visible as possible in the media arena. Being interviewed in a widely read magazine, or 
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writing an opinion editorial in a daily newspaper, is still seen as an important way to 
legitimise actions, criticise others, or address the general public. Moreover, the media itself 
also plays a role in the framing of solidarity and thereby influencing the public debate. Since 
this thesis was chiefly interested in how political, social, and economic actors frame 
solidarity, and which of them is most present, looking at print media outlets was the most 
important source. 
Second, printed newspapers are still relevant in the media arena, because ‘thresholds 
for audience members are particularly low and societal reach is exceptionally large’ (Wessler 
et al. 2008: 5). While the rise of social media at the start of the 2000s and the strong increase in 
the number of registrations on Facebook or Twitter sparked considerable interest in 
analysing social media data, scholars have shown that the available (big) data is not less 
biased than the selection of offline media data. Social media outlets are more often read by 
younger social groups, include algorithms that pre-select content for specific viewers, 
creating ‘filter bubbles’, and while readers have to buy the printed issue, social media users 
have to register and give personal information to the company for free (Eady et al. 2019; 
Golder and Macy 2014; Hargittai 2018). While the analysis of solidarity claims on social 
media platforms would be an interesting avenue for future research, selecting these sources 
requires further reflection on the data availability, data quality, and scope of online 
communication. The interaction of different public arenas (plenary debates, printed media, 
and social media platforms) might be very interesting to study in relation to the diffusion 
processes of solidarity statements. 
6.3 Outlook 
I wish to conclude by setting out three different pathways that might be of interest for future 
studies: the relation between populism and solidarity; citizen communication on solidarity; 
and long-term changes in the idea of solidarity. First, one of the indirect findings of the thesis 
is that populist parties and politicians are hardly present in the solidarity discourses. Even 
though it seems that populism is spreading almost everywhere and is being extensively 
debated across the social sciences (de Vreese et al. 2018; Manow 2018; Rooduijn 2019), the 
discursive appeal to solidarity is not really prominent in these parties. In the context of the 
present thesis, this might be explained by the case selection. The AfD was a Eurosceptic party 
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at its inception and turned into a more right-wing populist and anti-immigration party since 
2014 (Lewandowsky 2015; Schmitt-Beck 2017). As I show in Chapter 4 for the German 
discourse, if the AfD is present, then it is by opposing solidarity and demanding the re-
introduction of the Deutsche Mark (DM). During the migration crisis, right-populist parties 
such as the AfD were rather on the margins of the discourse and far from being the driving 
force in the debate on solidarity. 
Accordingly, one might ask: why does claiming solidarity not appeal to right 
populists?39 It would be interesting to investigate this further by looking systematically at 
partisan conflicts on solidarity and exploring various issues like social policies, citizenship, 
and integration issues, or immigration and asylum policies. Therefore, it could be 
substantiated how party ideologies influence the framing of solidarity in different policy 
fields. This might also identify frames that are more or less likely featured in populist 
communication styles. 
Second, future studies could analyse how citizens frame solidarity. Beyond the focus 
on elites and the framing of solidarity in media outlets, research has yet to examine how 
citizens deploy the concept of solidarity. Hence, the micro discourse level is currently 
missing from the research on solidarity. As such, future studies could consider reader's 
comments in the online media outlets, statements (tweets or Facebook comments) on social 
media platforms, or discussions on blogs.  These studies could also be conducted face-to-face 
by using focus groups and narrative interviews in order to analyse the meaning-making 
process on solidarity particularly around specific issues and policies. These insights could 
not only complement previous studies on solidarity discourses, but also inform survey and 
experimental studies that use various items to measure solidarity on the individual level. 
Accordingly, changing perceptions on solidarity or developing new understandings of 
solidarity could be captured in future surveys and might increase the validity of the data 
collection and analysis. 
Third, solidarity could be investigated beyond the crisis narrative. Linking the study 
of solidarity to crisis phenomena became most prominent in recent years due to the multiple 
                                                     
39 One answer might be the dominance of the positive framing of solidarity. As noted in the appendix 
of chapter 2, if actors refer to solidarity, they usually support it. Opposing solidarity in a direct manner 
seems hardly invoked by actors. This ‘positive bias’ is identified despite the often demonstrated 
partisan journalism of media outlets (Wallaschek 2019b). 
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crises in the EU. Analysing solidarity from a historical perspective might reveal long-term 
changes and show whether and how crises influence understandings of solidarity. This thesis 
has demonstrated that the framing of solidarity hardly changed fundamentally. Political 
solidarity became more prominent during the migration crisis in 2015, while other meanings 
became less visible. However, neither the appearance of a new meaning of solidarity nor the 
disappearance of an existing meaning amid times of crisis have been observed. Hence, 
meanings of solidarity seem to be rather stable and built upon pre-existing understandings 
of solidarity. Potentially, ideational changes might occur over a longer period of time and in 
specific policy areas like national welfare policies. Future studies could reconstruct the idea 
of solidarity in respect to national social policies in EU member states, and analyse how the 
understanding of solidarity might evolve due to the increasing Europeanisation of social 
policies. Regarding European affairs, one could investigate how and why the idea of ‘Social 
Europe’ became a promising paradigm for scholars, civil society actors, and politicians on the 
left in their attempt to promote European solidarity and a ‘social pillar’ in the EU. However, 
more recently, pundits and scholars have declared the death of ‘Social Europe’ (Crespy and 
Menz 2015; Höpner 2018). Why do others still argue for it in response to the multiple crises 
of the EU (Fernandes and Vandenbroucke 2018; Kofod 2017)? How can we explain the rise 
and fall of ‘Social Europe’ and the recent struggles over its future? Subsequent studies could 
seek to combine a historical institutionalist approach with a discursive institutionalist 
approach in order to investigate solidarity beyond times of crisis. 
In a recent interview with the public broadcasting station Deutschlandfunk Kultur, the 
sociologist Stephan Lessenich claimed that ‘solidarity is work’ and criticised calls to 
solidarity that are solely expressed on social media platforms (Lessenich 2019). The writer 
Bini Adamczak, on the other hand, recently stated that ‘solidarity is more difficult to achieve 
under conditions of fragmentation, but at the same time, it is also more pressing and 
reasonable – it is its actual terrain’ (Adamczak 2018). Both interviewees point out crucial 
challenges that face the study of solidarity. How is solidarity in the digital age possible and 
what are its manifestations and limitations? Is it an instance of solidarity if we ‘like’ a post 
that supports NGO activists rescuing asylum seekers in the Mediterranean? How can people 
show solidarity with colleagues, neighbours, and foreigners if a growing number of people 
live under precarious conditions? On what grounds can solidarity be established? 
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Despite the latent pessimistic tone in their claims, both statements share a discursive 
appeal to solidarity. Lessenich and Adamczak would not invoke solidarity, and would not 
criticise the digitalisation and fragmentation of solidarity in contemporary (European) 
societies, if it did not matter. While this thesis cannot offer a definitive answer to the initial 
question ‘What does solidarity mean?’, it has hopefully provided some genuine and original 
insight into the field of solidarity. 
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8 Appendix: Codebook 
8.1 The method: Political claims analysis 
The coding of the newspaper articles follows the political claims analysis (PCA) of Ruud 
Koopmans and Paul Statham (1999; Koopmans and Statham 2010), and used the package 
RQDA in the R environment (Huang 2016). The main idea of the PCA is that articles and 
reports in newspapers contain many different statements by various actors. Instead of 
focusing on the whole article as the unit of analysis, or only the content (Burroughs 2015; 
Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw 2017), the link between a statement and the speaker is 
emphasised. Consequently, the unit of analysis is the claim. Claims are defined as ‘the 
purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms 
or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the 
claimants and/or other collective actors’ (Koopmans 2007: 189). The components of a claim 
can be differentiated by following a logic of questions regarding each claim: ‘WHERE and 
WHEN, WHO makes a claim, on WHAT, HOW, addressing WHOM, for/against WHOSE 
interests and WHY’ (de Wilde 2014: 52). These questions are the grammar of claims and help 
the coder to identify the claim, making the coding transparent and comprehensible. 
In my project, I focus on four core codes in a claim: 1) the speaker; 2) the action; 3) the 
issue; and 4) the position. If I cannot identify all four codes in a statement, the potential claim 
is not coded. The other components that de Wilde mentions are coded if detectable. The 
codes and sub-codes allow for a detailed coding and subsequent analysis (Table A1). 
Following the PCA logic, newspaper articles can contain many claims, but also no 
claims at all. There are two limitations for the coding processes: First, I do not code claims 
that refer to events of migration that are older than six months from the date when it is 
reported in the newspaper. Otherwise, claims would include references to migration 
processes in the 19th century or after World War II. Second, I only code a claim once in each 
newspaper article. This means that every claim is unique in its composition in each article. 
Nonetheless, if one of the four codes changes, the claim is seen as a new one. 
The category claimant is the actor in the statement and has different forms: It could be 
a politician who states something in an interview or a journalist who writes an opinion 
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article. Collective actors such as the national government could be a claimant too. Crucial is 
that the subject of the statement is clearly identifiable. The claimant has further sub-
categories: claimant type, claimant scope, claimant function, claimant nationality and the 
claimant party affiliation. The action of the claimant must also be reported or stated in the 
text. That could be a verbal statement, passing a bill in the parliament, demonstrating or 
even violent attacks. The action has to happen in a specific context - this is the issue. The 
issue has to refer (somehow) to the crisis situation in Europe. Issues which are relevant for 
other regions in the world are not coded; except if they affect Europe or are situated in a 
European context, e. g. a claim that Syrian refugees have to get asylum in EU-countries. The 
last core code is position which is important in order to see what the claimant thinks 
about/acts upon the issue and what s/he demands. This means that the claim should be 
related to either pro- or contra-solidarity (or neutral by arguing for both sides). The 
following Table A1 gives an overview about the main and sub-categories. 
 
Table A1: categories in the PCA 
1. Time & 
source 
2. Claimant 3. Action 4. Issue 5. Addressee 6. Frame 
A_year 
B_source 
C_claimant 
type 
D_claimant 
scope 
E_claimant 
function 
F_claimant 
party 
G_claimant 
nationality 
X_special 
claimants 
XX_person 
XXX_parties 
H_action I_issue 
J_Issue 
scope 
 
K_addressee_type 
L_addressee_scope 
M_addressee_function 
N_addresse_nationality 
P_addressee_party 
Q_addressee_evaluation 
R_position 
S_justification 
T_justification_scale 
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The following statement by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the Euro crisis illustrates 
the coding of a claim: 
Merkel also briefly talked about the Greek debt crisis. The long-lasting infringement of the 
stability pact has brought Greece into this situation and not the [financial – S.W.] speculation. 
Therefore, short-term solidarity was not the solution. There is no alternative to a rigorous 
austerity programme. (Angela Merkel, Welt, March 2010). 
German Chancellor Merkel is the speaker (claimant), even though she is indirectly quoted in 
the centre-right newspaper in 2010 (source and time). She makes a verbal statement (action) 
about the Euro crisis (issue) and expresses her opinion that austerity measures are 
unavoidable in Greece (position is coded as contra-solidarity with the justification ‘financial 
solidity’ and the justification scope is ‘international_intergovernmental_EU’). The following 
claim by Michael Roth is an example from the migration crisis discourse: 
“We need more solidarity. We need more humanity”, claimed Michael Roth, the German 
Minister of State for Europe, in Luxembourg on Tuesday. “We are very, very open to develop a 
mechanism of solidarity which commits all member states to do more than before”, he 
emphasised (Michael Roth, Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 2015). 
The speaker is Michael Roth and coded as SPD politician (claimant), he makes a verbal 
statement (action) in the German centre-left newspaper in 2015 (source and time), talks about 
the migration crisis (issue) and his position is pro-solidarity. Thus, the statement is a claim. 
Additionally, the justification of the claim is coded. Since Roth talks about a new European 
political mechanism that should foster cooperation among the EU member states, the 
justification of the claim is coded as ‘political solidarity’. The justification scope is 
‘international_intergovernmental_EU’. 
8.2 Keyword search string  
Regarding the coding procedure, no inter-coder reliability test could be obtained, because I 
had no financial capacity to fund other researchers to code with me. This methodlogical 
challenge is addressed by extensive coder training (Krippendorff 2004), my own previous 
experiences and applications of the method, as well as the guidance offered by the codebook 
of de Wilde, Koopmans and Zürn (2014), who have coded newspaper articles and 
parliamentary debates in a similar manner. My codebook builds upon the codebook by de 
Wilde et al. and adjusts the catgeories and codes for my dissertation project respectively. 
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The reported results in the study are based on the following keyword lists in the 
database Factiva. For the German Euro crisis debate: ‘(Eurozone* or finanz* or Währung* or 
Schuld* or Kredit*) and Solidar* and (EU or Europ*)’. For the Irish Euro crisis debate: 
‘(Eurozone* or financ* or currency* or *debt* or *credit*) and (solidar* or mutual w/1 
support* or cooperat*) and (EU or Europ*)’. For the German migration crisis debate: 
‘(Flüchtling* or Flucht* or Migrant* or Einwander* or Zuwander* or Asyl*) and Solidar* and 
(EU or Europ*)’. For the Irish migration crisis debate: ‘(Refugee or escape or Migrant* or 
Migration* or Immigrant or Immigration* or Asyl*) and (solidar* or mutual w/1 support* or 
cooperat*) and (EU or Europ*)’. An asterisk controls for multiple endings of a word. 
Duplicates of articles were excluded from the article population. 
Accordingly, I applied a nominalistic approach in the selection and coding ‘solidarity 
statements’. This means that I have only coded claims with the word stem 'solidar*' or close 
synonyms. Using ‘Solidar*’ in the keyword search has the disadvantage that the threshold for 
selecting articles is rather high. By applying the nominalistic approach, the meanings of 
solidarity can be grasped from the actor’s claims. In a deductive-inductive coding process 
and based on previous studies on solidarity, I started coding preliminary understandings of 
solidarity and then included new ones, joint similar concepts, and reconsidered existing 
meanings during the coding procedure. This helped to grasp the various meanings of the 
contested concept of solidarity. However, looking at the concrete term ‘solidarity’ might 
create a ‘nominalistic fallacy’. Two reasons justify this decision and minimise the concerns: 
First, since the focus of this study is on solidarity, the study makes a more valid contribution 
by setting a rather strict threshold for the selection of articles and claims. Second, the high 
threshold positively influences the coding procedure, because the coding decision about 
whether the coded claim is about solidarity is already made. Consequently, the coding 
concentrates on the framing of the solidarity. This increases the validity and reliability of the 
coding procedure for solidarity as a polysemic concept (Béland and Cox 2016). 
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8.3 Categories of the PCA 
The codebook applies to both crisis discourses and to both countries. There are slight 
adjustments to claims in the Euro crisis and migration crisis. These are marked by the terms 
Euro for the Euro crisis and migration for the migration crisis behind the sub-codes. In the 
following, all the codes and sub-codes are listed that I marked in the material. The tables give 
an overview on the number of codes per country and per crises discourse. 
8.3.1 Time and source 
A_Year – the year of the claim 
A01_2010 
A02_2011 
A03_2012 
A04_2013 
A05_2014 
A06_2015 
 
Table A2: Year category in the PCA 
Year\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
2010 46 53 14 3 
2011 77 51 50 8 
2012 93 41 18 3 
2013 61 37 106 11 
2014 18 20 128 12 
2015 72 49 357 136 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
B_Source – the newspaper in which the claim was coded 
B01_Süddeutsche_Zeitung 
B02_Welt 
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B03_Irish_Times 
B04_Irish_Independent 
 
Table A3: Source category in the PCA 
Year\ 
newspaper 
Süddeutsche Zeitung Welt Irish Times 
Irish 
Independent 
 
Euro 
crisis 
Migration 
crisis 
Euro 
crisis 
Migration 
crisis 
Euro 
crisis 
Migration 
crisis 
Euro 
crisis 
Migration 
crisis 
2010-15 224 361 143 312 179 116 72 57 
Total 585 455 295 129 
 
8.3.2 Claimant 
C_Claimant type –characterises the claimant generally and how the claimant is organised 
C01_unorganised – a not clearly defined group or collective of persons, states, etc. 
C02_individual – a person speaking for her/himself 
C03_organisation – an organisation or institution making a claim (including spokespersons) 
(WTO) 
C04_representative(s) – person who has a position in an organisation/institution (not a 
spokesperson) (Sigmar Gabriel as party leader of the SPD) 
 
Table A4: claimant type category in the PCA 
Type\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Unorganised 6 4 19 6 
Individual 151 74 166 31 
Organisation 45 36 113 42 
Representative 165 137 375 94 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
  
 203 
D_Claimant scope – defines the territorial scope of an actor 
D01_local –acts beneath the national level (mayor of Berlin) 
D02_national – acts on a national level (German Government) 
D03_global – acts on a global level (UN) 
D04_EU – acts on the EU level (Council of the EU) 
D05_other – acts in another context, which is none of the above (G77) 
D06_unclear – territorial scope of claimant is unclear 
 
Table A5: Claimant scope category in the PCA 
Scope\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Local 35 12 162 4 
National 297 199 410 135 
Global 2 3 15 10 
EU 31 36 73 24 
Other 1 1 10 0 
Unclear 1 0 3 0 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
E_Claimant function – in which role a claimant acts/works/ is perceived  
E01_international organisation – representatives of UN, WTO, etc. 
E02_European Commission 
E03_European_Council 
E04_European_Parliament 
E05_IO-agency – relatively independent body in an IO (UNHCR or Frontex) 
E06_IO-bank – international bank (World Bank) 
E07_IO-court – European Court of Justice, Human Rights Court 
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E08_government – any sort of government on national or local level (including ministers, the 
Chancellor, the whole cabinet) or expressions like “Berlin says…” for the national 
government 
E09_legislative – any sort of legislative on national or local level (including the individual 
representative or a party fraction) 
E10_judiciary – any sort of judiciary 
E11_business – business company or employers' association (Bosch, BDI) 
E12_trade_unions – unions in every possible sector (DGB) 
E13_religious_actor – mostly persons with an office (Imam, pope, bishop) 
E14_civil_society – any non-governmental organisation, group or social movement 
(Amnesty; Occupy Wall Street) 
E15_citizen/people – a normal person without any special position in politics (“Max 
Mustermann/Jane Doe”) 
E16_experts/scientists – persons who are defined or named as experts for certain topics or a 
research group in a scientific context (Andrew Moravcsik) 
E17_public_figure – a person which is best known as commentator in talk shows or 
newspapers, this could also be an actor/actress (Emma Watson, Tony Judt) 
E18_other_politician/party – a politician who is in a party that is not in a parliament. In the 
German case this category is for the Federal President, too. 
E19_media/journalist – the claimant is an editor of a newspaper or the newspaper itself 
comments an event (Heribert Prantl, Glenn Greenwald) 
E20_ECB – European Central Bank (euro) 
E21_polity – some organisations make claims without naming a special person. So if the 
organisation “speaks”, this category fits (UN decides that…) 
E22_central_bank – claimants from other central banks such as the Federal Reserve Bank or 
the Bank of England (euro) 
E23_private finance – financial actors such as banks, hedge fund manager or investment 
banker (euro) 
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E22_migrants_refugees – if the claimant is clearly identifiable as migrant or refugee who is 
speaking, then I code this category (migration) 
E23_UN_secretary (migration) 
E40_other – persons or organisations which do not fit in any of the categories 
 
Table A6: Claimant function category in the PCA 
Function\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
International 
organisation 
0 5 3 0 
European Commission 11 18 42 12 
European_Council 4 2 6 7 
European_Parliament 10 7 17 2 
IO-agency 1 1 10 8 
IO-court 0 0 0 0 
Government 92 81 230 77 
Legislative 43 20 61 4 
Judiciary 2 0 1 0 
Business 8 0 3 0 
Trade unions 6 2 5 0 
Religious actor 1 1 43 3 
Civil society 4 4 29 19 
Citizen/people 30 16 72 9 
Experts/scientists 31 14 17 4 
Public figure 19 3 17 2 
Other politician/party 17 5 25 6 
Media/journalist 75 58 74 13 
ECB 3 3 0 0 
Polity 0 0 0 1 
National central bank 2 3 0 0 
Private finance 7 7 0 0 
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Migrants/refugees 0 0 2 1 
UN secretary 0 0 0 1 
Other 1 1 16 4 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
F_Claimant party – party affiliation of the claimant (F01 to F09 are the most important parties in 
Germany, F10 to F15 in Ireland, remaining categories are for party families in other countries) 
F01_CDU 
F02_SPD 
F03_FDP 
F04_Die_Linke 
F05_Bündnis_90/Die_Grünen 
F06_Piratenpartei 
F07_NPD 
F08_AfD 
F09_CSU 
F10_Fianna_Fáil 
F11_Fine_Gael 
F12_Labour_Party 
F13_Sinn_Féin 
F14_Socialist_Party 
F15_Green_Party 
F16_other – any party which does not fit in other categories (e. g. religious party) 
F17_general_partisan – coalition governments or federal government 
F18_socialist – socialist or communist parties 
F19_green – green party from other countries (Grüne Alternative Österreich) 
F20_social democrat – social democratic parties from other countries (British Labour Party) 
F21_liberal – liberal parties from other countries (NEOS – Das Neue Österreich) 
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F22_conservative – conservative parties from other countries (Tories/Conservatives) 
F23_far right – far right parties (Lega in Italy or RN in France) 
F_none – if the claimant has no party affiliation or if it is not possible to find out, then the 
category “none” is used 
 
Table A7: Claimant party category in the PCA 
Party\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
CDU 34 31 61 6 
SPD 24 7 46 9 
FDP 11 3 8 0 
Die Linke 6 0 7 0 
Die Grünen 15 2 20 0 
Piratenpartei 0 0 0 0 
NPD 0 0 1 0 
AfD 3 1 2 1 
CSU 10 2 70 1 
Fianna Fáil 0 11 0 1 
Fine Gael 0 13 0 8 
Labour Party 0 16 0 3 
Sinn Féin 0 1 0 0 
Socialist Party 0 1 0 0 
Green Party 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 2 1 
General partisan 9 5 23 9 
Socialist 10 8 12 2 
Green 1 0 0 0 
Social democrat 12 1 28 7 
Liberal 3 2 13 1 
Conservative 35 25 57 20 
Far right 1 1 9 2 
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None 193 121 314 102 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
G_claimant_nationality 
Euro crisis 
G01_Germany 
G02_Ireland 
G03_Great Britain 
G04_Greece 
G05_France 
G06_Italy 
G07_Switzerland 
G08_Belgium 
G09_Luxemburg 
G10_USA 
G11_Spain 
G12_Chile 
G13_Portugal 
G14_Slovakia 
G15_Poland 
G16_Finland 
G17_Cyprus 
G18_Netherlands 
G19_Austria 
G20_Latvia 
G94_European - any institution or organisation which is related to the European context 
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G95_Multinational - international organisations like the United Nations Organisation, 
Amnesty International or a group of states (if possible, I use the location of 
headquarters/stock exchange registration for companies) 
G96_other 
G98_Unclear – if the origin of the claimant is unknown and cannot be identified 
 
Migration crisis 
G01_Germany 
G02_Ireland 
G04_Spain 
G05_Greece 
G06_Turkey 
G07_Sweden 
G08_Italy 
G09_Austria 
G10_Cameroon 
G11_France 
G12_Denmark 
G13_Malta 
G14_Norway 
G15_Luxembourg 
G16_Netherlands 
G18_Poland 
G19_Portugal 
G20_Great Britain 
G21_Argentina 
G22_Bulgaria 
G25_Hungary 
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G26_Czech_Republic 
G27_Slovakia 
G28_Poland 
G29_South_Korea 
G30_Slovenia 
G91_other_Africa 
G92_other_Asia 
G93_other_Europe 
G94_European - any institution or organisation which is related to the European context 
G95_Multinational - international organisations like the United Nations Organisation, 
Amnesty International or a group of states (if possible, I use the location of 
headquarters/stock exchange registration for companies) 
G98_Unclear – if the origin of the claimant is unknown and cannot be identified 
 
Table A8: Claimant nationality category in the PCA 
Nationality\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Germany 237 59 444 23 
Ireland 0 129 0 67 
Great Britain 3 7 7 5 
Greece 22 7 19 4 
France 26 15 14 1 
Italy 5 1 37 11 
Switzerland 2 0 0 0 
Belgium 7 1 0 0 
Luxemburg 4 7 8 3 
USA 3 1 0 0 
Spain 6 1 7 0 
Chile 1 0 0 0 
Portugal 8 6 3 3 
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Slovakia 3 0 4 5 
Poland 5 3 14 11 
Cyprus 8 2 0 0 
Austria 3 0 11 1 
Finland 5 4 0 0 
Netherlands 1 1 4 2 
Latvia 2 0 0 0 
Argentina 0 0 7 1 
Bulgaria 0 0 4 0 
Cameroon 0 0 1 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 10 2 
Denmark 0 0 1 0 
Hungary 0 0 9 13 
European 6 4 12 9 
Malta 0 0 3 1 
Norway 0 0 0 2 
Slovenia 0 0 2 1 
South Korea 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 0 0 11 4 
Turkey 0 0 1 0 
Multinational 1 2 19 1 
Other 3 0   
Other African 
country 
0 0 2 1 
Other Asian 
country 
0 0 3 0 
Other European 
country 
0 0 6 0 
Unclear 6 1 10 1 
Total 367 251 673 173 
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X_special claimants 
This code is identified during the coding process. Some claimants are more relevant or 
visible than other ones. To identify these potentially central claimants, I code these persons 
with their full name (e. g. Angela Merkel, Ban Ki Moon). 
 
XX_persons 
This code is similar to the code above, but includes all persons with their full name who 
made a claim. Moreover and to increase readability in the respective network graphs, the 
first names are shortened. 
 
XXX_parties 
This code only includes the name of the politicians and party organisations. A politician had 
to make at least two claims in order to be coded as single politician. Politicians with one 
claim are subsumed under the name of the party organisation. Claimants without a party 
affiliation are coded as 'no party affiliation'. 
 
8.3.3 Action 
H_Action –describes the action of the claimant 
H01_verbal_statement – the person gives an interview or the newspaper writes “US 
President Obama said…” 
H02_written_statement – statements from opinion articles, press releases or research studies 
H03_executive_action – orders of the government to deport refugees or sign treaties 
H04_judicial_action –delivering a judgment or accuse a person through a lawyer 
H05_legislative_action –passing laws (parliamentary speeches are verbal statements) 
H06_protest/violence – any form of physical action like a demonstration, an attack on a 
refugee camp. These actions can be peaceful or violent 
H07_Other – any form of action which does not fit in any of the categories above 
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Table A9: Claimant function category in the PCA 
Action\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Verbal statement 197 150 419 100 
Written statement 147 94 174 44 
Executive action 4 2 27 13 
Judicial action 0  0 0 
Legislative action 7 1 0 0 
Protest/violence 10 1 36 7 
Other 2 3 17 9 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
8.3.4 Issue 
I_Issue – the topic of the claim  
I01_integration – how persons interact with foreigners; cultural differences, homogeneity of 
the people, learning specific language skills, religious conflicts (migration) 
I02_migration – statements about persons who want to cross or have crossed (national) 
borders (irregular or regular) (migration) 
I01_economy – statements related to the crisis due to economic aspects (Euro) 
I02_finance – statements related to the crisis due to finance (Euro) 
 
Table A10: Issue topic category in the PCA 
Issue\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Integration 0 0 53 12 
Migration 0 0 620 161 
Economy 122 73 0 0 
Finance 245 178 0 0 
Total 367 251 673 173 
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J_Issue scope –the territorial limitation of the issue of the claim 
J01_local – issues beneath the national level 
J02_national – issues related to the national level (national immigration laws) 
J03_global – all issues which capture the global level (Geneva refugee protocol) 
J04_regional EU – issues related to the European Union level (Schengen; immigration 
regulation discussed among EU member states) 
J05_other – issues which do not fit in any of the categories above 
J06_unclear – if it is not clear which limitation the issue has 
 
Table A11: Issue scope category in the PCA 
Scope\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Local 1 0 99 4 
National 76 95 139 34 
Global 2 1 14 2 
EU 288 155 384 118 
Other 0 0 37 15 
Unclear 0 0 0 0 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
8.3.5 Addressee 
This code is similar to the claimant aspects. An addressee is coded whenever the claimant 
refers to him or her in the statement and demands something. However, ‘demanding’ has to 
be understood freely. For instance, an addressee is coded when a claimant calls upon another 
actor to change his or her position on a certain topic; this also relates to criticisms (think 
about criticising the government in longer interviews or in parliamentary speeches). 
Nonetheless, many claims do not contain addressees. Thus, it is not a core category. If there is 
no addressee clearly identifiable, I code ‘none’. 
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K_Addressee Type 
K01_Unorganised – unorganised collective or not specified member of this collective serving 
as a representative (e. g. farmers, a farmer) 
K02_Individual – a person speaking on his or her own behalf 
K03_Organisation - ('DGB') including spokespersons. 
K04_Representative(s) - ('X, the President of France') but no spokespersons. 
K98_None – no identifiable addressee. 
 
Table A12: Addressee type category in the PCA 
Addressee 
type\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Unorganised 0 2 19 2 
Individual 5 10 24 12 
Organisation 93 93 190 52 
Representative 19 16 37 4 
None 250 130 403 103 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
L_Addressee Scope 
L01_Global 
L02_Regional_EU 
L03_Regional_Other 
L04_National 
L05_Local 
L97_Unclear 
L98_None 
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Table A13: Addressee scope category in the PCA 
Addressee 
scope\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Global 0 1 3 2 
Regional_EU 15 19 90 30 
Regional_other 0 0 10 3 
National 101 101 117 27 
Local 1 0 37 4 
Unclear 0 0 13 4 
None 250 130 403 103 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
M_Addressee Function  
M01_International_Organisation 
M02_European_Commission 
M03_European_Council 
M04_European_Parliament 
M05_IO-agency 
M06_IO-bank 
M07_IO-court 
M08_Government 
M09_Legislative 
M10_Judiciary 
M11_Business 
M12_Trade_union 
M13_Religious Actor 
M14_Civil_Society 
M15_Citizens/People 
M16_Experts/scientists 
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M17_Public_Figure 
M18_Other_politician/party 
M19_Media/Journalist 
M20_ECB (euro) 
M21_Polity 
M23_Private_finance (Euro) 
M25_Migrants_refugees (migration) 
M98_Other 
M99_None 
 
Table A14: Addressee type category in the PCA 
Addressee 
function\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
International 
organisation 
4 4 22 4 
European Commission 4 3 6 5 
European Council 1 0 3 2 
European Parliament 0 0 0 1 
IO-agency 0 0 0 1 
IO-court 0 0 0 0 
Government 64 63 104 16 
Legislative 8 1 7 1 
Judiciary 0 1 0 0 
Bureaucracy 0 0 1 1 
Business 3 1 0 0 
Trade unions 0 1 0 0 
Religious actor 1 0 4 0 
Civil society 0 0 3 0 
Citizen/people 4 10 6 3 
Experts/scientists 1 0 1 1 
Public figure 0 0 0 0 
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Other politician/party 3 1 1 0 
Media/journalist 1 1 0 2 
ECB (euro) 1 4 0 0 
Polity 22 26 80 25 
Private finance (Euro) 0 5 0 0 
Migrants/refugees 
(migration) 
0 0 20 7 
Police/military 
(migration) 
0 0 1 0 
Other 0 0 10 1 
None 250 130 404 103 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
 
N_Addressee Nationality 
Euro crisis 
N01_Germany 
N02_Ireland 
N03_Greece 
N04_Slovakia 
N05_Spain 
N06_Cyprus 
N07_Poland 
N08_Portugal 
N09_Great_Britain 
N10_Italy 
N11_France 
N12_Hungary 
N13_Luxemburg 
N94_European - any European institution or organisation related to the European context 
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N95_Multinational – international organisation (United Nations, Amnesty International etc., 
location of headquarter/stock exchange registration for companies) 
N98_Unclear 
N99_None 
 
Migration crisis 
N01_Germany 
N02_Ireland 
N04_Greece 
N05_Italy 
N06_Malta 
N07_Hungary 
N08_Netherlands 
N09_Syria 
N11_Sweden 
N12_Great Britain 
N13_Nigeria 
N15_Luxembourg 
N90_other_Africa 
N91_other_Europe 
N92_other_Latin_America 
N94_European - any European institution or organisation related to the European context 
N95_Multinational – international organisation (United Nations, Amnesty International etc., 
location of headquarter/stock exchange registration for companies) 
N98_Unclear 
N99_None 
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Table A15: Addressee nationality category in the PCA 
Addressee 
nationality\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Germany 43 17 78 4 
Ireland 0 37 0 13 
Greece 43 38 2 0 
Slovakia 3 3 0 0 
Spain 5 1 0 0 
Cyprus 3 1 0 0 
Poland 0 1 0 0 
Portugal 0 2 0 0 
Great Britain 0 1 2 2 
Italy 1 0 27 2 
France 2 0 0 0 
Hungary 1 0 13 1 
Luxembourg 1 0 2 0 
Malta (migration) 0 0 2 0 
Netherlands (migration) 0 0 1 1 
Syria (migration) 0 0 1 1 
Sweden (migration) 0 0 1 0 
Nigeria (migration) 0 0 1 0 
Other African countries 
(migration) 
0 0 1 0 
Other European 
countries (migration) 
0 0 6 5 
Other Latin American 
countries (migration) 
0 0 1 0 
European 13 16 82 26 
Multinational 1 4 48 15 
Unclear 1 0 3 0 
None 250 130 402 103 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
 221 
P_Addressee Party 
P01_CDU 
P02_SPD 
P03_FDP 
P04_Die_Linke 
P05_Bündnis_90/Die_Grünen 
P06_Piratenpartei 
P07_NPD 
P08_AfD 
P09_CSU 
P10_Fianna_Fáil 
P11_Fine_Gael 
P12_Labour_Party 
P13_Sinn_Féin 
P14_Socialist_Party 
P15_Green_Party 
P16_other 
P17_general_partisan  
P18_socialist  
P19_green  
P20_social democrat  
P21_liberal 
P22_conservative  
P23_far right 
P24_general_partisan_German – German government is addressed in the claim 
P25_general_partisan_Irish – Irish government is addressed in the claim 
P26_general_partisan_Greek – Greek government is addressed in the claim 
P98_none 
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Table A16: addressee party category in the PCA 
Addressee 
party\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
CDU 9 8 12 1 
SPD 2 0 13 0 
FDP 0 0 0 0 
Die Linke 0 0 0 0 
Die Grünen 0 0 3 0 
Piratenpartei 0 0 0 0 
NPD 0 0 0 0 
AfD 2 0 1 0 
CSU 2 1 10 0 
Fianna Fáil 0 5 0 0 
Fine Gael 0 3 0 0 
Labour Party 0 0 0 0 
Sinn Féin 0 0 0 0 
Socialist Party 0 0 0 0 
Green Party 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 1 0 
General partisan 3 4 51 13 
German general 
partisan (euro) 
21 8 - - 
Irish general 
partisan (euro) 
0 12 - - 
Greek general 
partisan (euro) 
11 17 - - 
Socialist 7 1 0 0 
Green 0 0 0 0 
Social democrat 12 2 5 0 
Liberal 0 0 0 0 
Conservative 5 5 9 2 
Far right 1 1 2 1 
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None 292 184 566 156 
Total 367 251 673 173 
Note: The sub-codes ‘German general partisan’, ‘Irish general partisan’ and ‘Greek general partisan’ 
have only been coded for the Euro crisis discourse. 
 
Q_ Evaluation of Addressee 
This variable captures the opinion of the claimant about the addressee. If the addressee is 
supported, it is coded ‘positive’. If the addressee is criticised by the claimant, it is coded 
‘negative’. If there is an addressee, but no clear opinion about him/her, the coding is neutral. 
If there is no addressee, ‘none’ is coded. 
Q01_Positive 
Q02_Neutral 
Q03_Negative 
Q99_None 
 
Table A17: Addressee evaluation category in the PCA 
Addressee 
evaluation\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Positive 25 28 20 5 
Neutral 30 46 89 32 
Negative 62 47 157 32 
None 250 130 407 104 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
8.3.6 Framing 
R_position –claimant’s evaluation of the issue (core category) 
R01_pro_solidarity – the claimant takes a cooperative stand, s/he/it wants to help other 
people or countries 
R02_contra_solidarity – claimant acts egoistic, rejects calls to solidarity 
R03_neutral – claimant is neither pro nor contra explicitly or argues for both sides 
 224 
Table A18: Position category in the PCA 
Position\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Pro 285 199 493 137 
Contra 61 26 144 32 
Neutral 21 26 36 4 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
S_justification 
Rainer Forst (1999) states that every human being has the moral right to justification. Every 
action of a government, a collective actor or an individual has to be justified to those 
influenced by the action. Robert Entman makes a similar claim in regard to framing. 
Judgements and “suggested remedies” should be taken into account to understand the 
intend of the statement (Entman 1993: 52). In my project, the justification is understood as 
such a judgement and proposed solution. This means that a claimant should not only have a 
position about an issue, but should also provide a justification why s/he claims X or Y. 
However, this is not a core category, because many actors demand something without giving 
reasons (de Wilde et al. 2014). 
S01_cultural_solidarity – based on common religious traditions, same language, cultural 
norms, universal moral claims 
S02_social_solidarity – reference to redistribution, welfare benefits or neighbourhood 
support 
S03_monetary_solidarity – based on financial support and financial risk-sharing 
S04_political_solidarity – acting together in political contexts to create new modes of 
cooperation (instruments, policies, laws). 
S06_economic_solidarity – support or help in an economic sense in the EU or in certain 
economic sectors 
S07_legal_solidarity – different than S09, because it claims solidarity based on legal 
regulations (e. g. EU directive 2001 to help other member states if they face danger, severe 
problems, sanctuary) 
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S08_misuse_of_solidarity – since another actor claims solidarity in a wrong way/for a wrong 
reason, the claimant does not want to show solidarity 
S09_legal_regulations – bound by legal rules, having to act in a certain way (Dublin III-
Regulations) 
S10_economic_prosperity - to foster wealth, prosperity, richness, economic growth (euro) 
S11_sovereignty – claiming unrestricted authority on (national) territority, no external 
intervention in domestic state issues (euro) 
S12_justice – fair treatment of people (euro) 
S13_necessity – acting without personal conviction, but because s/he has to 
S14_self-interest – acts only in own interests, does not care about others 
S15_financial_solidity/stability – focus on austerity measures 
S16_responsibility – a moral duty to act 
S17_conditionality – action takes place only under predefined circumstance 
S18_distrust – does not trust other people/countries and what they do (migration) 
S19_security – secure borders, border surveillance, fight against terrorism (migration) 
S20_demarcation – against any crossing of borders of people, opening borders for refugees or 
helping asylum seekers (migration) 
S21_social_cohesion– support or declining help because social cohesion has to be preserved 
(migration) 
S80_other 
S98_none 
 
Table A19: Justification category in the PCA 
justification\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
Cultural solidarity 20 11 80 30 
Social solidarity 10 20 46 20 
Monetary solidarity 40 30 26 5 
Political solidarity 21 13 166 62 
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Economic solidarity 21 11 6 0 
Legal solidarity 3 4 9 2 
Misuse of solidarity 21 11 11 1 
Legal regulations 6 2 23 2 
Economic prosperity 5 3 8 0 
Sovereignty 4 0 13 9 
Justice 3 5 23 2 
Necessity 18 8 0 0 
Self-interest 17 8 4 1 
Financial solidity 63 17 0 0 
Responsibility 10 23 0 0 
Conditionality 8 14 0 0 
Distrust 0 0 1 1 
Security 0 0 42 14 
Demarcation 0 0 51 6 
Social cohesion 0 0 23 2 
Other 2 2 24 1 
None 95 69 117 15 
Total 367 251 673 173 
 
 
T_Justification scale 
The justification scale elaborates the justification category. Claiming solidarity (or not) does 
not automatically reveal for whom solidarity is claimed. The justification scope focuses on 
who is included in the claim for or against solidarity. Does the solidarity claim only include 
the national community, does the demand to act in solidarity refer to EU member states or to 
refugee groups and open borders movements? The category shall capture these different 
notions of justificatory claims. 
T01_national(exclusionary) – refers to national community and national politics 
T02_international_intergovernmental_EU – justification refers to EU member states (either 
one specific or a group of EU member states or the Council of the EU) 
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T03_transnational_supranational_EU – refers to the EU as a polity 
T04_ transnational_with_specific_group – refers to specific social groups such as Syrian 
refugees, religious minorities, LGBT-activists, political dissidents, but does not refer to the 
general category of 'refugees and asylum seekers' 
T05_local 
T03_global – refers to the global community or global institutions (migration) 
T04__transnational_migrants_refugees – it refers to migrants/refugees (migration) 
T05_ international_countries of origin –home countries of migrants/refugees (supporting the 
economy of home countries instead of opening borders and giving asylum to refugees) 
(migration) 
T07_ international_North Africa –countries in North Africa who are often addressed with 
regard to refugee movements, crossing the Mediterranean and arriving in Europe (e. g. 
Tunisia or Libya) (migration) 
T08_ transnational_EU citizens – widens the T01 scope by especially referring to citizens of 
the EU as “we” standing together to help (each other) (migration) 
T09_transnational_Irish emigrants – in the migration situation, the claim is concerned about 
the Irish emigrants and how they are affected by the crisis (migration) 
T10_international_conflict zone countries – support for those countries who are close to a 
conflict zone, have to deal with many migrants, refugee camps (e. g. Libanon) (migration) 
T11_national_diverse population (inclusionary) – referring to a multiculturalist society that 
needs or provides solidarity (migration) 
T80_other 
T98_none 
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Table A20: Justification scope category in the PCA 
Scale\crisis 
Euro crisis 
Germany 
Euro crisis 
Ireland 
Migration crisis 
Germany 
Migration crisis 
Ireland 
National(exclusionary) 39 43 105 25 
International 
intergovernmental EU 
178 118 216 62 
Transnational 
supranational EU 
37 13 0 0 
Transnational with 
specific group 
0 0 26 2 
Local 1 0 0 0 
Global 0 0 3 1 
Transnational migrants 
refugees 
0 0 153 56 
International countries 
of origin 
0 0 9 1 
International North 
Africa 
0 0 8 0 
Transnational EU 
citizens 
16 7 5 1 
Transnational Irish 
emigrants 
0 0 0 2 
International conflict 
zone countries 
0 0 10 4 
National diverse 
population(inclusionary) 
0 0 10 2 
Other 1 1 11 2 
None 95 69 117 15 
Total 367 251 673 173 
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